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This study examines the attempts by the government of Kenya to
develop and implement policies directed toward the problem of urban
unemployment.

Specifically, it focuses upon two policy areas directly

related to urban unemployment:

education and economic growth.

An

additional element of this study is to examine the possible consequences
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of Kenya's external dependency upon the linkages among education,
economic growth, and employment opportunities.
Throughout the 1960's, the main problem in the educational
sector of developing societies as perceived by planners, politicians,
and theorists, related primarily to the challenge of producing numbers
of educated people to promote a rapid localization of jobs and to sustain the high rate of economic growth which were believed necessary for
development.

The policy prescriptions involved a dramatic quantitative

expansion of school enrollments.

This was understandable and inevitable

in view of the dramatic manpower shortages which existed at the time of
independence.
In recent years, however, these efforts at expanding educational
opportunities for the people of Kenya have resulted in widespread
unemployment of school graduates.

The dynamic rate of economic growth

and a forceful campaign of Kenyanization have not been successful in
creating sufficient employment to meet the growing numbers of Kenyan
students who believe themselves qualified for gainful employment.

The

problem is particularly significant in the city of Nairobi, where the
African population is increasing through births and migration by over
10% per year.

In contrast, the tiny increase in employment is scarcely

noticed.
In an attempt to resolve the problem of unemployment among graduates, governmental policies in Kenya were directed toward improving
various components of the school system, such as examination content
and procedures, curriculum, and vocational and technical education.
Policymakers believed that the mismatch between education and employment
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was the cause of graduates lacking marketable skills to secure the
needed employment.

However, the impact of these educational strat-

agies in solving the unemployment problem has been extremely limited.
Thus, any attempt to trace the causes of graduate unemployment
in Kenya rapidly leads to an analysis of the entire socio-economic
structure and touches on almost every element of development stratagies.

A major factor is Kenya's dependency on external economic

forces, which influence and constrain its actions by controlling the
amount of resources available to it and the distribution of political
power.

The evidence presented in this study points to the continued

vulnerability and limitations of the Kenyan economy imposed by its
periphery role ",lithin the world economic system.
While changes in curriculum and in the examination system may
be expected to bring educational benefits, it is unrealistic to suppose that such changes alone will improve the employment prospects of
graduates in the labor market.

The results of this study suggest

that the roots of the unemployment problem are in the structure of
society, and particularly in the failure of the Kenyan economy to
industrialize and modernize at a rate that absorbs the labor force.
These economic problems are traced to Kenya's continued dependency on
external economic assistance, which reduces its ability to determine
the course of national development independently.

This economic prob-

lem is of such a magnitude that it can only be solved by structural
adjustments, both internally and externally.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The main purpose of this study is to investigate those socioeconomic, historical, and political factors which best explain the
sources of graduate unemployment in Kenya.

In the academic research,

education and economic growth are generally agreed upon to be central
components of national development, particularly as they relate to
the expansion of employment opportunities. However, current thinking
on national development does not agree as to the interrelationships
between these variables and, as a result, there is a divergence of
opinion concerning the type of developmental approaches which should
be taken to resolve the unemployment problem.

This study is an

attempt to empirically verify the historical roots of the prevailing
social problem of graduate unemployment and Kenya's attempt to address
it.
In order to gain a better understanding of the problem, it is
necessary to examine the socio-economic evolution of Kenya in very
broad outline form, starting from the early colonial intrusion of
the country.

This is justified because the present economic, social,

and institutional (educational) structure of the country has characteristics whose origins date from different key formative periods: (a)
the incorporation of Kenya into the international economy through the
process of colonialism (1846-1963); (b) the shaping of Kenya's social
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relations as the country's links with the international economy
changed in the context of decolonization (1950-63); and (c) the
performance of the post-independence Kenyan economy as shaped by
internal and external interplay.

These externally-manipulated

historical changes led to some structural economic changes and
much institutional continuity in the post-independence period.
The central task of this study, is, therefore, to determine to what
extent dependency conditions the relationship between the educational
system and the economy and distorts manpower planning in Kenya.

THE PROBLEM
Kenya, unlike many African countries, has enjoyed a relatively
high rate of growth (well over 6% per annum between 1964-70) and is
regarded as a model of economic development for other African states.
However, a closer examination of the Kenyan economy reveals many
sources of potential conflict which have not been addressed by
policies which emphasize economic growth.

Central to the urban unem-

ployment problem is the potential conflict arising out of a rapidly
growing number of school leavers* on the one hand, and on the other,
the limited opportunities for a sufficient level of employment for
this segment of the labor force.

In the first few years after inde-

pendence, the problem was confined to the primary school leavers.

* In the context of Africa, the tenn "school leaver" refers to three
categories of students: those who complete a certain level of education (primary or secondary) but are unable to continue due to a
lack of school opportunities; those who drop out for any reason; and
those who graduate.
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But since the early 1970's, secondary and technical school graduates
and increasing numbers of university graduates have been experiencing
difficulties in securing employment.

The school certificate is no

more a guarantee of economic success for the majority of Kenyan students.
What are the factors that condition the paradox of a developing
country such as Kenya which clearly needs more educated manpower, but
is unable to use it when it becomes readily available?
at fault?

Is education

Has it expanded too rapidly? Has it produced the wrong

kind of manpower? Or does the fault lie e1sewhere--perhaps in the
economy, or in economic development policies and plans? This study
attempts to untangle the complexity of the problem by raising some
important questions, taking into account the social, economic, and
political predicament in which the nation of Kenya finds itself.
LITERATURE REVIEW
For the past three decades, Western development theorists have
been enthusiastic about the contribution of education to economic
development and employment opportunities in developing nations.

Stu-

dents of socio-economic development emphasize education as an
agent of sociocultural change that develops human capital, influences
the formation of elites, and modernizes attitudes and behavior in the
general population (GR4; GR67).

Economists and governmental officials

have also emphasized that education can produce the knowledge and
skills required for economic development (GR45; GR54; GR61; GR139).
Based on this assessment, many developing countries have concentrated
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on expanding the educational system from primary school through
the university.

For example, primary school enrollments in Ghana

almost tripled between 1960 and 1970.

In Gambia and Botswana, enroll-

ments more than doubled between 1960 and 1970.

In Kenya. Zambia, and

Sierra-Leone, enrollments nearly doubled during that same period
(GR37: 20-21). This development suggests not only a general rise
in the level of literacy. but also substantial increases in access to
educational opportunities for Africans.
In recent years, however, serious questions have been raised
which challenge some of the traditional assumptions about the effects
of education on economic growth and social mobility (GR29; for US, see
GR19 and GR71). The efforts to rapidly expand educational opportunities have not been without problems.

Despite the heavy investment in

education, unemployment of school 1eavers has become a matter of growing concern--even political discontent--in many cases, as these
developing countries do not have sufficient employment for school
graduates (GR1; GR52; GR59).

Even in the early 1960's, Archibo1d

Callaway found that unemployment among primary school 1eavers in
Nigeria had reached serious proportions (GR26).

A more recent report

found that in Western Nigeria, 41% of the primary school 1eavers were
without employment nine months after leaving school (GR43).

In

Kenya, a 1968 tracer Project indicated that of a total of 1,186
secondary school 1eavers, 175 (14%) remained unemployed in their first
year after school.

The remaining 1eavers were distributed as follows:

513 (45%) undertook further education, 394 (33%) were employed. and
the remaining 86 (7%) were untraced (GR88).

In the 1975 Certificate
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of Primary Education examination (ePE), of 220,000 candidates,
approximately 150,000 (68%) failed to gain admission to secondary
schools.

Of these, some found work; others jOined the ranks of the

unemployed.

This growing problem suggests that the further rapid

expansion of formal education beyond the literacy level without constructive efforts to create meaningful employment opportunities is
likely to generate political as well as educational unrest.
The unemployment situation among school leavers has worsened
in Kenya since 1968, for two reasons.

First, there is a paucity of

secondary school openings for those who want to continue further in
their education, even though the demand for education has increased.
Secondly, despite an impressive rate of growth in the GNP (6% per
annum between 1960-70), employment in the modern sector of the economy
has not been growing in a direction that would absorb the thousands
of school leavers.

The policy measures which should be adopted to

resolve this developmental dilemma are the subjects of heated and sometimes bitter arguments.
Two contrasting approaches are frequently discussed in the literature to analyze the development and underdevelopment of Third World
nations.

The first is embraced by the "diffusion model ," which sug-

gests that the development of areas such as Africa will come about
only through closer association with the developed countries of the
West in a much more comprehensive technological, even ideological,
sense.

The second explanation, incorporated into the "dependency

model ," views foreign penetration into the political and economic
structure of the Third World as a conditioning factor and implies
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that development can occur only if both internal structures and
Third World relations with other nations undergo a complete change.
The purpose of this critical literature review is twofold:
(1) to outline the various explanations offered by these two approaches
regarding the relationship between education, economic growth and
employment; and (2) to examine the extent to which the dependency
relationship has influenced the structuring of post-independence
Kenyan society and the degree to which it conditions manpower planning.
The Diffusionist Perspective and the National Development Experience
in Africa
During the 1950's and early 1960's, one of the major doctrines
of the development literature was that successful economic development
in Third World countries could be realized only through substantial
capital accumulation and rapid industrial growth (GR4; GR136).

Rapid

growth, it was argued, is the surest means of increasing tne standard
of 1ivinq for most, if not all, members of society.
In addition to emphasis placed on economic growth as the key
process in development, social scientists paid particular attention
to the spread of the social, cultural, and political patterns of
modernity established by the developed countries of the West, such as
education, political parties, and urbanization (GR4; GR67).

It

was suggested that rapid growth in all of these areas would inevitably
transform Third World nations into modern states.

Based on these

assumptions, social scientists looked to identify the proper "inputs of
modernity," which, if installed in Third World countries, would ensure
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the progressive "stages" necessary for "take-off" (GR136).

This

view constituted the basis on which Kenya's development strategies
have been created.
In order to help Third World nations such as Kenya improve their
economic performance, flows of foreign aid and investment were
channelled to them from the West.

.

This policy was further reinforced

-

by bilateral and multilateral aie agencies such as the World Bank
and the United Nations, which set growth targets and devised performance indicators on the basis of which assistance was allocated (GR34).
In many instances, growth rates did accelerate, and the tempo of
expansion was much faster than once thought possible.

For example,

the Kenyan economy experienced a relatively rapid rate of growth of
real monetary GDP--well over 6% per annum for

19~4-70

(KG7. 1971).

As a result of this trend, the average 5% growth target of the First
United Nations Development Decade (1960-70) was achieved quite
readily, and accordingly, the target was raised to 6% for the Second
Development Decade (1970-80).

As this study will demonstrate, an

inevitable consequence of the emphasis on growth has been the mushrooming of urban centers resulting from an accelerated influx of both
educated and uneducated workers in search of scarce urban jobs.
Unfortunately, optimistic predictions regarding the ability of the
modern industrial sector to absorb these migrants have not been realized.

In actuality, the failure of the modern urban industries to

generate a significant number of employment opportunities is one of
the most obvious failures of the development process over the past
two decades.
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The realization that growth does not necessarily mean development has led to a re-examination of the development process itself
in at least two important respects.

First, the traditional argument

that rapid growth is a necessary condition for higher standards of
living for the masses has been retrospectively criticized on the
grounds that growing inequality now is too high a price to pay for
a future higher aggregate output.

Proponents of this view urge that

the goals of development planning or policymaking be redefined to
include reduced inequality as well as increased output; if necessary,
some growth should be sacrificed to achieve a better distribution of
available output (GR2; GR2l; GR33; GR69).

The re-examination process

has also obviated the logic that without growth, there will be little
to redistribute, now or later; many planners and academicians have
begun to ask whether there aren't better ways to grow.

This, in turn,

has given new impetus to a fundamental debate over the sources of
development or underdevelopment and the extent to which inequality is
a necessary concomitant of growth.
Education and Development:

The Human Capital Approach

A prominent feature of deliberate progress in modernization is an
emphasis on formal education.

Students of socio-economic development

emphasize education as an agent of change that develops human capital,
influences the formation of elites, and modernizes attitudes and behavior in the general population (GR1; GR4; GR67).

Economists and

government officials have emphasized that education can produce the
knowledge and skills required for economic development (GR18; GRGR20;
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GR61; GR139).

Thus, a consistent theme contained in the human

capital literature is that accelerated development depends upon
enlargement of the supply of educated manpower which, in turn,
depends on a broadening of access to a formal educational system.
This logic seems straightforward.

Developing nations such

as Kenya were deficient in their supply of skilled manpower at the
time of independence.

Without such manpower, which it was assumed

could be created only through the formal educational system, development leadership in both the public and private sectors would be
woefully lacking, and economic growth would be retarded.

Rapid

quantitative expansion of enrollments, therefore, appeared justified
in light of the substantial manpower scarcities of the early 1960·5.
As a result, Kenya and other developing countries have concentrated
their attention on the rapid quantitative expansion of the educational
system from primary school through the university.
The role of education in the development process has been
clearly articulated by economist, Theodore Schultz (GR139) and is
incorporated in what is known as the human capital theory, an offspring of the diffusion theory.

The emphasis of this theory is on

the development of knowledge, skills, and capacities to improve the
rate of societal economic progress.

The task of translating this

theory into application in underdeveloped countries was strongly
influenced by the work of economists such as Mark Blaug (GR18),
Frederick Harbison and Charley Meyers (GR61), and Mary Jean Bowman
(GR20). The human capital theory suggests that:
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The nations of the Third World were poor not because
of international economic relations, but because of
internal characteristics, most notably, their lack of
human capital. As with the poor within the advanced
countries, nothing in the situation of the Third
World countries called for radical structural change;
development was possible if only they would improve
the quality of their woefully inadequate human resources.
(GR8D: 15)
The proponents of this school of thought argued that the rapid
recovery of Western Europe with American capital through the Marshall
Plan could be largely attributed to the existence of a ready pool of
qualified manpower.

Hence, less developed countries, lacking in the

"knowledge and superior technique of production," should be provided
with aid and technical assistance to increase the quality of their
human capital, which would result in their achieving self-sustaining
growth (GR80: 15).

Development, in this sense, means an educated

society and an educated labor force.

Subsequently, international

organizations (World Bank, ILO, UNESCO) and foundations (Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation) responded to this perceived need by
channeling their funds into educational and training programs in
underdeve10ped countries.

As Kinyanjui succinctly put it,

What American capital had done in Western Europe was
expected to happen in underdeveloped countries if they
invested more in the development of their human resources and more foreign capital was channelled into
these countries.
(GR86: 7)
In their well known study, Education, Manpower, and Economic
Growth (GR6l), Harbison and Meyers stressed the point that the appraisal
of human capital is a logical starting point for analysis of growth
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and modernization in underdeveloped countries.

They argued that

education, in addition to being a form of consumption, is also an
individually and socially productive investment which contributes to
economic growth.

According to Harbison:

Human resources constitute the ultimate basis for the
wealth of nations. Capital and natural resources are
passive factors of production; human beings are the
active agents who accumulate capital, exploit natural
resources, build social, economic and political organizations, and carry forward national developments.
Clearly, a country which is unable to develop the skills
and knowledge of its people and to utilize them effectively in the national economy will be unable to
develop anything else.
(GR6l: 3)
This approach to development was echoed in African countries in
the years immediately after independence and, to a large extent,
accounts for the rapid expansion of higher education in the 1960's
(GR56; GR72).

The result of such expansion has been ever-burgeoning

educational budgets in most developing countries.

It is estimated

that, on the average, 16% of the national budgets of developing countries are now being spent on education.

Between 1960 and 1970, the

annual growth rate in educational expenditure was 13% in Asia, 16%
in Africa, and 20% in Latin America (GR26: 14).

Many countries, in-

cluding Kenya, allocate as high as 30% of their government's
expenditure for education (GR37: 21).
The influence of the human capital approach on the study of
education and development in Kenya is clearly evident from an
examination of various documents (both official and unofficial) that
have been published since independence.

The predominant themes of
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these documents are:

(1) that education must foster a sense of

nationhood and promote national unity; and (2) that education must
provide the skills and knowledge required for national development.
These views are expressed in the Kenya Education Commission Report
of 1964 (better known as the Omindi Report), the 1970-74 Development
Plan, and the Report on the Educational Goals and Objectives of 1976.
The result of this policy has been the tremendous quantitative expansion of the educational system from primary school through the university.
As a result, the educational budget now consumes nearly 30% of the total governmental expenditure (KG6, 1980).

Thus, money and resources

were channelled into tremendous expansion of a system still largely
cast in a colonial mold.

Fundamental changes of structure, curricu-

lum, examination, and, indeed, the whole style and approach of the
educational system were postponed.
In recent years, however, the idea that conventional educational
expansion beyond literacy is an unmitigated social good and an engine
for development has been fundamentally challenged.

In the present

context, the most crucial challenge is taking the form of growing
open unemployment in urban areas.

Although the evidence is fragmentary,

the following examples provide indications of the problem.

In the

late 1960's, the rates of urban unemployment in the 15-24 age group
reached tremendously high percentages:

40.4% in Guyana, 39.3% in

Algeria, 39% in Jamaica and Sri Lanka, 21% in Malaysia, and 22% in
Ghana (GR15l: 48-50).

This trend suggests that the further rapid

expansion of formal education beyond the literacy level without constructive efforts to create meaningful employment opportunities is
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likely to generate political as well as educational unrest.
Since gaining independence, Kenya has experienced economic
growth largely continued on the lines set by the earlier colonial
structure.
quences.

Such continuity in policy has had two related conseOn the one hand, this growth has resulted in a rapid rate

of real monetary GOP, well over 6% per annum for 1964-70 (KG7, 1971).
Kenya's greatest advantage has been in the manufacturing sector,
which, for example, accounted for 13% of GOP in 1979 (KG6, 1980).
On the other hand, the so-called "Kenyan miracle" of the 1960's has
not resulted in a similar expansion of employment opportunities to
absorb the thousands of unemployed Kenyans, including school leavers.
Instead, there have been serious inequalities of income among regions
and social groups.

These sharp inequalities inevitably create strong

ambitions to migrate to the cities, to strive for higher education,
to search for jobs.

These structural characteristics, from the main

thrust of development, constitute the basic weakness of the economy
and militate against the effective development of the country.
Originally, the goal of the educational policy in postcolonial
Kenya was the production of skilled manpower.

However, \'Ihen faced

with the problem of unemployment of school leavers whose aspirations
are oriented to urban jobs and an urban way of life, the human capital theorists have been critical of education for being dysfunctional
in the sense of inculcating wrong values.

To correct this perceived

developmental problem, the task of the educational system was reoriented,
not only to produce skills and knowledge required for high-level manpower, but also to indoctrinate school leavers to settle down in the
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rural countryside as subsistance farmers and self-employed artisans.

The vocational and nonformal education programs introduced in

Kenya since the early 1970's are intended to achieve this goal.

But,

as discussed in Chapter IV, many of these educational reforms solved
an immediate political problem by offering a new outlet for the
economic aspirations in Kenya.

The impact of these educational

strategies on the employment prospects of school leavers has been
severely limited by the restricted market for technical and vocational
skills in the country.
A Critique of Diffusion and Human Capital Theories
Many of the early claims made on behalf of the unfettered quantitative expansion of educational opportunities--that it would accelerate economic growth; that it would raise levels of living, especially
for the poor; that it would generate widespread and equal employment opportunities for all--have been shown to be greatly exaggerated
and, in many instances, simply false (GR19; GR29; GR71).

The most

devastating challenge has been the glaring poverty of Third World
countries despite three decades of developmental efforts.

The failures

of foreign aid and Western technology to transform these countries,
the growing disparities between the rich and the poor, the relative
poverty of Third World nations in the international community, and the
rising unemployment of the educated in these countries demonstrate
clearly the analytical weakness of the diffusion and human capital
approaches.

These theoretical formulations neglected the structure

and patterns of economic growth and their distributional implications.
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They failed to properly identify the actual beneficiaries of
economic development.
By far the most crucial weakness of the diffusionist model
is its inability to address itself to structural problems of underdevelopment.

The theoretical framework contributes very little to

constructing explanations of change based on factors residing outside
the national boundaries of Third World nations.

The problems

associated with imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism in the
emergence of Third World countries are not given the attention
they deserve.

A somewhat more complex analysis is required--one which

stresses many other factors of both an economic and a noneconomic
nature.
Alternative Explanations:

Dependency and "Revised Dependency"

Dependency theory has gradually emerged as a major alternative
to the prevailing paradigm of the 1960's.

The primary focus of depen-

dency analysis is on the problem of foreign penetration into the
political economies of Third World nations (GR53; GR138; GR148).

The

basic hypothesis of the Dependency Theory is that development and
underdevelopment are partial, interdependent structures of one global
system.

Dos Santos, for example, conceptualizes dependence as a con-

ditioning situation which determines the range of options open to
po1icymakers:
By dependence we mean a si, tuati on in whi ch the economy
of certain countries is conditioned by the development
and expansion of another economy to which the former is
sUbjected. The relationship of interdependence assumes
the form of dependence where some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and be self-sustaining; while
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other countries (the dependent ones) can do this
as a reflection of that expansion, which can have
either a positive or negative effect on their
immediate development.
(GR138: 109)

The conditioning process referred to by Dos Santos has its
origin in the expansion of capitalism into the underdeveloped world
over the last several centuries.

The most significant consequence

of the Western impact upon Third World societies was the fusion of
market and social structures through the establishment of the international division of labor (GR13; GR53).

Colonial areas became a

source of cheap raw materials as well as a market for manufactured
exports and investment capital from the West.

This characteristic

remains the basic foundation of the economic relationship between
the developed and developing countries to this day.

An understand-

ing of dependency, therefore, requires an analysis of economic
relationships in the capitalist countries of the West and their
expansion to the Third World, and the compromises and collusions among
the various international and national elements which create the
dependent situation.
Dependency theory is probably most closely identified with the
work of Andre Gunder Frank.

In his book, Capitalism and Underdevelop-

ment in Latin America (GR53), Frank argues that the development and
expansion of capitalism in the periphery began and furthers an unequal
and combined development of its constitutive parts.

Growth is unequal

because dependent nations can only grow as a reflection of the expansion
of dominant nations.

He refers to development as "combined" because it
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is the combination of inequalities plus the transfer of a significant
part of the economic surplus produced in the Third World to developed
countries which explains inequality, deepens it, and transforms it
into a necessary and structural element of the world economy.

Thus.

capitalist expansion creates underdevelopment by concentrating wealth
at one pole--the metropolis--and poverty at the other--the satellite
(GR53: 6).

These internal and external dimensions of metropolis-

satellite relations are structurally similar, interlocked. and mutually
consistent.

In Frank's view. these relationships are crucial factors

shaping the political and economic systems of Third World nations.
The economic and socio-political connections between satellites
and the metropolis create mutually beneficial links between local
elites and external interests that give the former a vested interest
in the preservation of the status quo.

Even after decolonization.

the national elite of Third World countries pursued a policy of
"accomodation" with the former colonial masters in order to maintain
access to capital, technology. skilled cadres, and markets (GR137).
Many of these leaders still view such institutional continuities as
necessary for their immediate goal of rapid economic growth.

Conse-

quently. they reject major structural changes in the inherited economic
system so as to avoid a disruption of their valued connections with the
West.
For dependency theorists, the outcome of the above described
historical process is an asymmetrical structure of relations between
the metropolitan and satellite states, accounting for the widening
gap in levels of development between them.

Because of its historical
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perspective, the notion of dependency has come to be uniquely
associated with international capitalism.

This literature has

been criticized on the grounds that dependency theory cannot explain
imperialistic relations among socialist countries, as in the case of
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (131).

However, Finley's (GR49)

preliminary research on Economic Linkage and Political Dependency in
Eastern Europe contradicts Ray's premature conclusion.

Finley con-

cludes that Eastern European dependence on the USSR both reinforces
and complicates the overarching system of political dependence.
cent political events in Poland support Finley's position.

Re-

This

suggests that dependency reduces the capacity of governments to determine the course of national development autonomously, irrespective of
their ideological orientation.

And to the extent that African nations

remain dependent upon foreign trade, foreign investment, and foreign
assistance for the creation of wealth and the provision of goods and
services, demand and decisions adopted in the developed economies of
the West become permanent inputs into the national policymaking process.

Under such conditions, dependent nations have little prospect

of self-sustained economic growth.
Relevance of Dependency Analysis for Africa and Kenya
The Frankian notion that underdevelopment is a logical outcome
of an ongoing historical process has received widespread acceptance
among such Africanists as Rodney (GR134), Amin (GR5), Leys (GR105,
GR106), and Arrighi and Saul (GRll).

They argue that the incorpora-

tion of Africa into the emerging world capitalist economy, first
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through a direct colonial administration and then, more subtly,
through free trade, ensures that African production is geared towards
producing exports for the dominant economies of the West.

The politi-

cal and social system also ensures that the gains from this production
are divided among a small African class (who use much of their gain
for importing luxury consumer products rather than diversifying investments) and the dominant metropolitan countries.

In the present context,

this external relationship both threatens and inhibits autonomous
and self-sustaining growth.
Since the mid-1970's, Kenya, as well as the Ivory Coast and
Nigeria, has become the subject of intense scholarly investigation
which has spurred a major academic debate.

One school of analysts

has interpreted the country's performance in terms of a dependency
framework, stressing widening inequalities and structural segmentation,
and relating these elements to the growing ties with foreign capital
which have marked postcolonial Kenya (GR 76 ; GR100; GR105).

Another

school, mainly "revised dependentistas," have challenged this view,
stressing the role in Kenya of an increasingly powerful indigenous
capitalist class, in effective control of the Kenyan state and leading
a relatively dynamic capitalist transformation in the country (GR106;
GR149).

This debate has been significant because of its relevance to

more general theoretical and strategic concerns regarding the economic
prospect of "periphery capitalism" and the usefulness of a dependency
perspective.
The groundbreaking study on dependence and underdevelopment in
Kenya is Colin Leys's Underdevelopment in Kenya, The Political Economy
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of Neo-colonialism (GR105).

According to Leys, Kenya has been

incorporated into the international capitalist system since the
colonial period, and such incorporation has deprived Kenya of the
resources (human and material) necessary to pursue an autonomous
development.

Furthermore, external penetration served to introduce

capitalist socio-economic structures within Kenya.

The emergence of

these structures has created a new social stratum from among the
indigenous population, with an interest in organizing and facilitating
the new activities involved (trade, mining, crop production, commerce,
etc) (GR105: 9).
The ongoing impact of external ties is shaping internal social
relations within Kenya, maintaining the dominance of social classes
tied to foreign interests (GR100; GR105; GR134).

One segment of the

working class, connected with the modeY'n economic sector, does indeed
benefit substantially from the policy of IIdependent development,1I
while the segment associated with the traditional sector essentially
does not.

The implication of this situation is increased inequality

between the emergent IIl abor aristocracyll of workers in the modern
sector and the mass of people who can, at best, make periodic forays
into the wage economy as migrant labor (GR12).

From the perspective

of national planning, this structural characteristc creates a problem
for policymakers in Kenya.

As Leys points out:

All governments of periphery countries could of course
prefer better terms of trade and less dependence on
foreign technology. but in most cases the social strata
and classes which they represent have not been willing
to make the sacrifices which a serious attack on these
patterns would imply. It is artificial to point to
the existence of theoretical alternatives, without
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recognizing that the status quo is underwritten by
the social classes which underdevelopment has
created and brought to power in the periphery
countries.
(GR105: 13)
The present pattern in Kenya does not lead to "autonomous"
development, but to a further consolidation of underdevelopment.
The growing inequalities among regions and among social groups,
rising import bills, and balance-of-payment difficulties are logical
outcomes of Kenya's subordinate role in the international economy.
And to the extent that Kenya remains a dependent nation, the objectives, intensity, and efficiency of development policies are limited
within certain margins of flexibility.
Similarly, Langdon (GR102) and Kaplinsky (76) argue that Kenya
has not developed an autonomous capacity to sustain capital accumulation through internal interaction among sectors of the economy.

In

asserting the dependency position, they point first to the limited
achievement which characterizes Kenyan economic development in general and that of industry in particular.

Despite the high growth

rate in the fields of investment and industrial output, the growth
of employment in urban and rural areas has lagged far behind manpower growth, which has become the most crucial developmental
problem in the country.

The growth of a modern, import-substituting

sector has proven to be capital-intensive and labor-displacing.

As

a result, the government's ability to provide productive employment,
even to those who are educationally qualified, is severely limited.
The key to Kenya's dependency is the penetration of the economy
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by multinational corporations.

Langdon (GR102) and Kaplinsky (GR76,

GR78) argue that the penetration of multinational corporations into
the Kenyan economy has shifted the basis of metropolitan penetration
from commerce to industry.

Such penetration, according to Langdon,

generates technological and social dualism in the economy, and these structural and distributional effects
reshape class structure in the periphery--as parts of
the usual class formations are integrated into the
transnational community and other parts excluded. This
reshaped class structure generates changed dynamics in
the periphery political economy.
(GR102: 27)
Dependency analysis, therefore, views multinational corporations as
the agency of a dual process of transnational integration and national
disintegration (GR148). And in terms of Gunder Franks' definition,
the multinationals are helping generate the "development of underdevelopment" in Kenya.
On the whole, Leys, Langdon and Kaplinsky (all proponents of
classic dependency analysis) agree that because of Kenya's external
dependency, the policy decisions of the government are strongly influenced, if not determined, by internal consequences of foreign trade,
foreign investment, and foreign assistance.

The result is that the

amount of resources available to the government of Kenya to support
public policies aimed at providing employment opportunities depends
to a significant degree, on external rather than internal conditions.
"Revised Dependency Analysis:

the New "Orthodoxy"

Early theories of imperialism, such as those espoused by Paul
Baran (GR13), argued that the relationship between dependence and
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higher levels of inequality occurred because foreign capital supported
"semi-feudal" elites, and thus impeded industrialization.

In the

seventies, however, it seemed plausible to argue, as Bill Warren
did, that foreign investments are likely to be associated with the
intensification of capitalist accumulation in the Third World (GR160:
92-107).
•

Warren demonstrated, by way of a statistical survey, that:
industrial growth has taken place in the Third World since
World War II;

• growth in the Third World, during this period, has increasingly been based on home market consupmption;
•

such growth has created important intermediate sectors;

• foreign capital investment has been decreasing;
•

independent technological development has been occurring;

• dependent development has become a characteristic feature of
many formerly underdeveloped countries.
Warren's position has won over many converts to the idea of
"dependent development," two words considered inimical to each other
by earlier dependentistas such as Frank.

The basis of this position is

the observation that industrialization and growth are occurring in many
areas of the Third World, and the control which foreign capital once
enjoyed is rapidly diminishing (GR27: 89-90; GR47: 32).

This stage,

which is characterized by an alliance between domestic and international capital, might also describe Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan,
Hong Kong, Nigeria, and the Ivory Coast.

It has particular importance

in the Kenyan case, as argued by Leys (GR106) and Swainson (GR149).
Whatever the differences among these countries, and there are many,
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the common elements are the dynamic patterns of industrial growth and
their close integration with the international capitalist system.

To

the radical academic, these countries form a "semi-peripheryll between the rich and the poor, while to many liberal analysts in the
developed world, they are "newly industrializing countries,1I held
up as the success stories of the 1960's and 1970's.
The proponents of revised dependency analysis argue that Kenya
is in a position to determine the process of economic development
autonomously.

The principal force of this process, they say, is

the emergent domestic bouregoisie and the state apparatus under its
control.

Nicola Swainson (GR149), and most recently, Colin Leys

(GR106), argue that since Kenya's independence, the dominant factions
of the African capitalist class have been able to commandeer the
state apparatus and use their power to break into areas of accumulation that were off limits to Africans during the colonial period.
They insist that the Kenyan bourgeoisie is not a foreign/metropolitan
creation, but a class which developed within Kenya itself, and was
subsequently held back by colonialist policies.
Both sides in the Kenyan debate recognize the movement toward
tighter state control on foreign capital in Kenya in recent years.
The principal measures taken by the state to expand the sphere of
indigenous accumulation include loans, licensing, and public investments.

But their analysis of this development reflects differing

views of the state and of class relationships within Kenya.

Swainson.

for instance, sees clearly the increased application of such controls
as a function of the indigenous bourego;s;e's movement into industrial
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production and use of its dominance over the state to facilitate
private accumulation, mainly by restricting foreign capital--a sign
of state strength.

Kaplinsky and Langdon, on the other hand, see

the roots of such efforts as attempts to deal with the growing foreign
exchange gaps inevitably shaped by a transnationally-dominated importsubstitution industrialization strategy and as reflections of concern
by middle-level and other state functionaries who have shared little
in the considerable benefits of symbiosis in Kenya.
Despite the points of disagreement, both sides in the Kenyan
debate agree that the present pattern of development is subject to
growing limitations and blockages and is increasingly dependent on
external economic events.

Most dependentistas agree that Third World

nations have lost control over decisions affecting their national
economies as a result of linkages established through foreign trade,
foreign investment, and foreign assistance (GR53; GR105; GR138).

These

three components of national dependence emerge as significant characteristics affecting the policy decisions of Third World governments for
the following reasons:
(a) Countries which are hosts to large amounts of foreign
investment (relative to their wealth and population) are likely to
experience high levels of inequality among regions and social groups
(GR3l; GR42; GR55).

The heavy penetration of foreign capital, mainly

in the form of direct investment by multinational corporations in
the mineral, plantation, and light manufacturing sectors, is highly
profitable to foreign investors and results in a large return flow
of income to metropolitan centers.
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(b) Foreign investment enhances the possibility of the transfer
of capital-intensive production techniques which are inappropriate
to the needs of the developing nations, having been imported unchanged
from the industrial countries (GR14; GR76).

Capital-intensive tech-

nology generates little employment, and, if anything, it eliminates
employment.

Since investment decisions by the multinationals are

based on a plan for improved profitability, minimizing labor cost
is their first target.

This means that the employment needs of a

host country, such as Kenya, are relegated to a secondary position.
(c) Countries which rely heavily on the export of a few primary
products such as coffee and tea are likely to experience continued
underdevelopment since international trade is characterized by unequal
exchanges of goods and services (GR5; GR46).

Because of the dominant

position of developed economies in the world market, Third World
governments are not in a position to bargain effectively to achieve
a comparative advantage of trade.

In effect, the demands for and

the value of the different commodities of Third World nations is
determined by events within the developed economies.

This point is

clearly demonstrated in the Kenyan case when, in 1977, the price of
Kenyan coffee dropped substantially, which was responsible for subsequent balance-of-payment difficulties.
(d) The transfer of public foreign assistance required for
development carries with it elements of cost relating to structural
dependency (GR137: 274).

Aid entails a further loss of national power

of decisionmaking and adds a new dimension to dependency.

Aid brings

with it the rights of donors to take part in policymaking and the
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necessity for dependent countries to constantly justify their
policies in order to continue the inflow of foreign aid (GR63; GR159).
A final cost of aid is in the interest required in its repayment;
this also contributes to the spiraling debt and balance-of-payment
problems.
On the whole, the consensus among dependentistas is that foreign
aid, foreign investment, and foreign trade are essential components of
the decisionmaking environment within Third World nations.

Each of

these aspects of national dependency poses both potential influence and
potential constraints on the actions of Third World governments
because of its impact on the amount of available resources, the
distribution of political power, and the intrusion of external decisionmakers into the national policymaking process (GR166).

Logical

extensions of the above assumptions of dependency analysis lead to
an expectation of the following structural characteristics in Kenya:
• agricultural stagnation resulting from adverse terms
of trade, urban migration, and low rates of surplus
and reinvestment, leading to urban food shortaqe and
structural inflation;
•

continued balance-of-payments crisis requiring dependence upon foreign finance to a growing degree, and
perhaps repeated devaluation of the Kenyan shilling;

•

noncompetitive domestic industrial sector with powerful
trade unions, resulting in employers and unions forcing
urban wages and prices upward to protect against rising
import and food prices s further feeding inflationary
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tendencies; and
•

increased urban migration as agricultural terms of
trade deteriorate, resulting in explosive growth of
shanty towns around Nairobi.

Educational Research and the Dependence PersPEctive
Despite the recent interest in the internal dynamics of
peripheral capitalism, dependency theory has, on the whole, inspired
very few studies on education.

Indeed, the studies which have attempted

to develop a Marxist point of view about the interaction between
schooling and the labor market have not come from the existing studies
of underdevelopment, but rather from studies of education in advance.p
capitalist countries, particularly the United States (GR19; GR2l).
There is no definitive study of education which utilizes the insights
that have been gained from the recent debates on underdevelopment theory.
In the case of Africa, only Walter Rodney (GR134) has attempted
to show the linkages between the development of Western education and
the underdevelopment of the continent.

Rodney view colonial educa-

tion as merely "education for subordination, exploitation, and the
creation of mental confusion" (GR134: 241).

He argues forcefully

that
The main purpose of the colonial school system was to
train Africans to help man the local administration at
the lowest ranks and to staff the private capitalist
firms owned by Europeans. In effect, that meant
selecting a few Africans (a process of incorporation)
to participate in the domination and exploitation of
the continent as a whole. It was not an educational
system that grew out of the African environment or
one that was designed to promote the most rational
use of material and social resources. It was not an
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educational system designed to give young people
confidence and pride as members of African societies,
but one which sought to instill a sense of deference
towards all that was European and capitalist.

(GR134: 241)
As Rodney clearly identifies, the main purpose of colonial
education was to provide trained manpower to run the colonial economic structure.

It was not intended to give skills that would use

African resources for autonomous development of African societies.
The quality, context, and quantity of education given to Africans
was different from that offered in European schools.
colonial education system was racially segregated.

In fact, the
The overall

colonial educational policy was, therefore, to reinforce the destruction of the autonomy of African economies and to reorient them toward
production for the dominating metropolitan capitalist economies.

In

this way, colonial schooling was part and parcel of the totality of
the forces of underdevelopment, and its reproduction in the postindependence period must be examined carefully.

As Kinyanjui (GR86)

succinctly put it:
Western education, like political and economic structures
planted in the colonies, was an essential part of the
expansion of Western capitalist system. As part of the
superstructure of the capitalist system, it had the
double task of incorporating the colonized people into
that system and reproducing the emerging relations of
production.

(GR86: 29)
The implication here is that the educational system, in its present
form, can become an instrument for social control and domination.
This is contrary to the human capital assertions which suggest that
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there is a relationship between education and development.
Rodney also points out that colonial dependency generated
unequal distribution of educational resources among regions and
social groups.

The districts that were closely integrated into the

colonial economy (such as the coffee growing regions of Kenya and
the former settlements of the missionaries) devoted many of their
resources to the development of education. The result has been that
these regions emerged as more developed than those that were not
integrated into the colonial economy.

This point is fully supported

by Kinyanjui (GR85, GR87). who argues that post-independence governmental policy seems to have exacerbated the existing regional and societal
differences, rather than minimizing the gap.

Kinyanjui attributes

this phenomena to the continued political and economic power of
these developed regions.
On the whole. Africanists who adopt the dependence perspective
in the study of the Kenyan political economy have ignored completely
the role of education in the discussion of the underdevelopment process.

The focus of their analysis has been the economic structure;

they have paid scant attention to the superstructure and, in particular, to the educational sector.

The ways in which education and the

educational structure are affected by dependency are not given appropriate attention.

The primary task of this study is, therfore, to

examine how dependency conditions the relationship between the educational system and the economy and distorts manpower planning in Kenya.
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Public policy is considered to be the end product of the public
decisionmaking process.

It is, therefore, a dependent phenomenon

which responds to changes in the factors which influence public decisionmaking.

Among the factors which constrain policymaking is the

problem of external dependency; namely, foreign aid, foreign investment, and foreign trade.

Each of these aspects of national dependence

influence the formulation and implementation of policies.

Thus, the

primary goal of the analysis is to determine the consequences of
the dependency relationship on the efforts of the Kenyan government
toward solving the urban unemployment problem.
The analysis of the extent to which external dependence affects
the content of public policies is approached through an application of
a policy analysis framework.

Policy analysis combines two critical

disciplines that are central to an understanding of the process of
decisionmaking in the Third World:

political science and economics.

In an examination of the decisional choice by public authorities in
achieving social, economic, and political goals, policy analysis
framework is a useful means of inquiring into the interaction between
social, political, and economic organization and process.
Methodological Technigues
The techniques of the methodology in this study include:
historical analysis, field research, analysis of primary and secondary
data, interviews of Kenyan governmental officials and technical
assistance personnel.
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The following questions guide the research problem:
•

In what ways does the educational system complement or
contradict economic planning?

• To what extent has education met the political needs and
priorities of the government?
• To what extent has the type of education offered by the
institutions matched the education and training needed
by the labor market?
• To what extent does Kenya's external dependency contradict
or bedevil manpower planning?
Analysis of Data
The method of analysis used in this study is part historical
and part quantitative.

The field research was undertaken in Kenya

between September 1981 and March 1982.

The historical data on the

restructuring of the Kenyan society and economy from colonial time
up until independence in 1963 was collected from published reports
and colonial governmental documents deposited in the National Archives.*
Secondary data on the economy and on education was collected
from governmental sources (particularly the Central Bureau of Statistics at the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development), UNESCO,
the Regional Mission of the World Bank, the East African Regional

* The information generated highlighted the intense struggle between
the colonizers and the colonized over the distribution of educational and economic resources and opportunities and the Africans'
reaction to the colonial restrictions.
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Office of USAID, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA),
the International labour Organization (IlO), and other Kenyan governmental ministries.

Additional information was collected through

in-depth interviews with leading governmental officials, politicians,
foreign technical assistance personnel, and managers of foreign cor-

*
'
pora t 10ns.
SUMMARY
The literature on development is replete with studies purporting to identify education and economic growth as central components
of national development, particularly their relationship to employment.

Nevertheless, the interrelationships between these variables

have not been substantiated by empirical evidence.

While higher

levels of educational expansion and economic growth, as measured in
GNP, have been achieved in Kenya (see Chapter III), graduate unemployment has emerged as one of the most critical developmental dilemmas
in the country.

In the present context, three significant questions

remain unanswered:
ing social problem?

(1) what are the historical roots of the prevail-

(2) what attempts are being made by the government

of Kenya to address this problem?

(3) did these programs in fact

alleviate the problem significantly? The first task of this study is,
therefore, to provide some answers to these questions.
An additional element of the study is drawn from literature on

* A total of twenty-five high-level officials from the private and

public sectors were interviewed. The information generated through
interviews was then used to further elaborate the secondary data
collected.
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national dependence in Latin America.

The central theme of this

literature is that dependence affects the resources available to
Third World governments and leads to the intrusion of external
decisionmakers into the national policymaking process.

As a result,

the policy decisions of these governments may be strongly influenced,
if not determined, by the internal consequences of foreign aid,
foreign trade, and foreign investment.

The second task of this study

is to determine to what extent dependency conditions the relationship
between the educational system and the economy and distorts manpower
planning in Kenya.
Although theorists have ignored the role of education in the
discussion of the underdevelopment process, this study is an attempt
to refine the components of dependency theory as they relate to policy
decisions within Kenya by establishing empirical evidence as to the
proposed consequences of dependency upon the linkages between education, economic growth, and employment opportunities in Kenya.

CHAPTER II
THE DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN EDUCATION IN KENYA, 1846-1980:
A CASE OF DEPENDENCY RELATIONSHIP
This chapter examines the development of Western education in
colonial and post-colonial Kenya.

Part I of this chapter investigates

the intense struggle which took place between the three principal actors
involved in the formulation of educational policy in colonial Kenya during the period between 1846 and 1963:

(a) the European missionaries,

(b) the colonial administrators and European settlers, and (c) the
indigenous African population.

Part II examines the relationship be-

tween the colonial legacy of Kenyan education and the pattern of
national development since Kenya's achievement of independence in
1963.
THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL CONTROL
Colonialism and Economic Change
Kenya's links with Western capitalism were forged in the late
nineteenth century, when the world market was dominated by a few industrial giants such as Britain, France, and Germany.

Kenya became a

protectorate under Britain in 1895 and a Crown Colony in 1920 (GR22;
GR149: 22).

Although missionary work in Kenya started as early as 1846,

it was not until the construction of the Uganda Railway in 1901 from
r10mbasa on the coast to Lake Victoria that significant European influence
took place in Kenya (GR15; GRl12: 1-7). The construction of the railway
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spearheaded the integration of Kenya into the colonial system.

The

British policy during the following years was determined by the need
to make the colony pay its own way, that is to pay back the loans for
the railway and to put an end to the need for annual grants from Britain
for the administration of the Protectorate (GR105; GR149).

The way

chosen to accomplish this was to try to establish a white settler
agriculture which could produce for export.

The administration encour-

aged European settlers from South Africa to come and settle in Kenya.
The result was that Kenya began to play the classic role of a country at
the periphery of a capitalist system providing raw material exports for
metropolitan manufactured goods.
The dominant concern of the colonial authorities during the first
decades of their rule was the provision of good and cheap agricultural
land for the settlers.

Through their political domination, the settlers

constructed an economy which would benefit them exclusively.

Large areas

of land were allocated for them by the colonial state; tribes such as
the Kikuyu, the Maasai, and the Nandi had to give up land which previously had been under their control (GR168: 63-67; GR105; GR156).
land was sold to the settlers on favorable terms.

The

For example, in the

Crown Land Ordinance of 1915, leases for 999 years were given out at
very low prices.

In the 1930's, the Carter Commission set aside nearly

17,000 square miles, or twenty percent of Kenya's best land, for exclusive White settlement (GR64: 87; GR156: 34).
Despite the expropriation of land from the Africans, the settlers
had a difficult time making their farming a profitable venture due to a
lack of both knowledge and capital.

This was the main cause of the
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enormous exploitation of labor that took place in Kenya; the settler
farms had to have cheap wage labor to be economically viable.

In

addition, the settlers were cognizant of the fact that African peasant
farmers, who worked for less money, who had lower personal consumption
demands, and who used more labor-intensive techniques, could produce
and sell at lower prices.

If this situation were allowed to continue,

African production would undercut European production in the product
market, and, by offering an alternative source of cash income, drive up
wage rates on European farms and plantations.

Indeed, between 1912 and

1913, African production had accounted for at least 70% of exports
GR105; GR99).

This sentiment was clearly expressed by Lord Lugard in

1922:
The requirements of the settlers, to put it bluntly, are
incompatible with the interests of the agricultural tribes,
nor could they be otherwise than impatient of native development as a rival in the growing of coffee, flax, and sisal.
(GR108: 397)
To forestall or permanently prevent this competition, two specific
strategies were developed by the colonial government.

The first strategy

was directed toward forcing Africans to work as laborers on European
farms, partly by force, partly by taxation, and partly by preventing
them from having access to enough land or profitable crops to enable
them to pay the various taxes without working for wages (GR105: 10;
GR22; GR170).

In this fashion, a considerable supply of African labor

was available for the benefit of European settlers.

It has been esti-

mated that in the mid-twenties, more than half of the able-bodied Luos
and Kikuyus were employed on European farms (GR105: 31), and in total
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about forty percent of all eligible males worked on European farms
(GR168: 63-77).
The second strategy was directed toward increasing the monopoly
power of the settlers through control of the main state agencies such
as the marketing and regulatory boards, production committees, and credit
institutions.

Through control of the state, the settlers were able to

manipulate the legal framework of colonial rule and to prohibit the
Africans from growing cash crops and from establishing commercial
enterprises.

The system of racialist rules and regulations worked to

guarantee highly differentiated access to resources and opportunities
among Europeans, Asians, and Africans.

The Coffee Plantation Regulation

Ordinance of 1918, the Marketing of Native Produce Ordinance of 1935, and
the Credit to Native Control Ordinance of 1903 and 1948, for example, were
measures designed to restrict significant African participation in Kenya's political economy (GR73).
The infrastructural development also favored the settlers.

The

railway served the areas of White settlement, and different prices were
charged for the shipment of European and African produce.

The pricing

of commodities also discriminated against the Africans (GR105; GR22).
The tax system served to transfer money from the poor African areas to
the wealthy White areas.

Despite the fact that in 1920-23 Africans paid

approximately 70% of all taxes in Kenya (GR22: 193), the Whites reaped
nearly all the benefits of government services such as agricultural extension and credit.

Given all these restrictive and discriminatory policies,

it is no wonder that the European settlers dominated Kenya's colonial
economy.

This domination was not a function of the Europeans I productive
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efficiency nor their propensity to innovate.

Their domination was the

consequence of the prohibition by force of African competition as well
as the exploitation of Africans in the production process.
Thus, early on, Kenya was characterized by a regulated and controlled economy.

Far from operating in an open, competitive frontier

economy where riches were to be seized by the bold and adventuresome,
European settlers entered a political econonlY in which they were protected, nurtured, and fostered through their control of the State's power.
These factors meant that Kenya was involved in a dependency relationship
rather different from the simple staple export pattern; its dependency
was characteristic of what Apollo Njonjo (GRl17) refers to as "Apartheid
capitalism," involving the dependence of dominant local forces (particularly the settlers) on the colonial state's resources and actions, which
were significantly--though not wholly--shaped outside Kenya (GR99: 20).
Had access to resources and opportunities not been restricted, European
dominance over African interests would have been impossible.

The cor-

responding educational system also mirrored that same ideology which
justified access to resources according to race and class.

This restric-

tion of access and formalization of privileges remains the principle of
economic organization in Kenya at the present time.
The particular pattern of Kenya's incorporation into centers of
metropolitan accumulation shaped the dialectics of African nationalist
opposition, resulting in the emergence of the Mau Mau movement which
militarily challenged European occupation of Kenya.

The crisis which

this movement generated led to a series of constitutional changes which
preceded formal political independence (GR135; GR16l).

The 1954 Lyttleton
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Constitution and the 1958 Lennox Boyd Constitution sought to establish
the economic foundation of Black conservative rule in Kenya (GR140: 56-57).
As a result, African participation in the legislative council was accelerated.

The 1954 Swynnerton Plan introduced reforms into African

agriculture for the first time.

The plan called for the development of

extension services in the African areas, permission to grow cash crops,
access to credit, and land consolidation and registration.

In short,

these reforms attempted to introduce capitalist agriculture and commerce
to African areas.
Despite the military defeat of the Nau r·1au, African nationalism
in this period succeeded in creating a

ne~

political context in which

successive colonial administrators accepted the urgent need for political
and economic changes for Africans.

This shift represented, however,

simply an extension of privileges to very few educated Africans, particularly the Kikuyus, who would cooperate with their formal colonial masters.
The existence of an African petit bourgeoisie class facilitated the transition of the Kenyan political economy from colonialism to a neocolonial
relationship, further tightening the links of dependence (GR161; GR22;
GR105).

The important question of structural transformation for the

majori ty of Kenyans who had formed the most potent Mau r·lau base was
put aside.
By 1963, Kenya inherited, along with independence, a very disintegrated political economy, already organized for the benefit of Europeans
and those African petit bourgeoisie who came to dominate the State.
With few exceptions, Europeans occupied the top brackets of the income
scale, the Asians the middle, and the Africans the bottom.

Inequality
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was deeply embedded within the society.

The government's response to

the existing dependency relationship has focused on Africanizing* the
schools, businesses, the civil service, and commerce, thus keeping the
major tenets of dependency intact.

In the present context, such

dependency distorts the relationship between the educational system
and the economy and conditions manpower planning.
Educational Policy in Colonial Kenya
The economics and politics of European dominance in Kenya required
an educational system that would enhance the privileged positions of the
European settlers and the traditional elites (and hence their offsprings)
who collaborated with the colonizers.

To achieve that end, tremendous

cooperation was required between the colonial administration, the missionaries, and the European settler class (GRl12; GR140; GR142: 32-47). This
symbiotic relationship, which lasted until the mid-1950's, had a tremendous impact on the development of education in Kenya and the present
political-economic relationships within the country.
More than fifty years before the British incorporated Kenya as a
protectorate, European missionaries of different denominations had already established schools to spread Christianity.

The first mission

school was established at Rabai, near Mombasa, in 1846, but little progress was made in establishing schools further inland until the contribution
of a railway which enabled the missionaries to expand their evangelist

*Africanization refers to the process by which African governments
attain national control of their economies, by replacing their own citizens with expatriats in the strategic areas of the economy.
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activities (GR15: 12; GRl12; GR142: 5).
had been established in Kenya.
119).

By 1906, fifty mission schools

This number reached 105 by 1916 (GRl12:

Indeed, missionary influence remained the dominant force until

the mid-1920's when it had to submit to the rule of colonial administration.

Even then, the missions continued to operate their schools

independently.
In 1909, the British Government commissioned a study of Education
in British African territories.

The Frazer Report recommended the estab-

lishment of education in British territories on a racial basis.

The

reason for this segregationist policy was summed up in the Beecher Report
of 1949 which stated that
African education cannot be compared with education in
European or Asian society. . . . The peculiar nature
of African education, with its limited achievements, is
such that long-term planning alone is appropriate. We
are only (with African education) at the state of
establishing standards,while European and Asian educational systems are concerned with maintaining long and
well established standards.
(GRl12: 132)
The argument supporting segregation is academic.

The material

reason for segregation was that the three racial groups of Kenya were
being trained to maintain their respective social statuses.

The Euro-

peans were being trained to be the masters, the supervisors, the leaders;
the Africans to be the servants, the laborers.

Each had to be educated

to take his place in society, not according to his ability, but according
to his race.

The context and purpose of education was set by occupation

as well as by social and political limitations.
As a result of this policy, the educational systems were treated

43
differently in terms of financial support.

Financial provision for

African education was not seen to be of vital importance and was,
therefore, always considered in relation to the country's ability to
pay.

In 1925, the per capita cost of African education was tl.6, while

the European cost was

~41.6;

in 1931, the figures were t3.5 and L42.6;

and in 1935, to.8 and t36.7 respectively (GRl12: 145).

In the late

1940's, the African population was estimated to be at least three hundred times as large as the European, yet expenditures on education for
the two races was almost equal; and in some years, the expenditure on
European children was greater (GR66: 337).
TABLE I
ALLOCATION OF COLONIAL REVENUE ON EDUCATION FOR
THE DIFFERENT RACES, 1926-1949 IN tIS
Year

African
(92%)

Indian
(6%)

European
(2%)

1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1930
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1948
1949

47,797
52,431
72,003
74,131
83,088
82,823
76,472
70,594
72,411
74,097
70,154
77 ,193
80,130
81,869
79,936
75,030
81,221
75,118
93,968
211 ,953
323,340

14,471
17,318
22,963
25,603
30,582
34,348
32,371
41,675
33,818
34,060
37,341
39,140
43,861
45,602
48,094
48,327
49,820
52,040
63,647
137,313
206,969

28,815
36,032
42,294
49,360
49,310
49,189
48,126
42,400
44,011
44,041
46,529
49,255
49,003
51,881
50,655
54,338
66,800
87,845
119,631
207,622
285,459
Source: (GR1l2: 136)
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The distribution of educational resources and opportunities was
also uneven among the three racial groups.

From the early years of

colonialism, education was compulsory for European children between
the ages of 7 and 15 (GR85: 4).

Education for Africans was not compul-

sory until after the Second l'Jorld War.

The numbers of schools available,

as well as the rate of enrollment for these three racial groups, differed
markedly.

Hhile the Europeans had secondary schools as early as 1915

and Asians had them in nearly every major town where they had settled
by 1923, the Africans opened their first secondary school in 1926 and
only four secondary schools in the 1940's (GR81: 29; GR142: 50-68).
In 1911, the Colonial authorities in Kenya took the first step
towards what the missionaries considered an invasion into their domain
by forming a Department of Education.

The fear on the part of the mis-

sionaries that the government intended to take control over all education
was strengthened when, in 1915, a State school for Africans was opened
at Machakos (GR75: 150-151; GRl12: 37; GR140: 73).

The missionaries

refused additional Government educational grants on the grounds that
financial control was the first step towards a final takeover.

Never-

theless, as the colonial authorities in Kenya and Britain began to take
interest in education and the missionaries found it increasingly difficult to finance the school system on their own, a pattern of cooperation
developed in which missions came to depend largely on governmental financial support.

The State left the responsibility for supervision and

management of the schools to the missionaries.
Initially, the Department of Education was concerned primarily with
the education of European children.

No serious thought was officially given

45

at the outset to education for Africans.

Shortly thereafter, however,

the colonial administration and the settlers both recognized the need
to educate Africans if economic sufficiency were to become a reality for
the European community.

The education of the Europeans and Indians

provided the managerial and artisian classes of citizens.

The education

of the Africans was intended to provide a more productive menial class
of workers.

Therefore, cooperation among all European interests in Kenya

was seen to be vital to the success of this undertaking.

This initial

agreement among the administration, the missionaries, and the settlers
formed the starting point, and only later did disagreement arise regarding what form this education should take, what methods should be adopted,
and to what extent it should be carried out.
Initial governmental interest in education for Africans was motivated by two needs:

the need to make the colony self-sufficient and the

need for an enlightened class of Africans to put into effect the British
doctrine of "indirect rule." The settlers also needed an enlightened
labor force, capable of taking instructions; and they turned to schools
to provide it.

The missionaries, on the other hand, wanted only to spread

the teachings of tile B.i.ble in the quickest and most effective way and
saw education as the easiest means of doing so.

With the administration

and the settlers entering the field, however, the missionaries were forced
to extend their educational services to cover secular education and
technical training for the economic development of the country.

Thus,

in 1919, a joint government-missionary-settler commission agreed that a
minimal amount of academic education for Africans was necessary (GR140:
17). There was some fear in the European community that academic studies
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would discourage African children from becoming laborers.

As a result

of this fear, it was decided that only selected individual Africans
should receive a general education and only to eleven years of age.
any further education should be vocational.

Deliberate preference

was given to the children and close relatives of those recognized as
traditional political leaders such as chiefs and representatives of
local native councils in exchange for translating to the Africans the
policy of indirect rule.

In essence, the new policy created a strati-

fied educational system within the African community (GRl12: 59-61).
Although the different European groups wanted the Africans to
be educated, soon the divergence of their aims and motives, the different interpretations given to education, and the differing goals became
apparent.

First, there was the major conflict between the Africans and

the colonists regarding the role of education.

The higher wages com-

manded by Africans who had been to school, their apparently favorable
relationship with the colonists, and their generally higher status
compared with their illiterate contemporaries all seemed to point to
education as the secret of power and material progress.

The Africans,

therefore, not only rejected the restriction imposed on their educational
advancement, but they also rejected an education tailored to keep them in
subservience to the Europeans (GR103; GR140: 24).
Secondly, there were conflicts between the missionaries and the
colonial administration as the former sought to keep their adherents
from attending government schools by discrediting the staff in those
schools on moral grounds.

The latter, in turn, charged the missionaries

with disrupting the African way of life.

This was expressed in the
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circumcision controversy of the 1930's. Missionary control of primary
schools and the missionaries' ambivalent stand on matters related to
African traditions were to lead to the opening of Independent Schools,
particularly among the Luos, the Kikuyus, and the Pokomos (GR7; GR140:
27; GR142: 149).
Thirdly, there was internal conflict created by the missionaries.
They had, from the beginning, worked on the doctine of divide and conquer.

Those Africans who accepted Christianity were able to receive

preferential treatment in the field of education, while non-Christians
were discriminated against.

This, for all practical purposes, also

meant preferential treatment in the labor market.

This group of Afri-

cans included the sons of chiefs, the preachers, and the businessmen.
This point must be stressed because the graduates of missionary schools
(the collaborators of colonialism) are now the most influential people
in the government; and by virtue of their position, they stand to gain
from the present setting of economic development and have established a
base from which their offspring will always benefit if the system remains
unchanged (GR85).
Legal recognition of education in the colony came in 1924 with the
legislative council's passage of the Education Ordinance.

In theory,

the 1924 Ordinance gave the right to inspection of schools to the Director of Education.

Under the ordinance, missionary schools were

recognized as voluntary agencies and became eligible for grants-in-aid
(GRl12: 89; 140; 142).

Despite the ordinance, missionary influence on

African education remained very strong until the time of independence.
Prior to 1925, therefore, neither the officials in Kenya nor those
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in London had any clear idea of what should constitute education for
Africans. apart from the fact that it should be geared towards economic
development and hence self-sufficiency of the colony.

Directives from

the Colonial Office were vague and open to different interpretations.
In many cases, the policy laid down did not meet practical circumstances and was frustrated by the conflicting interests of the
administrators, the settlers, the missionaries, and later the Africans.
Educational Policy After 1925
In 1925, the British Colonial Office issued its first statement
on African education.

The 1925 Memorandum laid down the thirteen princi-

ples which became the basis of educational policy in all British African
colonies for the next quarter of a century (GR104: 13; 140).

Drawing

heavily from the 1924 Phelps-Stokes Report, which sought to develop the
"right sort" of education for African children (i.e., vocational education), the memorandum initiated a process of experimentation aimed at
adapting education to African life and cultural heritage.

This position,

maintained through WW II (and being perpetuated in the post-independence
era), was interpreted as meaning education that would not overly stimulate the outside interests of rural African children; it would encourage
them to remain farmers and not to seek other kinds of employment in
urban centers (GR75: 150; GRl12: 59).

Ironically, these views are

expressed in the Report on Educational Goals and Objectives of 1976 and
also in the 1979-83 Development Plans.

In both instances, no serious

program was pursued by the government to transform the social and economic
conditions of Kenyans, particularly in agriculture.
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The 1925 t1emorandum and those subsequent to it compl etely i gnored the felt needs of the African community for equal access to
resources and opportunities.

The different racial groups were educated

according to the social and occupational role their members were expected
to play in national development.
expected to survive indefinitely.

Apartheid capitalism in Kenya was also
The events of the fifties, particularly

the Mau Mau struggle, were to shatter these assumptions.
As early as 1924, the Afri can community had shown an a\'/areness that
colonial policy was designed to perpetuate their state of subservience
to Europeans.

They had also begun to question the imbalance between

their contribution to colonial revenues and the social benefits that
they received in return.

For example, Direct Tax in the Nyanza Province

showed an increase of 325% between 1905 and 1910, whereas the nonAfrican revenue of the country in general showed a decrease of 12%
(GRl12: 134).

Africans then began to express the view that part of

their taxation should be earmarked specifically for the development of
their own areas.

The Education Ordinance of 1924 established an

Advisory Conmittee on which Local Native Councils were represented.
Gradually, the idea that responsibility for primary education should
rest in local hands became accepted.

The Africans seized the opportun-

ity offered by local native councils to tax themselves to finance
education and ta open up new schools in their respective communities
(GRaS; 165).

The extent of local contribution is shown in Table II

on the following page.
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TABLE II
LOCAL NATIVE COUNCILS EDUCATION EXPENDITURE:
IN SHILLINGS 1926-1931
Council

NK

CK
S Lumb\'1a
Kiambu
Fort Hall
S Nyeri
Embu
Meru
Machakos
Taita
Ki tui
Digo
Giriama
Elgeyo

1926

1927

20,000
30,000
2,200
la, 000

40,000
300

100
980

100

24,000
100
6,000

22,500
200
6,000

1928

1929

1930

1931

100,000
110,000
20,300
120,000
40,000
600,100

211 ,000
213,894
300
120,500
31,500
100,500

251,000
244,770
14,700
112,900
99,700
150,500

196,000
32,096
10,000
57,000
95,200
160,500

400
16,880

500
21,000

2,500
1,000

19,000

7,000
1,000

2,000
3,200
21,000
37,600
6,400
10,250
2,000

500
3,200
16,700
3,340
6,250
13,000

1,000
3,000
500
15,420
6,980
10,850
10,000

40,100

31,300

34,335

6,000

3,000
1,000
6,400

30,000

22,500

i~arakwet

Nandi
WSuk
Baringo
Narok
Kajiado

10,000
2,000
20,000

Source: (GR1l2: 150)
The decision to entrust Local Native Councils with the responsibility for primary education was calculated to shift the financial
burden from the government.

Although the Councils welcomed the idea

as an opportunity to develop their own schools, by 1942, their financial
situation was in desperate shape.

Educational expenditures continued

to rise to the detriment of other social services such as rural access
roads, health services, and marketing facilities (GRl12: 151).
From the 1920's until the mid-1940's, the institutional framework
for the formulation and implementation of policies for African education
included the joint participation of colonial administrators, missionaries,
and European settlers. The colonial administrators repeatedly sought to
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free themselves from this burden, but political pressure by Africans for
more rapid expansion forced them to accept responsibility after the Second
World War.

At this point, the old colonial policies of "self-sufficiency"

and "trusteeship" were dropped and' ,"partnership" was substituted ,(GR129:7;
GR140).

The British Government recognized the growing political role of

Africans and began to create more of a progressive political situation
in the colonies.
Educational Policy After World War II
After the War, the British policy began to change in the face of
African nationalism.

The British began to accept the idea that many

British colonies would soon be independent (GRl12: 63; GR129: 8; GR140).
In 1948, therefore, the Advisory Committee drew up a memorandum entitled
Education for Citizenship in Africa, in which it was argued that mass
education would be valuable only insofar as it trained young Africans
to become responsible citizens of free countries.

There is nothing to

suggest that the intensified local educational activity of the late
1940 s and the early 1950 s was the result of the recommendations of this
l

l

committee.

Rather, the activity could be more justifiably attributed to

the changed local political condition in Kenya.
The 1948 Ten-Year Plan for education in Kenya (CG3) aimed to qive
50~~

of school age chi ldren an education 1astino 6 years and recommended

that primary schools should be controlled by local authorities.

Further-

more, the Plan called for local authorities to increase their expenditures
for primary schools from tlOO,OOO in 1948 to

~234,000

in 1957 (GR129: 8).

But the demand was such that further expansion of government schools was

beyond the financial means of local authorities.
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Africans took this

opportunity to begin to build their own schools using funds generated
through individual contributions.

The self-help efforts led to the

emergence of a shadow school system, unregulated by the government.
This system now accounts for 60% of the secondary school enrollment in
the country (KGS, 1977).

The central government felt increasingly

uncomfortable about its inability to give the desired level of supervision and financial assistance to unaided schools (GR142: 148).

This

situation has remained unchanged and is the major headache of the postindependence government.

In order to limit an influx of African pupils

into upper primary and secondary schools, the government introduced a
pyramid structure into African education which allowed a large number
of pupils to enter primary schools and then progressively restricted
opportunities as the students climbed the educational ladder through
secondary school to the university.

Each grade had to be passed in

succession if a pupil were to proceed.
The Beecher Commission (1949) introduced a 4-4-4 system of primary, upper primary, and secondary schools to replace the previous
6-2-4 system.

The Commission based its recommendations regarding

educational structure on a 50% dropout rate.

As soon as the dropout

rate fell and more Africans remained in schools, examinations played
an even more important role in limiting the numbers that ascended each
successive rung on the educational ladder (GR140: 41-43; GR164: 6).
The grading of classes and schools and the provisions for expansion were
based on the assumption that of the pupils who entered primary schools,
50% would drop out.

In other words, for every 100 children entering
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primary school, only 8 would proceed to intermediate schools (upper
primary), and only 2 would finally enter secondary schools (GRl12: 110).
The aim of this policy was clearly to limit the number of educated
Africans who could qualify for the franchise, thereby preventing their
influx into the labor market.

The fear was that too many educated

Africans would put pressure on the government and on employers to offer
them occupations which had traditionally been held by Europeans; they
also feared that a large reservoir of trained but unemployed Africans
might lead to political unrest.

In 1963, the combined result of drop-

out and examination failures appeared as presented in the table below.
TABLE I II
WASTAGE AND RETENTION IN KENYAN SCHOOLS, 1963
Primar~

Year
--I

Degree of Wastage (%)

III
IV
V
VI
VII-VIII

20
14~

10

8~
l~
~

Secondarl School
Year
Jr

44~

II

Note:

School

(Common Ex)

I
II
Sr III
IV
V
VI

Degree of Absorption (%)
44
38 (KAPE)
5
3~

1

~

(KASE)
(School Cert
Univ Exam)

Of those who finished their primary course, only 44% proceeded to
the first year of secondary courses.
Source: (GRl12: 112)
It is not surprising that Africans opposed these recommendations

which recognized the termination of education for half of the children
after only four years of schooling (at the age of about ten).

They felt

justified in concluding that the Beecher Commission was designed to provide cheap, maleable. and constant labor in the form of eleven 'year olds,
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to the settler community.

Thus, dissatisfied with the education pro-

vided by the missionaries and the negative response of the Beecher
Committee to any of the African concerns, Africans sought, from their
own pockets, to provide themselves with education.

This gave rise to

the Independent Schools Movement, the gravest reflection on the entire
educational policy and a serious charge against the colonial government
in Kenya.
Although many of the points stated in the Beecher Report were
not implemented because of the Emergency, the planning and implementation
of educational policy nevertheless remained isolated to a great extent
from developments in other areas until the time of political independence.
At the Lancaster House Conference of 1960, the central question raised
by the colonial authorities was on what terms political independence
would be granted to Africans.

The most critical issue politically was

the land question (GR105: GR161; GR162).
can public were far-reaching.

The aspirations of the Afri-

The solution should, therefore, at least

satisfy the minimal expectations of the most land-hungry groups in Kenya.
The British, on the other hand, were not willing to accept any takeover
of land by Africans without adequate compensation to the European settlers.
Ultimately, an agreement was reached which satisfied both the Africans
and the Europeans.
The essence of the agreement was that Africans buying land in the
White Highland should pay for it with loans from the Kenyan governmenti
the Kenyan government, in turn, was to obtain considerable sums of money
(approximately taO million) from the British for this purpose (GR159;
GR161).

The transfer of power could then take place in an orderly
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fashion, and the respect for private property would be upheld.

The

pattern of decolonization was, therefore, carefully influenced externally to detach that emerging African bourgeoisie class from the
squatter wage worker radicalism of the Mau Mau.

It led to much

continuity in the regulative, restrictive, and unequal internal relations
of the colonial past in Kenya (GR102: 41).

The internal pattern of

exchange relations, education, and the civil service was Africanized.
Against a backdrop of dramatic political and economic activity, Kenya's
educational system underwent a series of organizational changes, both
before and after independence (GR87). The transfer of political power
to Africans in 1963 did not bring fundamental changes in the economic,
political, and educational structures of Kenya (GR87; GR105; GR162).
African Reaction to Colonial Restrictions
Although educational administrators in Kenya spent considerable
time and effort on programs designed to adapt Western educational forms
to their conception of African needs, they paid little attention to the
integration of Africans into the new occupational structure except as
adjuncts to positions held by Europeans.

Until the pace of political

development increased markedly in the mid-1950's, authorities tended to
restrict the output of post-primary institutions to the immediate and
visible needs for middle and low-level manpower.

The priority for edu-

cational expansion, such as it was, focused on the spread of mass
primary education with a vocational emphasis.
The African reaction to the colonial restrictions manifested itself
in the form of independent churches, particularly in Western Kenya, while
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in Central Province, the African response to missionary control took
the form of a revolt in the 1930's and subsequent establishment of
independent schools (GR7; GR9; GR140: 27).

Dissatisfied with

mission education, the African community, particularly the Kikuyu of
Central Kenya, began to organize themselves to establish their own
independent schools.

Christian missionary control of primary schools

and the missionaries' ambivalent stand on matters relateG to African
traditions (particularly the controversy surrounding circumcision),
led to the opening of Independent Schools, particularly among the Luos
and Kikuyus.
The vocational emphasis on African education was seen by the
Kikuyu as a second-rate education designed to keep them as permanent
laborers for the Europeans (GR129: 5).

So far as the Kikuyu were con-

cerned, the missionaries were apparently cooperating with the European
settlers who were intent on alienating the land and forcing the Kikuyu
into the role of a semirural labor force.

As a result, the Kikuyu were

determined to boycott missionary education since it symbolized colonial
oppression.

The special situation of the Kikuyu and their close prox-

imity to European settlements led to rapidly extending political concerns
and also to a more sensitive appraisal of the political implications of
education.

According to Anderson, the Kikuyus

. . • sought to create a generation of Africans sophisticated and able enough both to argue their case for
self-determination and to demonstrate their competence
to benefit by it, and thus obviate any resource to the
violence latent in the colonial situation.
(GR9: 14)
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In other words, the Kikuyus were aware of the importance of education
for political emancipation.

But more importantly, they were determined

to excel in education so that they could control the political structures of the State at independence.

The evidence presented in this

study suggests that, after assuming leadership in 1963, the educated
Africans (Luos and Kikuyus) have instead, ironically, contributed to
the perpetuation of neocolonialism in Kenya.

This raises the suspic-

ion that personal interests of the Kikuyu-Luo-educated class dominated
their desire to overthrow the colonial system.

Recent political events

in Kenya, particularly the imposition of a one-party State in r1ay 1982
and the attempted subsequent coup, demonstrate in clear terms the
determination of this educated political clique to subordinate Kenya's
interests to the clique's own personal interests.
Although early African organizations such as the Kikuyu Association were formed at Government urging and served as a buffer between
tribal grievances and the central government, those established later on
were more instrumental in confronting colonial authorities on various
issues (GR15: 119-122; GR96; GR13G).

For example, the Young

Kikuyu Association, which was established in 1921, often confronted
the authorities over issues of land, labor, and taxation.

When its

leader. Harry Thuku. was detained in 1922. the association was able to
organize a massive demonstration of approximately 8,000 people (GR66:
279-281; GR135: 251).

The Young Kikuyu Association was later named the

Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) under the leadership of educated men
such as Jomo Kenyatta.

The reason that such educated Kenyans became

the leaders of the independent struggle is explained by the fact that
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many of them were deprived of any meaningful role in the colonial
structure.

They therefore directed much political activity toward

permanent opposition to established authority--European as well as
the chiefs and elders who served as tools of European domination.
In a similar fashion, the lack of any meaningful role for school
1eavers in contemporary Kenyan society may lead to permanent opposition of the present government.

In fact, in recent years, there have

been many student strikes against the government, resulting in the
frequent closure of the University of Nairobi (GR89; Weekly Review,
March-August, 1982).
At the height of the Emergency in late 1952, the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association claimed over 400 schools, and the expansion
came to an end when the government closed these schools for allegedly
subversive activities (GR165: 7).

In short, colonial educational poli-

cies and practices in Kenya did profoundly influence the nature of
politics, acting as a catalyst in the growth of resistance to foreign
domination and, more importantly, in the recruitment of elites committed
to the achievEment of political independence.
Summary
The allocation of colonial State revenue, the ideological

outlook

and the skills imparted in each of the educational systems reflected the
expected positions its products would occupy in the colonial hierarchy.
African education was particularly geared to produce a better worker and
a more useful servant to the Europeans.

The combined effect of this poli-

cy was to reduce effectively the numbers of qualified Africans who would
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participate in the emerging modern industrial and commercial structure
of the country.

For example, in 1964, a Kenyan survey on high level

manpower revealed how few Africans there were in the professions:

36

doctors, 20 electrical engineers, 17 university professors, and 7
economists (KG:ll). Thus, by the time of independence, there were
serious shortages of indigenous high- and middle-level manpower required
for modernizing the economy.

The developmental dilemmas which Kenya

encountered at independence were simply the results of its position at the
periphery of Western capitalism since the beginning of the nineteenth
century.
REAPING THE FRUIT OF IIUHURU II
Educational Policy in Post-Independent Kenya, 1963-1980
At independence in 1963, Kenya inherited a very disintegrated
political economy, already organized for the benefit of European settlers.
The entire setup of the political, economic, and social interaction was
intended to reflect and to justify supposed racial differences and hence
differential access to economic opportunities.

The ILO Mission (GR69)

estimated that by 1960, fewer than 4,000 European farmers owned approximately 3 million hectares of land, 4/5 of the total area of the country
having reliable rainfall.

Europeans dominated agricultural production

completely.
During the same period, the average earnings of the 22,000 Europeans in wage-employment was more than Ktl,300 compared with those of
38,000 Asians of just over Kt500, and those of an estimated 530,000
Africans of Kt75 (GR69: 91).

The corresponding educational system also
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mirrored that same ideology which justified separate educational
institutions for the three racial groups.

The provision of elementary

and secondary education on the eve of independence reflected a racial
pattern which was characteristic of the colonial mode of development.
The secondary schools were concentrated in the areas near European
settlement and urban centers.

In 1963, about 30% of all secondary

schools in the country were in the urban areas, and these mainly
catered to the Asians and European communities which formed about 3%
of the total Kenyan population (GR85: 4).
The table below indicates primary school enrollment on the eve
of independence and reflects a similar racial pattern.
TABLE IV
PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT BY RACIAL GROUPS
1963
Racial Groups

African
Arab
Asian
European
Note:

# of Pupils

840,677
3,322
40,915
6,639

Corresponding School-Age Pop.
Total # of
Chil dren

% of Pop. Chi1dren in School

2,421,300
9,000
52,800
8,900

34.7
36.9
77.5
74.6

School age was estimated to be 5-14 years.
(KG7, 1965: 6)
While 75% of the European school age population was in school in

1963, the corresponding figure for Africans was only 35%.

Inequality

was thus deeply embedded within the economy and the educational system.
It was obvious that something had to be done in the immediate post-
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independence period.
Africanization of the political economy was the political answer to the problem.

The main features of this strategy were formulated

in the government document, African Socialism and its Application to
Planning in Kenya (KG1), 1965.

According to this document, the achieve-

ment of a rapid growth rate is the primary focus of government policy
in Kenya.

This approach to development made no attempt to restructure

the political and economic institutions established in the country during the colonial period.

Chief among these institutions is the educational

system, with many of its colonial legacies, such as the different school
systems catering to the different social classes and the emphasis on
academic criteria for advancement within the system.

In fact, to a large

extent, the educational system has remained the pillar of neocolonialism.
Kenya's response to the inherited educational disparities involved (a) Africanizing enrollment in the schools, and (b) expanding
access to opportunities by accelerating the supply of educational facilities.

Rapid expansion was also justified for achieving a rapid rate of

economic progress (KG12; KG15).

An impression of the educational

expansion which followed independence can be oained from the following diagram which shows the level of primary and secondary school
enrollments for the period 1961 to 1979. The figure shows that primary
school enrollment jumped from 870,000 in 1961 to over 3.5 million in
1979.

Secondary school enrollment reached 378,000 in 1979 from a mere

22,000 in 1961.

Educational opportunities for girls, however, have tended

to be lower at every level of education when compared with those of boys.
The situation has improved tremendously with the passage of free education

62

in 1974 for the first four years of primary school.
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School Enrollments.

As a consequence of the rapid growth of enrollments following
independence, government expenditures on education likewise increased
rapidly and education's share of the governmental recurrent budget
also increased, as indicated in Table V, on p 63.

By 1976/77, the

Ministry of Education was consuming close to 30% of the budget.

As

Nkinyangi (GR118) explains, this pattern of expenditure attests not
only to a high social demand for education, but is indicative of the
faith the masses and po1icymakers ascribe to the role of education as
a panacea for societal development.

It also points out the serious

impact that educational provision has on other recurrent expenditures.
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TABLE V
APPROVED GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE (NET) ON EDUCATION
AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE,
1963/54 TO 1976/77. IN Kt. MILLIONS
Year

Next Recurrent*
Expenditure on
Education (a)

1963/64
1964/65
1965/66
1966/67
1967/68
1968/69
1969/70
1970/71
1971/72
1972/73
1973/74
1974/75
1975/76
1976/77

Total Gov1t
Expenditure

8.3
5.2
6.S
6.5
7.6
8.6
15.7
25.4
31.3
37.1
33.9
54.2
64.6
72.7

(a) as %
of (b)

(b)

42.6
44.S
49.7
54.6
58.8
61.3
73.9
92.5
109.5
121.8
146.1
186.5
228.6
248.3

19
12
14
12
13
14
21
27
29
30
27
29
28
28

(a) Totals in table are at current prices (not adjusted for inflation)
(b) Figures are not comparable for all years. For instance, in 1970
the Central Government took over responsibility for financing
primary education from County Councils.
(c) Figures for 1976/77 are revised estimates.

* Expenditures financed by current receipt from internal borrowing
and loan repayment receipts, direct and indirect taxation.
Source:

(KG?)

Table VI summarizes the location of financial resources to the
various educational systems in the country.

Primary education contin-

ues to receive the largest allocation, accounting for 58% of the total
recurrent expenditure.

This despite the insistence of the Kenya Educa-

tion Commission (KG12) to assign greater urgency to secondary and
postsecondary education to meet the manpower needs of the country.
Secondary education received only 12% of the education budget in the
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1978/79 fiscal year.

On the whole, the large expenditure on education

attests to a high social demand for education and also reflects planners'
and politicians' perceptions of the importance of education in development.
Within the Ministry of Education budget, expenditures are distributed as shown below.
TABLE VI
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
ESTIMATES OF RECURRENT EXPENDITURE
1978/79
Ki:.'OOO
Education Section

Net Expenditure in Kt' s

%of
Total

Administration and Planning
Primary Education
Secondary Education
Technical Education
Teacher Education
Education for Handicapped
Polytechnic Education
Higher Education
Miscellaneous

4,428.7
59,740.1
13,003.4
1,093.9
3,239.6
392.1
1,542.0
11,587.8
7,338.1

4.3
58.3
12.7
1.1
3.2
0.4
1.5
11.3
7.1

102,329.7

99.9

Totals
Note:

The table excludes expenditure on education by other ministries,
notably on primary education in municipalities and on adult
education.
Source:

(KG6, 1980: 178)

The basic characteristic of educational policy in postcolonial Kenya
has, therefore, been the perpetual expansion of the school system as
a means of redressing past disparities.

From the pOint of view of a
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long term employment objective, the most damaging aspect of these events
may be the effects of undifferentiated quantitative expansion on the
educational system itself. As in the economy, basic structural changes
were required in the educational system inherited from the colonial period.

Yet the pressure of sheer expansion left little time for qualitative

changes.

Such expansion was supported by both young people and their

parents who contributed enormous sums of money toward education.

Thus,

money and resources were channeled into a tremendous quantitative expansion of the system still largely cast within a colonial mold.

Fundamental

changes of structure, curriculum, examination and, indeed, the whole style
and approach of the educational system were postponed.

In a sense, the

growth of the system and the Kenyanization of enrollments had prevented
the educational structure from being adapted to national needs and made
more equitable.
Despite the evident strides made in expanding educational opportunities, certain serious problems have emerged in recent years that
deflect the country's educational goal and the reality of the economy:
rising costs, educated unemployment, and regional disparities.

This

section will focus primarily on the distribution of educational resources
and opportunities among regions and social groups and examine the extent
to which such disparities have deflected the government's stated objectives
of regional socioeconomic equity.

Since education is viewed as a vehicle

for social mobility, the analysis of educational inequality is fundamental
to an explanation of the problem of unemployment in Kenya.
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The Distribution of Educational Resources Since Independence
Since independence, the government of Kenya has, in various documents, emphasized the need to distribute the fruits of development
equitably.

In Sessional Paper No. 10 (KG1), the official objectives

were stated as:

continued expansion of the economy, wider sharing of

the benefits of expansion, national integration of the economy, and
an attack on extreme imbalances and disparities.

These objectives have

subsequently been reflected in the country's four development plans published since independence (1966-70; 1970-74; 1974-78; 1979-83).

However,

the development policies pursued so far have been limited, relative to
the objectives these policies were intended to attain.

In fact, they

have produced results which often have reinforced the existing class
and regional differences characteristic of the colonial mode of development (GR17; GR69).

The ILO Report speaks of these disparities:

Differential access on a regional basis to such advantages as roads, education, and development projects is
closely related to economic disparity, and is thus a
major force behind migration, both from the country to
the towns and from one rural area to another. Particularly serious is the way in which regional imbalances
interact with tribal fears and forces, partly as a cause
and partly as a result.
CGR69: 301)
The disparities described above are particularly expressed in
the provision of educational opportunities at the regional level.

Gross

disparaties remain between provinces and districts in such areas as the
proportion of the primary age group actually in school, distribution of
qualified teachers, distribution of secondary schools, etc (GR85).

Al-

though the disparities had their roots in the colonial political economy,
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they have been intensified by the development policies of the postindependence government.

The disparities not only affect the structure

and nature of the educational system, but also have a strong bearing on
such issues as social mobility, income distribution, and social differentiation.
Primary School Enrollment.

The outstanding feature of Kenyan

education since independence has been the rate of expansion.

As indi-

cated in Table VII, primary school enrollment jumped from one million in
1965 to nearly 3 mission in 1978.
is unevenly distributed.

However, access to primary education

The overall enrollment ratio (of the official

6 to 12 age group) in 1978 was 81%.

Provincial enrollment ratios ranged

from 101% for Central Province, 99% for Eastern, 89% for Western, and
73% for Nairobi to 56% for Coast and 11% for North Eastern Province.

TABLE VII
PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 1965-78 AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE PROJECTED
SCHOOL AGE POPULATION (6-13)
Province
Central
Coast
Eastern
N Eastern
Nyanza
R Valley
Western
Nai robi
Kenya

1965
Enrollment

%of Pop.
Aged 6-13

1978
Enrollment

% of Pop.
Aged 6-13

238,001
57,523
199,107
912
162,229

68
33
52
2
36
35
51
57
45

615,000
170,000
601,000
9,000
498,000
570,000
415,000
90,000
2,976,900

100.8
56.4
99.3
10.8
68.0
75.4
89.0
72.6
81.0

161,272

146,679
45,096
1,010,889

Source: (KG8; KG7: 1979)
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The four provinces (Central, Eastern, Western, and Nairobi) had a headstart in Western education because of missionary activity in the early
days of colonialism.

And since independence, these four provinces have

been very active in lobbying for central government resources.

The same

cannot be said about North Eastern and Coast Provinces which are lagging
well behind because of geographical and historical circumstances.

Tra-

ditionally, the predominance of Islam in these two provinces restricted
missionary expansion, resulting in a delay in Western education reaching
them.
The national figures on access to primary education hide sizable
provincial differences.

On the basis of data put together by Kinyanjui

(GR86) and presented in Table VIII, there are indeed substantial disparities among provinces and districts.

The explanation for these disparities

is partly historical and partly due to a combination of political and
economic factors.

Historical factors include early missionary activity,

particularly in Central and Western Provinces, a strong tradition of
self-help in the former African Reserves, and the development of export
agriculture, notably, coffee and tea in the former White Highlands. Most
of the privileged districts had a head start in Western education because
of a combination of these historical and economic factors and have managed
to maintain their lead in the post-independence period because of their
economic and political power.
In contrast to the high participating districts, there are many
districts with lower participation rates.

These include districts in

Coast Province where resistance to missionary evangelism and the prevalence of Islamic schools prevented the spread of Western educational
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TABLE VIII
THE PROPORTION OF SCHOOL AGE CHILDREN (6-13) ENROLLED IN
PRIMARY SCHOOL BY DISTRICT, 1971 AND 1975
# of Children in School as a Propor-

tion of Projected 6-13 School Age
Population, 1971-1975

Province
Central

Coast

Eastern

N Eastern
Nyanza

R Valley

Western
Nai robi

District
Ki ambu
Kirinyaga
Murang'a
Nyandarua
Nyeri
Kil i fi
Kwale
Lamu
Taita Taveta
Tana River
Mombasa
Embu
Is1010
Kitui
Marsabit
Machakos
Meru
Garissa
Mandera
Wajir
Ki s i i
Kisumu
Siaya
South Nyanza
Bari ngo
Nakuru
Laikipia
Narok
Kaj i ado
Kericho
Samburu
E/Marakwet
Nandi
Uasin Gishu
West Pokot
TransNzoia
Turkana
Bungoma
Busia
Kakamega

1971

1975

%

-.!....

99
67
95
80
97
31
33
29
71
41
58
67
52
56
31
89
62
15
5
8
52
48
57
36
38
48
71
26
45
41
16
39
51
39
25
49
5
63
49
62

112
107
124
112
120
56
68
101
99
61
65
107
59
98
38
129
92
16
8
11
114
99
100
80
90
91
120
50
69
73
21
85
102
76
54
99
11
113
102
116

72

77

Source:

(KG8, 1971, 1975)
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forms.

Included also are the arid and semi-arid districts, mostly

inhabited by pastoralists, and the four main urban centers of Kenya:
Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, and Nakuru.

The explanation for the low

participation in urban centers is a simple one.

While participation

is universal among high and medium income groups, it may well be very
low among the urban poor and the unemployed.

The rising urban squatter

settlement in these towns points to this likelihood.
Distribution of Qualified Teachers.

The shortage of qualified

teachers has been a common problem of developing countries since independence.

Generally, Kenya has done well in comparison with other

African countries.

In 1979, nearly 75% of the primary teacher force

was trained to teach, 37% of which had four years of high school plus
two years of teacher training (KG6, 1980: 183).

But the distribution

of qualified teachers among the various provinces is extremely uneven.
As shown in Table IX, 99% of the primary school teachers in Nairobi
(for 1978) were professionally qualified, followed by Central Province,
which listed 87% of its primary school teachers as professionally qualified.

The Coast Province, with only 59% of its teachers trained, ranked

last on the list.

The largest number of trained teachers was found in

the Central, Eastern, and Rift Valley provinces, and the least number
of untrained teachers was in Nairobi.

The explanation for Central Pro-

vince and Nairobi IS share of qualified teachers is partly historical
and partly due to a combination of political and economic factors.
Proximity to the enclaves of European settlement and the urban center
of Nairobi, the early missionary activity and a strong tradition of
self-help are some of the historical factors which account for Central
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TABLE IX
PERCENTAGE OF QUALIFIED PRIMARY SCHOOL TEACHERS IN
EACH PROVINCE, FOR SELECTED YEARS

Province
Nai robi
Central
N Eastern
Nyanza
R Valley
Eastern
Western
Coast
Totals

1974

1976

1978

%

%

%

97
81
71
64
64
61
59
57

98
82
61
55
59
59
57
53

Absolute Numbers of Teachers
UIHRAmED
TRAINED
2,935
14,911
225
10,800
11,247
12,057
8,415
3,312
63,912

99
87
64
64
65
65
63
59
Sources:

Province's lead in education.

35
2,132
127
6,088
5,948
6,754
4,962
2,416
28,134

(KG7, 1974, 1976, 1978;
KG8, 1974, 1976,1978)

Nairobi's position at the seat of qovern-

ment and industrial establishment, and a large European cOnTJ1unity, explain
its lead in education.

Therefore, there is a clear tendency for the

relative position of the disadvantaged provinces (Coast, North Eastern,
and Rift Valley Provinces) to have worsened over time while the privileged
provinces have maintained their lead.

The pattern is expected to be the

same in the provision of secondary school resources and opportunities.
Distribution of Secondary School Resources.
(a)

Secondary School Expansion.

At the time of independence, the

government of Kenya was committed to as large a secondary expansion as
it could afford because there was actually a shortage of students sufficiently qualified to replace the departing expatriates.

Rapid expansion
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was also justified to provide a sufficient number of secondary schools
for a large number of primary school graduates.
One of the best indicators of secondary school expansion is the
immediate success of Harambee, or self-help schools, which were initiated
on the basis of a felt need within each community for additional educational opportunities.

Since 1967, Harambee schools have been the

expanding edge of Kenya's secondary school system.
illustrates the extent of the expansion.

Figure 2, following,

For example, in 1966 there

were 206 government-maintained schools and 336 Harambee secondary
schools.

In 1977, the corresponding figures were 444 anJ 1042, respec-

tively.
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The Harambee school system is not under the jurisdiction of the
government.

The Ministry of Education has little to do with this

school system other than to certify its existence.

Initially, these

self-help initiatives were welcomed by the authorities as a sign of
the new modernizing spirit by the majority of Kenyans.

In recent

years, however, this uncontrolled expansion of Harambee schools has
done much to destabilize any government effort toward a balanced approach to educational development in the country (GR81).

The following

have been the unhappy consequences of this rapid spread:

(1) qualified

teachers in Harambee schools are in short supply; (2) standards of curricula are uneven, and it is often hard to control the enforcement of
certain minimum requirements; (3) the growing demand for academic schooling by the different ethnic groups hinders balanced national educational
planning as the richer districts maintain their lead by building more
schools and hiring the qualified teachers away from the deprived districts.
(b) Secondary School Enrollment.

Secondary education, like primary

education, at the time of independence consisted of three separate,
racially divided systems in which Africans made up about 37% of the total student body (GR75: 154).

In 1963, about 30% of all secondary

schools were in the urban areas, catering to the Asian and European
communities which formed only 3% of the total Kenyan population (GR8S:
4).

In a more determined step in 1967, the government directed that 50%

of all entering students must be Africans; and that year, the overall
proportion of Africans in secondary schools reached 82% (GR7S: 154). The
trend continued; and by the mid-1970's, the vast majority of students were
Africans, although some so-called "high-cost" schools stilL.included .,
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substantial percentages of non-Africans.
Progress in secondary education may be judged by the fact that
secondary enrollments increased almost ten fold in a period of thirteen years (see Figure 3, below), from 35,921 in 1964 to 320,000 in
1977.

Harambee schools accounted for 60% of the total secondary school

enrollment in 1977, which implies that a high proportion of the country's secondary school students were being trained in institutions of
low curricular quality, inferior in equipment, and inadequate in terms
of teaching staff.
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The low standard of education at the Harambee schools was shown
to have a significant negative impact on the employment prospects of
graduates from these schools.

Kinyanjui (GR88), for example, reported

that of the 1,186 secondary school leavers he traced, 37% of the
Harambee school leavers were unemployed in their first year after
leaving school.

The corresponding figures for aided national and pro-

vincial schools were 6% and 5%, respectively.

This evidence suggests

that the different school systems in Kenya are having differential
social impact.
(c)

Allocation of Public Funds for Secondary Education.

Since

so little data are available on the provincial allocation of government
expenditures for education, it may also be of some interest to see how
capital expenditures are allocated (even though this type of expenditure
is small compared with recurrent expenditures).

Only data for secondary

schools are available (see Table X, below).
TABLE X
PER CAPITA DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE ON SECONDARY
EDUCATION BY PROVINCE 1974-78 (KL)
Nairobi
Central
Coast
Eastern
North Eastern
Nyanza
Rift Valley
Western

0.31
0.53
0.25
0.20
0.20
0.15
0.19
0.23

Source: This table is taken from Bigsten (GR17), who
made his calculations from Development Estimates. 1974/751975/76 figures concern approved expenditures; 1977/78 data
concern estimated expenditures.
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Because these data indicate where new schools are built and where
old ones expanded, one might expect the biggest share to go to the
provinces, where the largest increase in enrollment has occurred.

The

Central Province had the largest increase in enrollment and also the
largest share of development expenditures--actually more than twice
what it would have received had the money been distributed on a percentage
basis according to population size.

Nairobi and the Coast have also

obtained considerable sums, despite the fact that the number of pupils
enrolled there has increased slowly.

This is probably due to the fact

that old, established, high-quality schools are well provided for.

The

Nyanza Province gets the least money per capita in development expenditures.
These partial data seem to support Nyangira's (GR12l) hypothesis
that the money tends to flow to the most developed regions.

Kinyanjui

(GR8S: 39) also concludes from his study that educational benefits are
being distributed in favor of the economically and politically powerful
districts and provinces in the country.
one important qualification must be made:

In the context of this study,
although the distribution of

educational expenditures among provinces reflects inequalities, they
are still considerably more evenly distributed than economic activity
in general (see Appendix A).

They can, therefore, to some extent be

assumed to counterbalance the regional disparities generated by the
production apparatus.
(d)

Distribution of Secondary Schools.

In the past eighteen years,

Kenya has achieved tremendous expansion in education, but regional inequalities have remained intact, and in some cases, have worsened.

The
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distribution of secondary school institutions in 1977, shown in Table
XI, illustrates once again the disparities which exist among the provinces.
TABLE XI
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF SECONDARY SCHOOLS, 1977
% of Nat'l

Aided Schools

Province

Po~. (l969~

Central
Coast
Eastern
Nairobi
N Eastern
Nyanza
R Valley
lies tern

15.3
8.7
17.4
4.7
2.2
19.4
20.2
12.2

101
31
76
30
4
80
62
60

Totals

100.0

444

#

%

Unaided Schools
#

Total

%

%

26
4
19
2

18
14
13

275
40
198
29
0
170
126
204

16
12
19

24
6
18
5
0
17
13
16

100

1,042

100

100

22
7
17
7

Source: (KG8, 1977)
According to the figures, Central Province, with less than

15~';

of the national population, contained 22% of the aided schools and 26%
of the unaided schools, with a total of 24% of the secondary schools
in the country.

The explanation for Central Province's large share of

educational institutions is partly historical and partly due to a combination of political and economic factors.

Historical factors include

the proximity of the province to the enclaves of European settlement and
the urban center of Nairobi, early missionary activity, and a strong
tradition of self-help in education, exemplified by the Kikuyu Independent Schools Movement of the early 1930's.

The agricultural development
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of the area, primarily in the White Highland, and the political dominance of its residents (notably the Kikuyu) have also helped to
consolidate this lead.
The province with the second largest provision of secondary school
institutions was Eastern, with 18% of the total secondary institutions
in the country.

Nyanza Province had the third highest percentage of

secondary schools in the nation, with 17.

Western Province had 16%.

These four provinces had a head start in Western education because of
missionary activities in the early days of colonialism.

Since inde-

pendence, these four provinces have been very active and sometimes very
successful in lobbying for central government resources, in contrast to
North Eastern, Coast, and some of the districts in Rift Valley Province.
Although people in these areas are becoming aware of the disparities in
education, they must contend with political and economic difficulties
if they are to catch up.

The urban areas, by comparison, are relatively

well endowed with secondary schools.

Nairobi, for instance, contained

5% of all secondary institutions in 1977, although the figure does not
include the elite, privately-owned schools.
(e) Distribution of Secondary School Teachers.
in Kenya are also very short of qualified teachers.

Secondary schools
As a result, the

government has sought technical assistance personnel from friendly
foreign countries in the form of trained teachers to overcome the existing shortages.
significant.

As Table XII shows, this noncitizen assistance has been
For example, in 1970, 35% of the technical assistants in

the country were working for the Ministry of Education (GR129: 30).
addition to expatriate teachers who are supplied to the government

In

79
through bilateral aid, there are also volunteer teachers serving
secondary schools in Kenya.
TABLE XII
DISTRIBUTION OF QUALIFIED SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS
BY PROVINCE AND CITIZENSHIP, 1977

Province
Central
Coast
Eastern
Nai robi
N Eastern
Nyanza
R Valley
Western
Totals

Aided Schools
NonCitizen
Citizen Total
943
243
551
454
24
590
496
442
3,743

Unaided Schools
NonCiti zen
Citizen
Total
290
42
221
34

241
105
121
166

531
147
342
200

122
145
44

1,222
364
676
706
24
712
641
486

150
126
68

95
12S
112

245
251
180

1,088

4,831

931

965

1,896

279
121
125
252

Source:

(KG8, 1977)

Of the total of 6,727 professionally qualified teachers in Kenyan
secondary schools in 1977, 72% were located in aided schools, while
only 28% were employed in Harambee and other unaided schools.

In 1970,

82% taught in aided schools, while only 18% were employed in Harambee
schools (GR8S: 35).

In 1977, Central Province had 26% of all qualified

secondary school teachers.

The province with the second largest provision

was Eastern with 15%; Nyanza, Rift Valley, and the city of Nairobi had
14%, 13%, and 13%, respectively.

This again indicates the existence of

long-established regional differences which had roots in the colonial
period and which were accentuated in the post-independence era.
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The citizenship profile of secondary school teachers indicates
that nearly 31% of the qualified teachers in secondary schools are
noncitizens.

Noncitizens account for 22% of the qualified teachers

in aided schools and 50% of the qualified teachers in unaided schools.
In the city of Nairobi, noncitizens make up 83% of the qualified
teachers in unaided schools.

This is an indication that a high pro-

portion of the private, elite schools are concentrated in Nairobi,
catering to the ruling classes.
The Harambee School as a Shadow System of Education
The Harambee School Movement, which gained momentum in the postindependence era, had its roots in the colonial period as exemplified
by the Kikuyu Independent Schools Movement discussed in a previous
section.

A Harambee school is usually initiated on the basis of a

perceived need within a community for greater educational opportunity
for its children.

The people of a community raise the funds for their

schools; they lend their labor for its construction; and they, most often
without any governmental assistance, maintain the schools over time
with the hope that the government will eventually step in and begin to
materially support them.
Despite an initial government stand on the 1964 Kenya Education Commission (KG12) recommendation that Harambee schools be strictly controlled,
there has been a gradual swing towards accommodating them.

In the

1970's and 1980's, politicians began to offer SUbstantial support for
these projects (GR16; GR81; GR129).

It is commonplace for politicians

of national prominence to become involved with school movements.

A
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great deal of importance is placed upon the participation of members
of parliament and local government officials.

This decision was, how-

ever, calculated to shift the financial burden from the government's
shoulders while the different communities welcomed it as an opportunity
to take a greater role in the education of their children.
In order to understand this apparent contradiction between stated
objective and actual policy choice, one must place Kenya's national
development policy in perspective.

Kenya is committed to an overall

development strategy which emphasizes gross economic growth, even at
the expense of social equity when necessary (KG1: 18).
underlies whatever other national choices are made.

This commitment

In a patron-client

state such as Kenya, political choices are more often made which may
not appear to make sense in strict economic terms, but which are
nevertheless believed to enhance the attainment of broad economic goals.
Often, social policies are adopted mainly because of the social-symbolic
functions they serve and not because they distribute lithe most good to
the greatest number of peop1e" (GR16: 101).
The policy of endorsing unrestrained expansion of secondary education, in particular the Harambee schools which are below recognized
standards, can only be understood when political payoffs are considered.
The growing number of Harambee schools has been complemented by an escalating demand from the general public that the government reward their
efforts by relieving them of the tremendous financial burdens involved
in sustaining such institutions.

Through local patrons such as chiefs,

elders, and KANU party officials and through their representatives in
Parliament, local communities make demands upon the government to
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contribute to the support of their schools. The government's response
to public demand has been to incorporate 25 to 30 Harambee schools
annually into the "aided" system.

In addition, the government insti-

tuted a scheme of aid to the Harambee secondary schools in 1975 entitled
the "Harambee Package Programme" (KG4: 420).

Under this plan, fifty

schools are offered government aid in the form of fully qualified
teachers, audio visual equipment, and annual assistance from the Inspectorate.
If a particular community lags considerably behind in education,
the blame is always passed to the local representative, who is considered
ineffective and is subsequently voted out of office.

Consequently,

community dissatisfaction is directed toward the local government representative

(or patron) rather than toward the national political elite

in Nairobi.

Thus, by its political-economic balancing act, the govern-

ment of Kenya is able to satisfy many demands and present the image of
satisfying several others (GR16. GR122).

As a result, an aura of sta-

bility and progress emerges which creates a climate favorable to sustained
economic growth.

In reality, however, the practice of selective incor-

poration of Harambee schools into the aided school system represents a
token response from the government in that schools are expanding so
rapidly that the present rate of supplying teachers or taking over
schools is not sufficient to insure that the secondary system will be
unitary in the near future (GR38).

The merit of this paternalistic

policy is not so much the tangible effect it has, but its symbolic
effects.

By presenting the image of doing something for the people,

the government is able to elicit support for its policies, however
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limited their effect may be.
Local and national politicians justify the existence of the Harambee schools on the basis of political considerations. They express
the view that unless the people are allowed to have their own schools,
political unrest could develop.

What these politicians ignore, however,

is that the current school phenomenon exacerbates existing regional,
ethnic, and class inequalities, which would have a devastating effect
on the course of general national development.

In addition, the fact

that Harambee schools are only symbolically linked to the total educational system, education inspectors could not effectively monitor the
activities of these schools.

What results is a very imperfect attempt

by the government to determine the direction of educational policy in
the country.
In the final analysis, the evidence presented in this chapter
leads to the conclusion that the development policies adopted by Kenya
since independence did not lead to structural changes per see

Instead,

the government devoted large sums of resources to education under the
assumption that such an investment would lead to development.

The

impact of this misguided strategy on employment will be discussed in
Chapter IV.
Summary
In the colonial period, the role and extent of education for
Africans was dictated by the differing interests of al1 the communities
who played a part in the formulation of educational policies, but even
more by those who directly controlled it. The missionaries, the
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administration, and the Europeans formed a limited partnership.
Later, the Africans became a fourth force; and when they failed to
be recognized, they established their own schools outside the officiallyrecognized educational system.
The sharp inequalities among the three racial groups in the
economic, political, and educational arenas became a major catalyst
for the Mau Mau uprising in the early 1950 1s. The rise of African
nationalism in this period succeeded in creating a new political context in which successive colonial Secretaries accepted the urgent need
for political and economic changes in the African community.

Impor-

tant though these changes were, the underlying philosophy concerning
development since independence was largely unchanged.

The pattern of

deco1onization was carefully controlled to bring to power an African
petty bourgeoisie class fully committed to the maintenance of the
status quo, thus perpetuating neocolonialism in all aspects of Kenyan
society.

Structural transformation of the Socialist type was ruled

out from Independence Government policy.

Instead, Africanization of

the political economy became the hallmark of Kenya1s development policy
after independence was achieved.

In the educational field, this meant

integrating a small segment of Africans into the former colonial
institutions, thereby altering the racial composition of the schools
without fundamental change to the structure of the educational system as
a whole.
The political and social forces which existed during the colonial
period have changed somewhat with time.

But, by and large, they shaped

the development of education and particularly the inequalities which
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occurred during the colonial period, some of which have persisted
during the twenty years since independence.

Indeed, some of the

developments of the colonial period, such as self-help, the Harambee
schools, and the use of examinations as a criterion for advancement,
have gained momentum since independence.

Thus, some of the dependency

relationship has remained strong even though political independence
has been achieved.

This relationship has, however, been modified by

the development strategies currently being applied in Kenya.

CHAPTER III
KENYA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN PERSPECTIVE: PITFALLS IN
PAST AND PRESENT DEVELOPMENT POLICIES
This chapter examines the relationship between the private and
public sectors of the Kenyan economy and the pattern of national
development since independence.

Specifically, this section demon-

strates how Kenya's continued dependency on external economic actors
has created a development pattern that cannot generate enough employment opportunities to meet the needs of Kenyan school 1eavers.
Since independence in 1963, Kenya has attracted attention as
one of the success stories of Africa, both politically and economically.
The evidence presented in this chapter questions this assumption and
points to the continued vulnerability and limitations of the Kenyan
economy imposed by its periphery role within the world system.
Kenya's economic difficulties came to a head in the late 1970's,
then spilled over into the 1980's as real growth lost pace with the
country's soaring population increase, causing a decline in per capita
gross domestic product (GOP).

The principal factors leading up to

the economic stagnation are:

a high-priced, import-intensive indus-

trial sector; low world prices for coffee and tea; continued bottlenecks in the agricultural sector; and rapidly increasing prices for
manufactured imports.

Declining export receipts and high import

dependance contribute to chronic balance of payments deficits and more
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hard times ahead for the Republic of Kenya.

These economic problems

diminish the aspirations of school graduates in obtaining attractive
modern sector jobs.
PRIORITIES IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY
Kenya has defined development in terms of the continued gl"owth
·,and elaboration of the political and economic institutions established
in the country during the colonial period.

With respect to economic

policy, the government has concentrated its attention on the achievement of rapid economic growth rates which it considers necessary to
raise the standard of living in the country.

The government's docu-

ment outlining the official development ideology is titled, African
Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya (Sessional Paper
No. 10, 1965).

The document's emphasis on fast economic growth is

based on the assumption that social justice can be achieved only by
sharing wealth, not poverty.

The document points out that

The most important {policy} is to provide a firm basis
for rapid economic growth. Other immediate problems such
as Africanization of the economy, education, unemployment,
welfare services~ and provi~cial policies must be handled
in ways that will not jeopardize growth. The only permanent solution to all of these problems rests on rapid
growth.
If grcwth is given up in order to reduce unemployment, a growing population will quickly demonstrate
how false that policy is; if Africanization is undertaken
at the expense of growth, our reward will be a falling
standard of living; if free primary education is achieved
by sacrificing growth, no jobs will be available for the
school leavers. Growth, then, is the first concern of
planning in Kenya (emphasis added).
(KG1: 18)
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The government has sought to promote rapid economic growth
by means of encouragement of. both small-holder and large-scale farming,
public investment and accelerated industrialization by providing incentives for private investment in modern industry, including foreign
investment.

The commitment to private investment, foreign investment

in particular, is clearly stated in the latest Development Plan:
The government will continue to maintain the policy of
a mixed economy. The target of high growth rate of the
sector will require substantial resources for investment.
Greater reliance will be placed on the private sector
investment, which will include investment from abroad.
As in the past, the government will continue to welcome
foreign investment and to provide adequate measures to
safeguard such investments. Foreign enterprises will be
welcomed and will be assured the ossibilit of ade uate
repatriation of profits. emphasis added.
(KG5:332)
In short, the Kenyan development model can be characterized as
"mixed;" it incorporates a diversity of organizational forms and
incentives, and combines private enterprise with significant government participation and guidance.

This approach, from the standpoint

of the main thrust of growth, reflects the belief that broader social
justice for the majority of Kenyans could only be achieved by pursuing
a development strategy similar to the colonial economic structure.
The new strategy in essence advocated that all the main elements
of the colonial economic planning approach remain intact except for
(a) the conversion of parts of the former White Highlands from largescale farming to small-scale household plots for the most land-hungry
peasants; and (b) ending the colonial restrictions of cash crop production in the former African Researves (CG2).

Important though
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these changes were, the underlying philosophy concerning economic
development was on maximizing growth, as measured in GNP.

In order

to obtain this narrow economic goal, imported capital, skills, and
enterprises were to be the main sources of this developmental objective.

The result of such strategy has been the concentration of

political and economic power in one or two urban centers while
effectively ignoring the development potential of the rural areas
,.

where 90% of Kenya's population resides.

In other words, the demand

for infrastructure grows where political power to obtain it is the
greatest.
THE STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE KENYAN ECONOMY
SINCE INDEPENDENCE IN 1963
The first feature of the Kenyan economy revealed by an examination of the national accounts is the existence of subsistence
semimonetary) and modern (monetary) sectors and a long-established
tradition of exchange relations between them.

There is a wide discrep-

ancy between the two, each commanding unparalleled strength and
influence in the economy.

Most of the production in the traditional

(or semimonetary) economy is agricultural, and a large part of the
rural population's food is produced and consumed with only minimum
intervention of a monetary economy.

The relative contribution of the

subsistence sector to the welfare of the population is greater than
its relative monetary importance in terms of the gross national product.
Table XIII details the percentage of the semimonetary sector's
contribution to the GOP.
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TABLE XIII
PERCENTAGE OF CONTRIBUTION OF THE SEMIMONETARY SECTOR TO GDP,
1964-79
1964
Agri culture

1970

1972

1974

1976

1977

22.9

20.0

17.6

16.5

15.3

14.6

4.1

3.5

4.3

4.3

4.2

4.1

Total nonmonetary 27.0

23.5

21.9

20.8

19.5

18.7

Total Monetary

73.0

76.5

78.1

79.2

80.5

81.3

Total Economy

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

A11 other

Source: (KG6, 1975, 1978)
It is estimated that over 90% of Kenya's 16 mill ion people
1i ve in the rural areas where they earn their livelihood.

A large

proportion of the rural population is engaged in subsistence farming,
characterized by low earnings and often temporary employment (GR152: 2).
Because of population pressure and limited land for farming, the vast
majority of the rural population frequently migrate to the cities in
search of jobs or they work on a part-time basis in the cash crop
growing multinational farms.

According to one estimate (GR107),

approximately 60% of the rural labor force is migrant in anyone
season for two reasons:

(a) jobs that occur in the modern sector are

considered to be more permanent and rewarding than those in the traditional sector, and (b) in the modern sector, wages are much higher
due to labor productivity resulting from scientific production methods.
This has intensified competition for modern sector jobs, particularly
among those with some years of formal education (GR132).
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Within the modern sector, agriculture is, of course, a major
component of the economy, accounting for 34% of GOP in 1979 (See Table
XIV).

The figure for 1964 was 23%.

This does not mean that Kenya

was becoming more agricultural in the sense that more of its resources
were being devoted to agriculture.

On the contrary, the growth in the

importance of agriculture in GOP has nothing to do with any actions by
Kenyans.

It is the result of a rise in the world price for Kenya's

agricultural exports, notably coffee and tea.

The export price of

coffee rose from K.shs. 10/71 per kg in 1974 to K.shs. 43/33 in 1977.
The price of tea rose from K.shs. 7/82 per kg to K.shs. 20/44 in the
same period (KG6, 1978).

In 1975, the contribution of agriculture to

monetary GOP was 18%, yet two years later it was marginally under 30%.
No shift of resources into agriculture could have accounted for such
an enormous change over so short a time.

Its contribution has increased

simply because world prices have increased.

This description reflects

once again the importance of semimonetary as well as monetary agriculture in the country's economy.
Since independence, the Kenyan economy has performed remarkably
well despite the setbacks in the latter half of the 1970's.

As shown

in Table XV, there were sUbstantial variations over the period
under review, ranging from a record 7.8% in 1968 to a dismal all-time
low of about 1% in 1975.

Oue to increases in the price of coffee

and tea in 1976 and 1977, the economy achieved a growth rate of 7.3%
in 1977.

The dependence of the economy on a few cash crops and its

consequent vulnerability can be seen from the low rate of growth
achieved in 1979 and 1980 due to fluctuation in the world price for
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TABLE XIV
GOP BY SOURCE, AT CONSTANT PRICES
1964
Sectors

1964

1968

1973

1974

1977

1979

1973-77

Agriculture,
forestry, &
fishing
(semi monetary)
(monetary)

39.8

36.3

34.6

29.8

29.0

36.0

- 0.1

(22.9)
(16.9)

(21. 0
(15.3)

(18.5)
(16.2)

(15.3)
(14.5)

(14.6)
(14.4)

( 0.7)
(35.3)

(-1.1)
( 0.9)

Manufacturing
repairing

10.4

10.4

11.6

13.3

15.6

13.2

1Q.8

Building &
construction

3.8

4.3

4.2

6.5

5.3

3.9

11.0

Electricity &
water

2.1

1.9

2.1

1.8

2.4

1.3

8.3

General government Services

12.8

14.6

16.8

15.1

17.8

14.5

5.5

Other Services

31.1

32.5

30.7

33.5

29.9

13.5

3.3

Total
Economy

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

4.0

Sources:

(KG6 & KG7, 1973-80)

coffee and tea as well as the increase in the price of imported oil.
The growth rate is likely not to exceed 3% before 1984, still well below the targeted rate of 5.4% mentioned in the latest Development Plan
(KG5) (GR152).

Continued economic problems mean limited expansion of

employment opportunties and thus, prolonged unemployment for the school
1eavers.
For a proper understanding of the performance of the economy, two
time frames are established.

The first phase covers the period 1964-73
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TABLE XV
ANNUAL AVERAGE RATE OF GROWTH OF GOP
(AT 1972 CONSTANT PRICES)
1964-67
6.8a

1968-72
6.8 a

1973-74

1975-76

5.3 b

3.2c
Sources:

1977
7.3 d
(a
(b
(c
(d
(e

= KG6,
= KG6,
= KG6,
= KG6,
= KG7,

1979
4.2 e
1973:
1974:
1977:
1977:
1980;

1980
2.4 e

5)
2)

13)
13)
GR169)

when the economy grew steadily at an annual rate of 6.6%; and the

s~cond

phase is 1973-80, when, as a result of the impact of a series of international crises, widespread drought which affected agriculture, and the
balance-of-payment difficulties, growth slowed down substantially.

A

boost came in 1976 and 1977 from an unprecedented boom in the world
price for coffee and tea.

The boom was followed by another severe

balance-of-payments problem.
The impetus for growth in 1964-73 came mainly from the monetary
economy comprising modern sector activities--manufacturing, agriculture, and services--which grew at an annual average rate of 7.5% as
compared with about 3.7% for the semimonetary economy, made up mostly
of traditional subsistence and small-holder cash crop agriculture
(KG6, 1971, 1974).

Agricultural growth was stimulated by redistribu-

tion of large estates to small-holder, rapid diffusion of hybrid
maize, and small-holder output growth.

Manufacturing was stimulated

by the expansion of domestic demand due to rising agricultural incomes.

Investment for domestic production was encouraged by a high
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level of protection, a liberal attitude towards foreign investment,
and active government promotion of and some participation in manufacturing (KG18).

Despite a rapid growth of population between

1964 and 1973 averaging 3.6% annually, real income per head increased
an average of nearly 3% per annum over this period (KG6 & KG7, 1964-73).
In monetary terms, GDP per head at current prices increased progressively from about Kt35 in 1964 to Kt58 in 1973 (KG6, 1965, 1974).
One item which is of particular interest to this study is the fast
growth of general government services.

Its contribution to total GDP

increased from 12.8% to nearly 17% between 1964 and 1973 (see Table
XIV), due'mainly to the rapid expansion of education in the
decades after independence.

At present, an average of approximately

30% of the total government expenditure is spent on education.
Kenya's growth performance since 1974 has been especially vulnerable to swings in its international terms of trade.

Whereas an

average annual growth rate of approximately 7% was achieved between
1970-73, it fell sharply to 3.5% in real terms in 1974, and still further to about 1% in 1975 (KG6, 1977). This was attributed to the
disappointing growth of agriculture (see Table XIV), traditionally
Kenya's most important sector.

The dramatic increase in petroleum

and other import prices raised input costs (i.e., fertilizers and
imported equipment) in monetary agriculture, and the widespread
drought throughout Kenya in 1973 and 1974 adversely affected output
in both traditional and modern sector agriculture, but particularly
the former.

The economy rebounded in 1976-77 due to the "coffee boom

following frost damage in Brazil, and decelerated after 1978 when

II
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coffee prices began to approach a more normal level.
Manufacturing growth, on the other hand, was less affected than
growth in the other sectors of the monetary economy by the events
of 1973 and 1974.

The average growth rate of the manufacturing

sector was 16.9% between 1970-79, as opposed to 11.3% in 1964-70
(KG6, 1980: 29).

Manufacturing share in the GDP rose from 12.5% in

1964 to 15.6% in 1977.

In 1979, the manufacturing share of GDP

was 13.2%, while the share of agriculture in GDP was 36%.

This

indicates the continuing preponderance of agriculture as the major
productive sector of the economy, despite the effort that was made
to develop the manufacturing industry at a rapid rate.
The dramatic growth of industry in Kenya has been largely
based on simple import-substitution industries developed by multinational companies (GR76; GR102).

Manufacturing production also

catered to the export markets in neighboring countries, particularly
in the protected East African Community (EAC).

The scope of further

industrialization along these lines is limited; the easy import
substitution possibilities have been exhausted, and the EAC preference for Kenyan goods ended with the collapse of the community in
1977.

The past pattern of industrialization has left Kenya's

manufacturing sector increasingly dependent on imported raw materials
and component and spare parts, and thus vulnerable in case of a
shortage of foreign exchange.
According to the Development Plan, 1979-83 (KG5: 327), about
50% of Kenya's import bill is accounted for by capital and imported
intermediate goods.

Machinery and capital equipment account for
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approximately 20% of all imports, and intermediate industrial
supplies account for 30%.

As the manufacturing sector grows rapidly,

its demand for imported inputs is.·.bound to intrease at an equally
fast rate.

The result has been a foreign exchange bottleneck.

It

has become necessary to reorient industry toward increased use of
domestic inputs and increased production.

However, export perform-

ance has not been satisfactory in that it has grown

consistentl~'at

a slower pace than GOP and has not shown sufficient diversification.
The most disturbing aspect of recent performance, from the point
of view of future growth prospects, has been the chronic underlying
tendency toward a trade and balance-of-payment deficit, which reflects
the capital-intensiveness of the import-reproduction process (with
huge increases in the import bill) and the fact that the end of the
easy stage of that process was virtually exhausted by 1972.
1975-77 coffee boom disguised this tendency for a time.

The

But during

1978-80, Kenya again experienced strong external shocks as a result of
the latest round of petroleum price increases and declining coffee
prices.

The balance-of-payments and income effects of these increases

were compounded by poor weather affecting coffee and maize production.
Once a self-sufficient nation, Kenya can no more feed its own people adequately.

As a result, GOP growth slowed to 4.2% in 1979 and

to an estimated 2.4% in 1980 (GR152, GR153).

The trade deficit rose

very sharply in 1978, and foreign exchange reserves rapidly diminished.
The increase in petroleum prices, combined with additional food imports, resulted in a 25% rise in the value of imports in 1980 (KG6,
1981).

While exports rose by 16%, this was not sufficient to prevent
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an increase in the current account deficit to almost US$900 million,
and, despite increased external borrowing, a decline of US$195 million
in foreign exchange reserves (GR169, PI16,17).
Despite an impressive rate of growth in GNP. unemployment and
gross inequalities in Kenya continue.

In many cases, these inequali-

ties may have been accentuated by the policies of the government
and the country·s position as a periphery of Western capitalism.

A

World Bank staff member estimated that for 1969, the poorest 40% of
Kenya·s population received only 10% of the total income, while the
richest 10% received 56%; the top 5% obtained 44% of the income, and
the top 1% received 8% (GRlll).

When compared with other countries,

the interpersonal distribution of income in Kenya is among the most
unequal in the world.

A cross-national study conducted by Chenery

et al (GR33) ranks Kenya as the seventh most unequal of twenty-six
countries, with only Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) under European racist
rule being more unequal in Africa.

And there is not any

significant evidence of an improvement in this situation during
the 1970·s and 1980·s.

These sharp inequalities inevitably create

strong ambitions among the populace to migrate to the cities, to
strive for higher education, to search for jobs. As long as extreme
imbalances persist, so will unemployment and poverty.
Foreign Investment and Governmental Policy
The Kenyan government has taken a positive stance toward foreign
investment in the country, particularly when there is Kenyan equity
participation.

And there are, at present, no legal limitations on the
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percentage of foreign ownership.

This policy is part of an overall

effort to industrialize Kenya and to reduce its reliance on agriculture
to provide employment for its nationals.

In the pages that follow,

by evaluating past and present performance of foreign investors and
the overall impact they have had on Kenya, one is led to question
the extent and type of employment efforts undertaken to date in the
country.
Since independence, emphasis has repeatedly been placed in
the Development Plans upon achieving an ambitiously rapid rate of
growth of industrial output, while at the same time, a domestic
resource gap has been identified as a major constraint to the achievement of the target growth rate.

And there has been an explicit

decision by the government to rely heavily upon foreign sources of
finance (both investment and aid) as an integral feature of its
development strategy.

The Sessional Paper on African Socialism

stated that
the real solution to the problem (shortage of capital)
is to raise per capita income, that is to grow. The
dilemma we face is easy to state but much more difficult to solve. To grow faster we must save more, but
to save more we must grow faster. In order to compensate for our shortage of domestic capital, in order to
grow rapidly so that our aspirations can be realized,
we must borrow from foreign governments and international institutions and stimulate the inflow of
private capital from abroad.
(KG1: 19)

One important aspect of the industrialization policy has been
the open door policy towards foreign investment.

The Foreign Invest-

ment Protection Act of 1964 signifies the importance the government
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attaches to foreign investment in national development.

The Act

provided for the issuing of a guarantee certificate to existing and
new foreign investors, provided the Minister of Finance considered
the object of their investment (or reinvestment projects) to be
in the best interests of Kenya (KG18: 3-4). The Act further
stipulated that the holder of a Certificate of Approved Enterprise
could transfer out of Kenya, in the approved foreign currency and
at the prevailing rage of exchange:
•

the profits, after taxation, of his investment of foreign
assets;

•

the approved portion of the net proceeds of sales of all
or any part of the approved enterprise, either in liquidation or as a going concern;

•

the principal and interest of any loan specified in the
certificate

(p 26).

The Act further reaffirmed that no approved enterprise or any
property should be compulsory in the taking of possession and acquisition and in the payment of full and prompt compensation contained in
Article 73 of the Constitution of Kenya.
Foreign companies benefit from a number of incentives accorded
them by the government.

The most important of these are the freedom

of repatriation of profits, liberal depreciation allowances on their
investments, and product market protection from other competitors.
Generally, after tax profits, excluding profits of a capital nature,
may be remitted only on equity capital brought into Kenya.

After

tax, there is a withholding tax on dividends remittances.

Interest
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on approved loans, which can be acknowledged in foreign currency,
may be repatriated subject to a deduction of withholding tax.
Repatriation of royalties and service fees is subject to the approval
of an agreement by the Central Bank, and withholding tax is deductible.
Corporate Taxes.

The corporate tax rate for industrial enter-

prise is 45% of the net profits, excluding dividends received from
resident companies.

The tax on the income of branches of foreign

firms is 52.5% (GR152: 20).

Profits from life insurance business

and the mining of certain specified minerals are taxed at a lower
rate.

New mining companies are afforded partial tax relief by paying

only 28% for five years after the company initially makes a profit
(GR152: 20).
Companies that deliberately accumulate profits so that shareholders can avoid taxation or distribute them in a nontaxable form
are subject to further tax under the anti-avoidance provisions of
the Income Tax Act.
are as follows:

The withholding tax rates from January 1, 1982

a 20% tax on dividends and a 20% tax on interest have

been introduced to be paid by residents and nonresidents.

A with-

holding tax of 30% has been imposed on all payments of management
fees and royalties to nonresidents (GR154: 415, Section 152).

Where

double taxation agreements exist between Kenya and the recipient
country of residence, these rates are reduced.
The various taxes imposed on foreign investors, however are
never fully realized.

According to the ILO Report (GR69: 437), for-

eign companies remit their net profits to their parent companies
without paying tax. and in various cases, they have been shown to
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underdeclare their true profitability.

By remitting accrued profits

through other channels (such as royalties, transfer pricing on intermediates, interest payments on interaffiliate debts, overinvoicing,
etc), they are achieving considerable tax avoidance in Kenya (GR69:
453-456; GR102).

For example, Exchange Control authorities in Kenya

estimated that overpricing of intermediate goods is 20 to 30% more
than they would fetch on the open market (GR69: 454).

The combined

effect of this is to reduce the potential inflow of foreign exchange
and revenues required for economic development.

As indicated in Table

XVI below, the dividend outflow for 1970 was almost equivalent to
TABLE XVI
INFLOW AND OUTFLOW OF CAPITAL
(Kt 1000)
Year
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

Profits (After Tax
&Deereciation)
9,843
8,665
8,731
8,750
9,079
11 ,791
12,515
17,428

Retention
Ratio
36
41
35
32
53
65
54
54

Dividend*
Outflow
6,329
5,119
5,713
5,950
4,267
4,127
5,757
8,017

Inflow of New
Caeital
6,286
7,254
5,782
700
5,934
4,428
6,147
9,447

* These are declared outflows. Real outflow can be very different
owing to the use of transfer pricing.
Source:

(GR1l6, GR69: 136,
Table 37)
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the inflow of new capital into the country.

In order to finance the

outflow of dividends, government policies have to be continually
shaped so as to attract a high rate of foreign investment.

Such

policies are manifestations of the dependence and underdevelopment
of Kenya and emphasize its powerlessness to shape the course of
national development independently.

Under such conditions, the

ability of the Kenyan government to formulate and implement policies
directed toward the problem of graduate unemployment is severely
circumscribed.
Subsidies and Other Incentives.

In addition to the repatriation

of profits. Kenyan tax law specifies various other permissible investment deductions to attract foreign investors.
that "an industrialist can write off

l20~~

The government advertises

of his investment against

taxable income over a period of a few years"

(KGll: 3).

Since 1975,

however. the initial investment allowance has been restricted to 20%
of investments in the rural areas or small towns (GR69: 438; KG19).
This allowance. which at current company tax rates represents a
subsidy of 9% of new investments in fixed assets. was designed to
encourage a wider geographical distribution of investments.
Annual deductions for certain classes of capital expenditures
incurred for business purposes are allowed as follows:
•

Industrial buildings, such as

factories~

4%, and "approved"

hotels: 6% annually on the expenditure incurred .
•

Plant and machinery:

heavy self-propelling vehicles such

as tractors: 38% on the declared value; other self-propelling
vehicles such as cars: 25%; all other machinery, including
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ships: 12.5%.
• Mining:

40% of expenditure in the first year and 10%

in each of the following years.
•

Farm works:

20% of expenditure in the first and each of

the four following years.
An investment deduction is also given on the capital cost of construction:

40% on ships, 20% on new factory buildings and new

machinery installed in them, and a 20% deduction on new hotels (GR152:
17).
Even so, recent studies by Norcliff (GRl19) and Richardson (GR133)
indicate that investment deductions do little to stimulate investment
and industrial dispersion.

Norcliff argues that since most industries

believe that the greatest efficiency is to be achieved in Nairobi
and Mombasa, there is very little pressure for localization outside
the two big cities.

According to estimates made by the ILO (GR69:

438), investment deductions had a revenue cost of about L330,000
a year in 1966 and 1967.

This is equivalent to more than 1% of govern-

ment revenue from direct taxation in those years.*
The availability of loans and equity participation by the
government in manufacturing investments is another form of financial
incentive.

The extent of access to local capital for foreign enter-

prise has varied from time to time, and bank borrowing had been
restricted to an amount equal to between 20 and 60% of the foreign

* The consequent unavailability of such revenues directly impacts the
performa~c~ of the economy and hence the expansion of employment
opportunltles to Kenyans.
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equity (GR69: 452).

However, local funds are available from other

banks, including statutory bodies.

The Industrial and Commercial

Development Corporation (ICDC), the Development Finance Company of
Kenya (DFCK), and the Industrial Development Bank (lOB) lend money
to foreign multinationals who participate in joint venture activities
with the government.

Using data collected by Herman (GR69:

45~)

and con,-

bininq it with the UNCTAD (GRi16) data, the ILO Mission estimated that
about 30% of all local private and public capital invested in manufacturing during 1964-70 went into foreign-owned companies.

Furthermore,

joint venture activities provide foreign corporations new avenues of
access to the national policymaking process.

This point is supported

by the findings generated from the case study of the Industrial and
Commercial Development Corporation presented at the end of this chapter.

The findings of the case study suggest that Kenya's attempt to

maintain national control of the economy through public investment has
been unsuccessful.
Probably the most important incentive to foreign investment is,
in fact, the protection which is accorded to many activities; and it
has been suggested that "foreign firms are lodged securely where protection is highest" (GR68).

Protection is given by import duties, by

licensing and quantitative restrictions, and by remissions and drawbacks of duty paid by manufacturers on imports used in production.
Duties on most imported items range from 13 to 75% (GR152:6).
In 1981, the Kenyan government unveiled a new import policy
linked to a revised tariff schedule in an effort to shift emphasis from
import substitution to promotion of industrial exports and the
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elimination of quantitative restrictions and import licensing.
Henceforth, all imported goods will be categorized into three import
schedules on the basis of their importance to the Kenyan economy.
three schedules are as follows:

The

Schedule I (most essential, i.e., raw

materials, capital goods, spare parts, etc), Schedule IIA (priority
goods used in industry or agriculture and petroleum products), and
Schedule lIB (nonessential goods, for which domestic equivalents or
substitutes exist).

Schedule lIB items will receive the foreign ex-

change remaining after the demand for the importation of more essential
goods is satisfied.
Like the tax laws, the new import policy is not strictly enforced.

Individual investors are able to negotiate special protection

for their investments.

As the manager of one American subsidiary

put it:
We used to put 100% deposit before importing capital
goods into the country. Not anymore, thanks to the
Kenyan representative on our Board of Directors.
When our partners cannot make a breakthrough, our
Managing Director goes directly to the President of
the Republic.
(PI: 18)
In addition, the level of restrictions vary with the country's balanceof-payments situation.

At present, due to a deficit position and

because of increasing fuel costs, controls are rigidly applied.
A survey of 50 foreign subsidiaries that have significant domestic-oriented manufacturing investments indicate that 48% of them have
sought protection and another 38% were seeking protection in 1973
(GR99).

Out of the 19 subsidiaries involved in entry negotiations
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in 1973, 53% were seeking import protection, while another 32% were
seeking the right to import machinery and/or inputs duty free.
of these subsidiaries achieved their objectives successfully.

Most
The

profits obtained through protection from sales on the domestic market,
together with the provision for the expatriation of funds, make it
possib1e--indeed provide an incentive for foreign firms lito expatriate
foreign exchange they have neither earned nor saved" (GR169: 310).
TABLE XVII
SUBSIDIARY REQUEST FOR IMPORT PROTECTION

ill
N

{2)
% of N
reporting
sought
Erotection

50

48%
r~ajor

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

{3)
~~ of N
seeking
protection
successfu11i

38%

(4)
% of N
with
erotection
38%

{6)

{5)
(3)
as %
of {2)

(4)

+
{3)

79%

76%

Issues Raised in Entry Negotiations by Subsidiaries (N=19):

Seek import protection
via tariff
Seek right to import machinery/inputs duty free
Seek government finance in
project
Seek guarantee against
domestic competition
Seek long-term status quo
clause
Seek guarantee or work
permits
Seek approval for generous
free agreements
Source:

%of 19 subs.
involved

%of achievement
of objectives

53%

90%

32%

100%

16%

67~&

11%

100%

11%

100%

11%

100%

11%

100%

compiled from (GR99, Tables B-12 & B-17)
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A study conducted by M Phelps and B Wasow (GR128) concluded that
consumer goods industries generally received a significantly higher
level of effective protection (69%) than those producing intermediate
goods (20%).

Comparing the ranking of industries by the level of

effective protection they were receiving and by their profitability
at world prices, Phelps concludes that there is a significant negative
correlation between the two.

In other words, industries receiving

the highest levels of protection tended also to be the least profitable
at world market prices (GR128: 25).

A high degree of effective pro-

tection may either enhance the profitability of the protected activity
at the expense of local consumers, or, alternatively, may either allow
a high degree of inefficiency to exist or may make nonviable industries
artificially profitable.

The primary cost of resource misallocation

suggested here must relate to the increased cost of living and the
loss of consumer surplus which result from the ability of producers
in Kenya to charge high prices behind the tariff barriers.

The

protected industries are not infant industries; rather, they are
subsidiaries of large multinationals whose employment contribution
is very limited.

The result is a structure of effective protection

with a wide dispersion of rates and little connection between the
protection rate and the need for protection.

This situation does not

best serve Kenya1s developmental objectives: rapid economic growth,
social equality, and expanded employment opportunities.
The protective system also allows free entry of intermediate
products. This free entry provides a specific encouragement for manufacturers to use imported inputs and directly discourages the domestic

108
production of intermediate goods, which reinforces the tendency of manufacturing investment to concentrate on final-stage processing (GR99).
It also encourages the use of productive methods which use imported
capital rather than local labor.

According to ILO estimates, duty

drawbacks on imported intermediate goods and capital equipment in
1969 were equivalent to a revenue loss of Ktl.3 million (GR69: 438). On the
whole, protection and permission to export profits together confer great
benefit on the foreign investor, while depriving Kenya of the needed
foreign exchange inflow required for expanding the economy and employment opportunities.
Scale of Foreign Enterprise in Kenya.

Only limited evidence

exists on the financial structure of foreign enterprise in Kenya.

Many

private companies in the estate sector are owned by foreigners, and a
number of subsidiaries of major enterprises are also set up as private
companies.

The larger subsidiaries, particularly those that seek govern-

ment equity participation, are public companies.
In agriculture, most of the large settler estates have now been
taken over by indigenous Kenyans, and much of the prime land has been
subdivided into small holdings.
tea and coffee estates.

Foreign investment remains high in

According to ILO estimates, about 40% of the

coffee and 70% of the tea produced in Kenya come from estates (GR69:
431).

Only pineapple growing and processing is still dominated by Del

Monte, registered under its subsidiary, Kenya Canners Ltd.
In the private service sector, foreign investment has lost its
dominance, with the possible exception of tourism--the second largest
foreign exchange earner.

Similarly, foreign trading companies which
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failed to move into manufacturing have also been taken over by local
c~~ital,

although takeover here does not imply independence by indig-

enous firms.

On the contrary, indigenous firms are dependent on

foreign investment for both technology and financial capital (GR69;
GR77; GR102).
The greatest part of foreign direct investment in Kenya has been
in import-substituting industries, particularly textiles, footwear,
assembly industries, paper and paper products.

Studies undertaken by

Kaplinsky (GR77) on the ownership of all large scale manufacturing and
all tourist firms in 1966 (GRl14) and 1976, summarized in Table XVIII.
show the share of this foreign investment and how it changed in the
period between 1966 and 1976.

The 285 firms operating in 1966 and

421 firms operating in 1976 are subdivided into two different categories
for analytical purposes:

by sector and by size of issued capital.

As indicated in the table, foreign subsidiaries are predominant in
footware, leather, rubber, industrial chemicals, paint, soap, cement, and
metal products.

Despite a decline in recent years, food and beverages

still remain preeminent.
While the share of foreign investment in total equity varies over
time and by sector and size of the group, the most striking observation is that the share of total equity owned by foreign capital declined
from 59.3% in 1966 to 42% in 1976.

However, this cannot be taken as

evidence that foreign enterprise is losing its dominance in the Kenyan
economy.

The decline reflects the tendency of large foreign firms to

sell off a minority of their share holdings to individual Kenyans or
to state corporations.

While the proportion of foreign equity in the

TABLE XVII I
SUMMARY OF FOREIGN OWNERSHIP IN LARGE SCALE MANUFACTURING AND TOURIST FIRMS. 1966-76
1966

Type
of
Firm

Total
issued
capital
KL

Total
foreign
owned
issued
capital
KL

1966-1976

1976
.~ of
issued
capital
foreign
owned
KL

~ of
Total
foreign i~sued
capital
owned
foreign
issued
capita 1
owned
KL- --

Total
issued
capi tal
KL

Growth of
total
issued
capita 1
'j,

Growth of
foreign
issued
capita 1
'j,

(a) b,)' industr,)'
Food. beverages
Textiles, leather
Wood. furniture
Paper. printing
Chemicals. rubber
Pottery. glass
Basic metals
Fabricated metal
products
Other manufacturing
Total manufacturing
Large touri st
Small tourist

7.250.526
1.223.597
5.000
5.291
7.698.132
1.126.352
100.003

48.7
59.6
1.2
1
89.2
50.3
33.3

45.863.454
14.849.560
1.264.697
8.104.734
19.121.916
2.337,000
2.100.000

13.253.442
8.393.968
189.546
3.279.144
13.607.520
1.036.980
571.725

28.9
56.5
15
40.5
71.2
44.4
27.2

308
690
290
1.534
222
104
700

183
686
3.791
61.976
177
92
572

1.814.776 1.154.340
103.770
73.614
31.079.540 18.636,831
785.190
13.181
51.015
NA

63.6
70.9
60
1.7
NA

8.713,301
443.008
44.914,116
7.709.327
1.366.281

4,438,560
143.459
19.627.468
2.017.287
2

50.9
32.4
43.7
26.2
0

480
427
331
982
2.678

385
195
241

66
3.762
240.460
1.690,013
5,000,120
10.330.875
14.173.740

6
987
30.325
481,869
2.629.740
5.574,177
9.932.896

9.1
26.2
12.6
28.5
52.6
5.4
70.1

115
4.760
307,650
2,258.508
12.331.231
33.407.599
63,562.890

6
539
27.980
3137,032
4.246.753
15.409.875
26.859.127

5.2
11.3
9.1
17.1
34.4
46.1
42.3

174
127
128
134
247
323
449

80
162
277
270

31,439.046 18,650.000

59.3

III .872.750

46.931.312

42

355.8

251.6

14.876.072
2,150.727
435.660
528.486
8.628.955
2.241.450
300.004

1~,205

NA

(b) b,)' size of
issued caDi tal

TIIT

99
1999
1001.000- 9.999
10,000- 49,999
30.000-199.999
200.000-999.999
Over 1.000.000

100
55

92

.......
Totals

Source:

(GR77: 9) compiled from Kenya Central
Bureau of Statistics

0
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wholly owned category (95%-100%) fell from 76.3% to 45.4% between
1966 and 1976, the proportion in the majority-owned category (50-95%)
rose correspondingly from 16.2% to 48% (GR77: 15).

Despite the growth

of small, indigenously owned firms, there is little evidence to suggest that the dominant position Qf foreign investment eroded in the
first 13 years after independence.

Furthermore, the increased involve-

ment by parastata1s in joint venture has not been accompanied by an
impressive rate of return.

While the rate of return for other companies

averaged between 12% and 25% in the mid-1970's, the corresponding figure
for state investments was only 5% (GR77: 11; GR102: 25).

In short, the

influence of foreign capital has increased over the years (see Table
XIX), and there is no suggestion that such influence will decline in
the future.

What the evidence suggests is that as long as the economy

is controlled from the outside, the capacity of the government to design
and implement policies directed toward the problem of urban unemployment
is severely limited.
Choice of Technology.

Concern with the "emp1oyment prob1em"

inevitably raises the question of the nature of technology employed in
the Kenyan manufacturing sector.

Foreign-owned subsidiaries typically

produce inappropriate products (those demanded by a small, rich minority
of the local population), stimulate inappropriate consumption patterns
through advertising and monopolistic market power, and operate with
inappropriate (capital-intensive) technologies of production.

This is

perhaps the major area of criticism of multinational corporations
(GR14; GR76; GR99).
Results from available studies on the capital-intensity of Kenyan
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TABLE XIX
DISTRIBUTION OF PARASTATAL INVOLVEMENT BY OWNERSHIP
1966

Total parastata1 involvement
Parastata1 involvement in
companies with:
a) majority shareho1ding
by foreign company
b) minority shareho1ding
by foreign company
c) majority shareho1ding
by locally resident
Europeans
d) minority shareho1ding
by locally resident
Europeans
e) majority shareho1ding
by locally resident
Asians
f) minority shareho1ding
locally resident
Asians
g) majority shareho1ding
by Kenyan Africans
h) minority shareho1ding
by Kenyan Africans

1976

(~OOO)

%

(~OOO}

%

3,688

100

83,722

100

1,797

48.7

9,006

10.6

1,163

31.5

50,105

59.8

516

14.0

2,176

2.6

173

4.7

3,651

4.4

143

3.9

6,331

7.6

2,290

2.7

5

0.1

2.168

2.6

4

0.1

15,263

18.2

Source: (77: 12)
manufacturing are mixed.

Certain analysts have concluded that foreign-

owned subsidiaries tend generally to be more capital-intensive than
their locally-owned counterparts (GR69; GR125).

Others challenge this

view and conclude that foreign-owned subsidiaries make stronger use
of labor-intensive techniques.

The suggested explanation for this latter

view is that the subsidiaries employ more skilled supervisory staff and,
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because of better management, use staff members more effectively than
local firms do.

Better supervision permits the use of productive

techniques which employ unskilled labor relatively efficiently (GR69;
GR125; GR126).

Simply put, this means that firms deficient in tech-

nical supervision must rely heavily upon machines, so that their
technology is more capital-intensive.
Langdon, making a particularly pointed observation on the shoe
and soap industries, concludes that foreign-owned subsidiaries are
more capital intensive than their locally-owned counterparts, largely
because of the sector of their operation (GR99: 66-96).

Drawing on

Stewart (GR145) and Lancaster's (GR97) work, he distinguishes between
high income and low income products and notes that high income products
frequently necessitate the use of a capital-intensive technique.

A

head office monopoly of policies regarding machinery purchase and product quality control forces local managers of subsidiaries to adopt
inappropriate capital-intensive techniques.

Thus, to the extent that

foreign-owned subsidiaries rely on their parents' portfolio of high
income goods (which Langdon shows to be overwhelmingly the case), they
are forced to utilize capital-intensive techniques which minimize the
expansion of employment in Kenya."
A highly significant part of this tendency to produce high income
products with capital-intensive techniques is the systematic attempt
which foreign-owned subsidiaries make to influence consumer taste
preference towards the choice of such products.

Langdon (GR102: 60)

offers some limited evidence to support this argument.

More recently,

a comprehensive listing of all advertising expenditures in various
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media has become avai1able.* Analysis of this data shows that of the
100 most advertised products in 1976, only 14 were produced by majority locally-owned firms, some of which were manufactured under license
from foreign firms.

Moreover, of the top 10 most advertised products,

all were produced by foreign-own subsidiaries; and six were produced
by the Uni1ever subsidiary.

Of these six, three were differentiated

forms of the same product (i.e., cooking fat).

Of the total of 27

subsidiaries interviewed by Langdon, 11.1% allocated over 10% of sales
to advertising; 22% allocated 5-10% of sales; and 18% allocated 2.5%
of sales to advertising ;n 1973 (GR103:6).

Details on advertising

confirm the degree of high income product promotion in the country.
The tendency of foreign-owned subsidiaries to produce high
income products using labor saving devices is having an important
impact on locally-owned firms.

From his study of the soap industry,

Langdon concludes that the locally-owned firms were being forced into
replicating the products and production techniques of the foreignowned subsidiaries.

In another sector, breakfast foods, the emerging

market for high-income products (actively reinforced by advertising)
has led two local firms to produce under license products which entail the choice of imported capital-intensive techniques.

Thus,

while an equivalent expenditure on machinery to manufacture traditional
breakfast foods would provide 600 jobs producing a domestic value added
of $3.6 million, a production of high income breakfast cereals created
only 15 jobs with a domestic value added of only $325,000 (GR78).

It

is reasonable to conclude that the employment and sectoral linkage of
multinational investment is limited because of the capital intensity

* Kenya Media Advertising Review, 1976 (Nairobi, Corcoran &Tyrell, 1978).
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of the industry.
Manufacturing Output and Import Dependence.

The rapid growth

of industry based on multinational corporations has imposed many
demands on Kenya's economy which it is incapable of meeting.

The

continued reliance on foreign technology and inputs has contributed
to chronic trade and balance-of-payments deficits.

Eight out of ten

firms interviewed for this study admitted that they import 100% of
their capital goods (machinery) and approximately 75% of their raw
materials or imported inputs (PI18-25).

In the case of the rubber

and automobile industries, 100% of the raw materials and other inputs
were imported (PI18,19). These findings are consistent with the findings
of other studies.
In his comprehensive study of multinationals in Kenya, Langdon
(GR10l: 108) found that 98% of Kenyan firms imported more than 70%
of their machinery.

Of those subsidiaries, 79% imported more than 95%

of their machinery.

Another 69% imported more than 70% of their raw

materials.

In the case of soap manufacturing, the subsidiaries imported

75-90% of their material inputs, while the less mechanized local Asian
firms imported 40-50% of their inputs (GR10l: 69).

In shoes, the sub-

sidiary imported 50-60% of its inputs, while the local small-scale shoe
manufacturers purchased virtually all their inputs locally (GR10l: 80).
Moreover, for subsidiaries as a whole, there was very little evidence
of potential improvements in local linkage effects in the future.

The

vast majority of subsidiaries interviewed (all but 6 out of 48 in
domestic market manufacturing) saw no prospects for future subcontracting
to local manufacturers.

Lack of linkage means limited expansion
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of the Kenyan economy and hence limited employment opportunities for
the school leavers.

Table XX demonstrates the import dependence

of Kenyan manufacturing.
TABLE XX
SUMMARY OF IMPORT DEPENDENCE OF KENYAN MANUFACTURING
1966-74 (Kt'OOO)
Current value
of
mfg out~ut

Year
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1966-68
1972-74

136,899
154,936
163,851
186,892
200,681
251,145
301,862
368,340
550,591
455,686
1,220,794

Intermed
consump
im~orts

50,422
53,896
57,982
60,839
72,822
95,021
85,097
112,086
209,106
162,302
406,290

Import consump
for
cap formation

Share
of (b)
in (a)

Share
of (c)
in (a)

17,721
23,600
20,009
20,932
28,712
36,203
42,481
46,145
46,585
61,421
135,211

36.8
34.8
35.4
32.6
36.3
37.8
28.2
30.4
38.0
35.6
33.3

12.9
15.2
12.3
11.2
14.3
14.4
14.1
12.5
8.5
13.5
11.1

Source:

(KG5: 330)

A marked decrease in the import share of goods used by Kenyan
industry would ordinarily suggest growing linkage effects to the rest
of the economy and an increased impact on social and economic transformation throughout the country.

However, the evidence presented

above does not indicate that such is the case.

In the 1966-68 period,

the share of imports for capital formation accounted for only 13.5%
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of the manufacturing output, while the corresponding figure for
intermediate consumption was. well

(lV~Y'

35%.

In the 1972-74 period,

the share of intermediate consumption and capital formation were
33.3% and 11.1%, respectively.

The continued growth in the import

bills deprives Kenya of badly needed

forei~n

exchange earnings re-

quired for economic growth and the expansion of employment opportunities
in the country.
Overall, the character of transnational subsidiary manufacturing
can be seen to have restricted significantly the transformative impact
on social relations from expanded industrialization in Kenya.

The

retarded employment growth that marked rapid industrial expansion in
1976-78 and the continued import dependence noted above for all Kenyan manufacturing must both be traced to the central role of
transnationa1s in the country, given the pressure seen to be working on
subsidiaries to limit their employment and linkage effects.
Economic Impact of the Employment Problem
There are many dimensions to the employment problem in Kenya.
Broadly, they may be summed up as general dissatisfaction with the
employment opportunities available (GR69).

For those who can afford to

be unemployed, this takes the form of open unemployment; for others who
must work to live, low-productivity employment outside the modern
sector provides temporary (and sometimes permanent) refuge for the frustrated job-seeker. This approach to the problem makes it difficult to
define precisely who and how many constitute the employment problem.
Despite the problem of measurement, there are some indicators of
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the magnitude of the employment problem.

In Kenya, three Tripartite

Agreements have provided an opportunity for those who wanted jobs in
the modern sector to register.

In 1964, 205,000 people registered

within two weeks (35% of modern sector employment).

In 1970, over

290,000 registered within four days (46% of total modern sector and 6%
of the population of working age)

(GR146: 155-181).

In 1979, a

total of 260,000 people registered (28% of the formal wage employment
in 1973 (GR107).

On each occasion, the books had to be closed because

the authorities were overwhelmed with applications.

Many of those

registering for jobs already had jobs and were trying to improve their
positions.

Therefore, it is important to note that these figures do

not indicate numbers unemployed in the economy.

However, it is reason-

able to argue that the very large numbers desiring modern sector jobs
is an indication of how favorably these jobs are regarded.

The employ-

ment problem is thus partly a reflection of the inequalities in
income-earning opportunities throughout the economy.

The ILO Mission

to Kenya summarized the problem in this way:
Unemployment has now become chronic and intractable in
nearly all developing countries. . . • Part of the difficulty is structural, in the sense that many of these
employment problems will not be cured simply by accelerating the rate of growth. It is increasingly clear
that these employment problems are closely related to
inequalities in incomes and opportunities which are
not merely among their consequences but among their
causes as well.
(GR69: xi)
Another indicator of the magnitude of the employment problem in
Kenya is the official estimate given in the latest Development Plan (KG5)
(which is, to be sure, imprecise and open to a considerable margin of
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error). The figures nonetheless bring out several points.

Although

wage employment is relatively more important in Kenya than in many
other subsaharan African countries at a comparable stage of development, it nevertheless accounted for a mere 18% of the labor force in
1978.

The vast majority of Kenyans (51%) are employed in small-scale

agriculture.

The rest are distributed in urban "informal" and rural

nonfarming activities, as shown in Table XXI.
TABLE XXI
DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION
Selected Years (in thousands)
Annual %
Increase
1976-83

1976

Estimated
1978

Target
1983

6,600
5,610

7,070
6,000

8,400
7,140

3.5
3.5

915
2,665
390
990
125
5,085

1,000
2,810
410
1,100
140
5,460

1.250
3,210
470
1,460
195
6,585

4.6
2.7
2.7
5.7
6.5
3.8

Residual (1 less 2)

525

540

555

Residual as % of
labor force

9.4

9.0

7.8

Labor Force:
Population (15-59)
(1) Labor Force (85%)
Employment:
Modern Sector
Small-scale agri
Pastoralists
Rural non-farm
Urban-informal
(2) Total employment

Source:

(KG5: 34, Table 2.1)
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According to the figures, open unemployment is estimated for
1978 at 9% of the total labor force, declining since 1976 and projected to fall further during the plan period.

Given the present

economic crisis and chronic ba1ance-of-payments difficulties, it is
unreasonable to expect that such a target will be achieved.
The estimated 9% open unemployment (540,000 people) no doubt
represents a major blemish on the economy.

Nevertheless, from the

perspective of the overall development problem with which Kenya is
confronted, the problem of open unemployment, visible as it is in the
urban areas and among school 1eavers, is of smaller magnitude than the
problem of the working poor (GR69: 35).

The plan draws a poverty line

at a household income of less than K.shs. 3,000/- per annum and identifies five distinct poverty groups, shown below in Table XXII,
which is taken from the 1979-83 Development Plan.
TABLE XXII
POVERTY GROUPS
Average household
income (K. shs.}

# of families

(a) Small farmers who derive income from land
618,500
(b) Landless, squatters, rural
labor, with no land
410,000
(c) Pastoralists in a nomadic setting (livestock income)
195,000
(d) Handicapped adults
140,000
(e) Urban poor in self
or wage employment
40,500
Totals
1,404,000

1,650
2,250
2,000
1,500
2,400
1,880
Source:

(GR69, 22, 35)
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The Plan estimates that these families have a total population
of 6,073,000, which is 49% of the nation's total population.

This.

information hides the sizeable differences in income among households.
If a line is drawn at an annual income per adult of below K.shs. 500/-,
approximately 45% of the total small-holder population can be classified
as living in poverty.

Given the problem of measurement and a lack of

reliable data, it is difficult to determine the total volume and pattern
of employment in Kenya.
In the same fashion, estimating the exact volume of urban unemployment has not been an easy task.

The ILO Mission to Kenya (GR69: 10)

estimated an urban unemployment of 8-15% (or a weighted average of
11.5%).

To this must be added the urban working poor (estimated at

50,000) and school leavers totaling over 300,000 (KG5: 48).

The problem

is thus much more serious than it superficially appears to be.

As long

as there are imbalances in the economy, there will also be high unemployment.
Trends in Wage Employment.

The only component of employment for

which a reasonably accurate statistical series exists is the wage
employment in the modern sector.

Table XXIII on the following page

shows the numbers employed in the modern sector growing from 826,000
in 1974 to 1,005,000 in 1980.

During this period, employment in the

public sector grew at an annual rate of 6.1% This is indicative of
the fact that the public sector is the largest employer in the modern
sector.

The growth in agriculture and forestry stagnated, which ex-

plains why the private sector had a nominal growth rate due to linkages
the sector has with the rest of the economy.

Overall, the annual growth
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rate for both the private and public sectors amounted to an average
of 3.1% over this period, barely matching the annual population growth
rate of 3.5% per year.

The most successful period, in terms of

modern sector job creation, was 1968-74, with an annual rate of increase
of 5.3%.

This is attributed to the rapid Africanization program dur-

ing that period and the First Tripartite Agreement which contributed
30,000 new jobs.
TABLE XXIII
SUMMARY OF WAGE EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR, 1974-80
(IN THOUSANDS)

Sector
Public

1974
330.1

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

342.4 356.4 376.4 390.0 424.7

%
annual
growth
1980* rate
471.5

Pri vate

1.1

Commerce/
Industry

282.5 280.9 303.4 320.1

332.6 353.7

N/A

Agri/
Forestery

213.7 195.8 197.7 206.4 189.0 193.9

N/A

Totals

6.1

826.3 819.1

857.5 902.9 911.6 972.3 1005.8

3.1

* Provisional
Source:

(KG7, 1980, Table 237)

It should be noted at the outset that the published data on
employment (which, of course, refers to wage employment in the modern
sector alone) may give a seriously misleading picture of the true position of modern sector employment.

This is particularly true since wage

employment in agriculture and forestry apparently expanded at a relatively

123
higher rate. at least until 1975, than employment in the manufacturing sector.

On the whole, however, the public sector is the major

industry in Kenya and has grown at a much faster rate than has emp1oyment in the private sector.
Table XXIV provides a much more accurate picture of the contribution of the modern sector. particularly the manufacturinq industry to
emp10vrnent opportunities in Kenva.
TABLE XXIV
SUMMARY OF MANUFACTURING OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT GROWTH, 1971-79

Year

% change
in total
wage em~lt

% change
in real
GOP

% change
in mfg
em~l.l:mt

%change
in real
mfg out~ut

1971/72
1972/73
1973/74
1974/75
1975/76
1976/77
1977/78
1978/79
1979/80

7.2
4.1
5.8
8.5
-0.9
4.7
5.3
1.0
6.7

7.0
6.8
4.3
1.1
4.1
2.4
8.8
6.6
3.3

12.8
2.7
11.4
7.2
- 0.6
8.0
8.4
10.3
6.3

10.5
5.0
9.7
9.7
0.0
18.2
15.9
12.6
7.1

Average
1971-80

5.2

4.9

7.5

9.8

Sources:

(KG6, 1974, 1978. 1980;
KG7, 1973, 1977, 1979)

First, there has been a distinct slowdown in wage employment growth
since 1974; the average annual increase in the 1975-79 period has
been 4.2%, compared with 6.4% in the 1971-74 period.

The spectacular

l~

increase in 1979 was due to the Third Tripartite Agreement, which
attempted to increase wage employment by 10%.

If the pattern of the

earlier government intervention of this sort (in 1970-71) is reproduced, then the 1979 increase simply represents an acceleration of
hiring intentions, followed by a significantly lower-than-average
increase in the 1980 data (as was also the case for 1972).

Secondly,

it is significant that although there has not been a great divergence
among rates of change in overall wage employment and in GOP in the
country, there has in recent years been much more divergence in the
direction of lower rates of employment growth in the manufacturing
sector itself.

For example, in the period 1971-79, the average an-

nual growth in total wage employment was 5.2% and in GOP 4.9%, while
in manufacturing employment growth averaged 7.5% compared with 9.8% for
manufacturing output.

That is, the expansion of production has not

been matched by a proportional expansion of employment opportunities
in manufacturing.

Thirdly, it should be stressed that manufacturing

employment growth has proven to be relatively limited in recent years,
despite very dramatic increases in output in the manufacturing sector:
18%, 16%, and 13% in 1976, 1977, and 1978, respectively.
Employment Effects of Foreign Investment.

Fairly comprehensive

data exist on total employment and wage bills in industry, particularly
in large-scale enterprises.

However, published data draws no distinction

between the nationality of the investor, and it is therefore impossible
to estimate the employment generated by foreign investment, on the basis
of this data.

However, using existing data on ownership patterns in

large scale industry and in all tourism, Kaplinsky (GR77) estimated the
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numbers employed in different types of firms, incorporating data from
the Central Bureau of Statistics concerning the broad size groups
each firm (see Table XXV).

In combining this data, he estimated

the total employment in foreign manufacturing firms to be
90,386 for 1976.

This figure represents only 11% of the total wage

employment in the modern sector for 1976.

Considering the fact that

foreign ownership is concentrated in the 25-50, 50-95, and 95-100
percentiles of ownership groupings, the actual contribution of foreign investment to employment becomes even less significant.

On the

basis of minimum and maximum assumptions, Kaplinsky estimated that the
share of multinational enterprises in total manufacturing employment
was 30-35%, or close to 30,000 jobs for 1976.

In short, foreign

investment contributed to less than 3% of the total wage employment
in the country in 1976.

Considering all the incentives accorded to

foreign investment, its contribution to the development of Kenya has
been negligible.
Regional Distribution of Wage Employment.

The distribution of

formal sector employment in Kenya is uneven, as shown in Table XXVI.
The dominance of Nairobi has just been maintained, at 27% of total
modern sector employment, and additional employment in Nairobi accounted
for 26% of the national increase in 1967-78. The same is true for
Mombasa, incorporated in the Coast Province figure.
employment opportunities in Nyanza and

l~estern

Formal sector

Province, where the

need is greatest, have expanded partly due to the growth of sugar
production.
However, the share of employment in Nyanza and Western Province

TABLE XXV
ESTIMATE OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT IN LARGE SCALE MANUFACTURING BY SECTOR
AND FOREIGN OWNERSHIP GROUPINGS, (1976)

Sector

0

Foreign Ownership Grouping (%)
25-50* 50-90* 95-100*
1-10
10-25

Total

ISIC
Food, beverages

31

10,501

1,391

3,213

288

4,795

4,747

24,934

Textiles, leather

32

7,049

815

1,534

1,822

7,384

3,213

21,817

Wood, furniture

33

6,713

0

0

0

0

719

7,432

Paper, printing

34

3,932

0

0

0

1,534

432

5,898

Chemicals, rubber

35

1,439

671

288

1,103

1,247

5,610

10,357

Pottery, glass

36

2,014

144

288

1,534

2,206

0

6,186

Basic metals

37

575

0

0

0

0

575

1 ,151

Fabricated metal
products

38

4,747

0

350

3,836

288

2,350

11,892

Other manufacturing

39

575

0

0

144

0

0

719

37,545

3,021

5,994

8,727

17,454

17,646

90,386

Totals

.....
N

0'1

(*) signifies areas of foreign concentration.
Source:

(GR77: 41)

TABLE XXVI
CHANGE IN FORMAL SECTOR EMPLOYMENT, ALL SECTORS
(1967-78)
1967
Province

Numbers

Increase in

Em~lo~ed

Share of increase
in #IS employed
1967-78

#IS employed

1968

1967-78

#

%

#

%

#

%

%

Nairobi

163,692

27.4

244,431

26.8

80,739

49.2

25.7

Central

87,834

14.7

137,612

15.1

49,778

56.7

15.8

Coast

77,763

13.0

122,678

13.5

44,915

57.8

14.3

Eastern

36,572

6.1

71 ,009

7.8

34,437

94.2

11.0

2,232

0.4

4,941

0.5

2,709

121.4

0.9

167,926

28.1

221,133

24.3

53,207

31. 7

16.9

Nyanza

43,458

7.3

67,301

7.4

23,843

54.9

Western

17 ,892

3.0

42,456

4.7

24,564

137.3

597,369

100.0

911,561

100.0

314,192

52.6

N Eastern
R Valley

Totals

7.6 )
) 15.4
7.8 )
100.0

Source: (KG7, 1968, 1978)

N

......
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combined still compares unfavorably with, for example, Central
Province: 10.3% compared with 14.7% in 1967 and 12.1% compared with
15.1% in 1978, considering also the additional opportunity created
for the latter by the proximity of Nairobi.

Similarly, the 15.4% share

of the two provinces in the 1967-78 increase, less than that of Central
Province, is not sufficient to have led to any significant change in
balance.

As in the case of Central Province, increases in employment

in Eastern Province will be supplemented by additional opportunities
in Nairobi and the adjacent Coast Province, embracing Mombasa.
Table XXVII shows clearly the domination of Nairobi and
Mombasa.

Together they account for 73% of wage employment in main

towns in 1978.

Outisde these two cities, there are no other important

centers--the largest, Nakuru, still accounted for only 3.7% of the employment in 1978.

Despite the urgency of expanding urban employment

opportunities in the overpopulated regions of Western Kenya, the Kisumu share was only 3.5%.
Looking specifically at manufacturing, the position is much the
same.

The two major cities, Nairobi and Mombasa, accounted for 69%

of the total manufacturing employment in the main towns during 1978.
The Thika municipality emerged as another potentially important center,
with 10% manufacturing employment in 1978. This is due to the proximity
Thika to the major city of Nairobi.

On the whole, the manufac-

turing employment distribution data reflects the industrial location
policy of the government, which tends to favor Nairobi and Mombasa.
It is reasonable to conclude that a significant impact on the distribution of employment opportunities in manufacturing can only be made by
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attempting to influence the location of plants.

In the absence of

such a policy, rural to urban migration, particularly among the educated, will continue, further exacerbating the problem of urban
unemployment in Nairobi and Mombasa.
TABLE XXVII
DISTRIBUTION OF WAGE AND MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT,
BY MAIN TOWNS, 1978

Main Towns
Nairobi
Mombasa
Nairobi/Mombasa
Nakuru
Ki sumu
Eldoret
Thika
Other towns
Totals

Wage

Manufacturing

Em~lo~ment

Emelo~ment

%

#

%

244,431
86,276
330,707
16,710
15,980
11 ,125
12,373
67,253

53.8
19.0
72.8
3.7
3.5
2.4
2.7
14.9

48,707
17,947
66,654
5,374
3,374
4,803
9,440
7,309

50.2
18.5
68.8
5.5
3.5
5.0
9.7
7.5

454,148

100.0

96,949

100.0

#

Source:

(KG7, 1978)

INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Kenya, like most other developing nations, relies on nonmineral
primary product exports for a large percentage of its foreign exchange
earnings.

In 1979, coffee and tea combined made up 45% of the total

exports.

In addition to its export dependence, Kenya relies even more

on the importation of raw materials, machinery, capital goods, intermediate producer goods, and consumer products to fuel its industrial
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expansion and to satisfy the rising consumption aspirations of its
people.

In recent years, import demands have exceeded the capaicty

to generate sufficient revenues from the sale of exports.

This has

led to chronic trade deficits which affect Kenya's ba1ance-of-payments
position.
Table XXVIII indicates that between 1970 and 1979, imoorts hove
risen at a faster rate than exports during the same period; and this
trend has resulted in a widening trade deficit.

In 1979, earnings from

TABLE XXV I I I
SUMMARY OF KENYA'S EXTERNAL TRADE,
1970 and 1975-79 (Kt million)
Type of
Trade

1970

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

Growth Ra tes
1970-79, PA

Exports

108.8

238.0

345.1

501.8

395.7

412.8

15.9

Imports

158.0

362.6

406.9

531.4

661.2

619.7

16.4

Trade
Balance - 49.2 -124.6 - 61.8 - 29.6 -265.5 -206.9

17.3

Source:

(KG7, 1980: 54, Table 51(c))

exports covered only 67% of the cost of imports, and the trade deficit
was at a high level of Kt 206.9 million.

The trade deficit was signifi-

cantly less in 1976 and 1977 than in previous years due to a high
foreign exchange earning from coffee and tea.

But during 1978 and

1979, the deficit again rose due to strong external shocks as a result
of the latest round of petroleum price increases and declining coffee
prices in the international market.

The ba1ance-of-payments and in-

come effects of these declines were compounded by poor weather
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affecting coffee and maize production.

As a result, GOP growth slowed

to 4.2% in 1979 and to an estimated 2.4% in 1980 (GR152).

The increase

in petroleum prices combined with additional food imports resulted in
a 25% rise in the value of imports in 1980.

While exports rose by

16%, this was not sufficient to prevent a rise in the current account
deficit to almost $900 million and, despite increased external borrowing, a decline of $198 million in foreign exchange reserves (GR169).
In short, the economy does not have the export capacity to sustain the
high level of imports which accelerated growth and investment setoffs, and this regularly chokes off the accumulation process and
hence, the expansion of employment opportunities.
Exports
Kenya's exports are highly concentrated by commodity, which is
easily proven by the statistics which show that three commodities provide more than half of all exports (see Table XXIX below).
TABLE XXIX
SUMMARY OF TOTAL EXPORTS*, 1975-79
(PERCENTAGE SHARES)
Categort

1975

Food & beverages
35.8
Coffee
(16.4)
Tea
(10.7)
Industrial Supplies
28.3
Fuel &Lubricants
25.6
(22.6)
Petroleum Products
Machinery/cap equip
2.3
Transport Equipment
1.8
Consumer Goods
6.1
Others
0.1
Totals
100.0
* excluding re-exports

1976

1977

1978

1979

47.6
65.6
58.8
56.2
(29.3)
(42.5)
(33.7)
(28.7)
(10. 0)
(14.9)
(17.1)
(16.3)
23.4
13.5
17 .8
19.1
20.8
17.3
18.6
20.0
(17.9)
(15.1)
(16.3)
(17.7)
2.0
0.3
0.4
0.4
1.1
0.2
0.3
0.3
5.0
3.0
3.9
4.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Source: ( KG6, 1980: 89)
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Before 1964, sisal was the third largest export product.
coffee and tea combined made up 45% of total exports.

In 1979,

These two pro-

ducts are dependent on world market forces entirely outside Kenya's
control.
It has already been remarked that price increases have been the
major reason for the increase in the value of most exports, particularly coffee and tea.

However, there have also been some large in-

creases in the quantity exported.
tea industries.

A good example are the coffee and

The volume of tea exported rose from 16,500 tons

in 1964 to over 70,000 in 1977 and fell to 64,000 in 1979 due to a
decline in the price of tea.

The predominance of coffee export in

1977 was much more the result of the sharp increase in price; nevertheless, 204,336 tons of coffee were exported in 1977 compared with
42,000 tons in 1974.

In 1979, the volume declined to 110,673, due

to a decline in the world price for coffee.

Here the dependence on

agriculture merged with the dependence on foreign trade.
It is important to observe certain trends in the industrialized
capitalist countries of the West who are Kenya's major trading partners.

For example, among these trading partner countries, the demand

for most primary products does not increase in per capita income.
Production of artificial substitutes--the result of technological
changes--also partly accounts for a slackening in the demand for
primary products.

In addition, certain policy measures in the

industrialized countries hinder increased exports from primary producing countries.

Among such measures are subsidization of domestic

raw materials and heavy import duties and tariffs against raw materials
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in developing countries.
A certain limitation of Africa's export orientation has to do
with the lack of flexibility and economic diversity in an economy
dependent on raw materials.

For example, when the price of coffee

falls on the world market, it is not possible, in the short term, to
move resources out of coffee into other lines of production.

Another

limitation has to do with the concept of 1inkages--both forward and
backward--i.e., the export industry does not generate enough domestic
demand for investment.
An examination of the direction of Kenya's exports provides
yet another weakness.

The main buyers of Kenya's exports are advanced

capitalist countries in Europe, North American, and Japan.

The insta-

bility and the unplanned nature of the capitalist markets, coupled with
the competitive efforts of other primary producers, renders the
dependence on such products extremely dangerous.
Table XXX shows that between 1970-79, nearly 50% of Kenya's
exports were destined to Western Europe and North America.

In 1979,

the United Kingdom and West Germany combined accounted for 30% of
Kenya's exports (KG7, 1980).

Although trade with Africa accounted for

24% of exports in 1979, the trend has been declining since 1977,
particularly after the breakup of the East African Common Market.

As

the main agricultural exports do not go to the East African countries,
manufacturing accounted for 90% of Kenya's export to Tanzania and
84% of its exports to Uganda (KG7, 1978).

It is clear that continued

dependence of African economies on the production of raw materials for
export is detrimental to their long-term development.

Thus, any
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developmental policy that promotes only the exploitation of primary
products to increase exports and obtain tax revenue for developmental
expenditure is not a viable long-term policy.
TABLE XXX
DESTINATIONS OF KENYAN EXPORTS
1970-1979
Percentage of Total Exports to:
Year

Western
EuroEe

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

34.9%
3l.1
39.4
38.4
36.0
33.4
43.4
55.4
5l.2
48.3

North and South
America

Afri ca

Far East &
Australasia

8.4%
5.8
6.0
7.5
5.5
7.7
8.8
7. 1
6.0
N/A

39.4%
42.6
36.3
34.5
34.8
34.4
26.3
19.8
21.0
24.0

6.9%
7.6
7.6
10.2
10.3
9.1
8.2
5.4
6.8
7.6

Source:

calculated from (KG7, 1979: 64; and
(for 1979) KG6, 1980: 93)

Imports
Whereas in general the relative share of the various categories
of imports remained unchanged in 1979, there was a notable increase
in the share of the value of fuels and lubricants and nonfood industrial supplies, while the shares of the values of certain other
categories declined.

Since the sharp rise in the price of oil in

late 1973, a substantial share of Kenya's imports is now tied to the
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importation of petroleum.

Kenya, with its auto-owning bourgeoisie

and expatriate population, is particularly vulnerable in this regard,
as oil imports account for one-fifth of the country's imports (see
Tabl e XXXI).
TABLE XXXI
SUMMARY OF TOTAL IMPORTS, 1975-79
(PERCENTAGE SHARES)
Categor~

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

Food & Beverages
Industrial Supplies
(nonfood)
Fuels & Lubricants
Machinery/cap equip
Transport Equipment
Consumer Goods
Others

5.9
29.0

6.5
30.6

5.2
30.3

5.8
27.2

5.3
29.0

26.4
17.0
12.9
8.6
0.2

25.5
17 .8
10.8
8.7
0.2

22.0
19.4
14.3
8.7
0.1

17.8
21.3
19.2
8.4
0.3

23.7
20.2
15.4
6.3
0.1

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Totals

Sources:

( KG6, 1980; KG7, 1980)

Imports of nonfood industrial supplies remained almost unchanged
in 1979, though there was more emphasis on imports of processed supplies
than on primary goods.

The most noticeable change was the heavy de-

cline in the value of imported transport equipment, particularly
imported passenger vehicles due to government restrictions to save
foreign exchange.

Imports of nonfood consumer goods also fell sharply

as the government banned a number of consumer goods from Nairobi
shops.

The restrictions imposed since 1978 clearly show the vulnerabil-

ity of the Kenyan economy and the worsening foreign exchange situation.
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Balance of

Pa~ments

The table below summarizes Kenya's ba1ance-of-payment position
regarding Current Accounts, Capital Accounts, and Cash Accounts.
TABLE XXXI I
SUMMARY OF KENYA'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
(MILLIONS OF KENYAN POUNDS)

A.

B.

C.

1971

1973

1975

1977

1978

1979

196.2
Imports
Exports
104.9
Trade balance
- 91.3
Freight, Transp, 39.1
Travel
Invest/income
- 8.8
Govt transfer
20.9
Invisible ba1
51. 5

219.0
164.5
- 54.5
39.0

342.7
212.1
-130.6
88.1

535.1
470.9
- 64.2
123.3

723.3
366.5
-356.8
132.2

665.0
380.3
-284.7
130.7

- 35.7
7.5
7.7

- 36.5
7.5
57.5

- 59.5
3.5
88.3

- 55.0
32.3
104.3

- 49.2
28.3
106.4

Current balance - 39.9

- 46.8

- 76.7

24.1

-252.5

-178.3

CaEita1 Account
Long term inflow 15.2
Current and cap - 24.7
balance

53.1
6.3

62.9
- 13.8

90.4
114.5

171.0
- 81.5

250.9
72.6

76.3

70.6

208.6

133.3

176.8

Current Accounts

Cash Account
External reserves

51.8

Sources:

(KG6, KG7, various years)

This table indicates that, with the temporary exception of 1977, Kenya
runs a deficit on Current Accounts, i.e., on transactions involving goods
and services.

Despite this fact, the country has consistently been able

to secure net inflows of long-term capital from the rest of the world,
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inflows that have become sUbstantial since 1974. The net total of the
Current and Long Term Capital Accounts is then combined into the Basic
Balance, which is the best single indicator of the health of Kenya's
payment position.

In three of the six sample years recorded, there was

a surplus in the Basic Balance, reflecting a generally satisfactory situation.

The years 1971, 1975, and 1978 were the main exceptions.

A

generally satisfactory situation is also revealed in the figures on the
country's foreign exchange reserve.
Kenya's growth performance since 1974 has been vulnerable to swings
in its international terms of trade.

The escalation of oil prices and

the associated world inflation imposed a serious deficit on Kenya with
little warning.

The economy accelerated once again in 1976-77 due to

the "coffee boom" following frost damage in Brazil and decelerated after
1978 when coffee prices declined to more normal levels.

At the same time,

the import bill rose (it increased by 80% between 1975 and 1978).
This combination resulted in a huge current deficit of

K~

252 million

in 1978, and the foreign exhcange reserve dwindled rapidly to about half
of the peak of 1977.

During 1978-80, Kenya again experienced strong

external shocks as a result of the latest round of petroleum price
increases and declining coffee prices.

As a result, GDP growth

slowed to 4.2% in 1979 and to an estimated 2.4% in 1980.

Kenya's

balance of payment constraints will continue in the short run.

Factors

outside Kenya's control, such as oil price increases, reduced demand for
Kenya's export commodities, and slow economic recovery in the industrialized countries are having a significant adverse impact on the
Kenyan economy.

The ba1ance-of-payment problem is indicative of the
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rough times ahead for the Kenyan economy and the gloomy employment
prospect for thousands of school leavers each year.
FOREIGN AID
In the face of this combination of volatile export earnings and
recurrent foreign exchange problems, Kenya has had to rely on external
government borrowing.

The deficits on external trade have been covered

partly by earnings from tourism and to an increasing extent by grantsin-aid from multilateral and bilateral agencies.

As can be seen from

Table XXXIII, in the early years of independence (1963-1969), the
United Kingdom was overwhelmingly the most important source of financial
aid.

Between 1963-69, over 80% of all aid was from Britain; by 1975,

the United Kingdom accounted for less than 30% of all disbursements.
Since the mid-1970's, the World Bank and the Scandinavian countries
have taken on the role of large donors.

For example, in 1980, 63%

of all loans came from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank.

The Scandinavian countries accounted for 30% of all grants

in 1980.
So far, Kenya has received 36 World Bank loans and 33 credits from
the International Development Agency (IDA) amounting to US$1,29l.l
million.

Loans given to Kenya carry a high interest rate.

have only a

~%

IDA credits

service share, while IBRD loans to Kenya have an inter-

est rate ranging from 7 to

8~%.

In fact, the World Bank loans, though

increasingly taking a big proportion of Kenya's total foreign aid, have
been the most expensive elements of aid to the country.

World Bank

(IBRD) loans to Kenya range from 10 to 30 years for repayment, including

TABLE XXX III

1963-1980

ECONOMIC AID TO KENYA,
l KL 000')

Loans

Source

Grants
-

-

41,653
3,557
4,175

United Ki ngdom
Uni ted States
West Germany

Loans

35,063
603

Sweden
Netherl ands
Canada

SOU R C E S -

19,453
2,053
4.649
1,508
7,461
1,255
454

Other countri es
Total bilateral

1,294
623
51,302
-

-

2,136
37,805
-

-

-

-

M U L TIL ATE

1,995
7,350

IBRD
IDA

1

3,556

1,131
849
3,788

Total multilateral
TOTAL AID

* 1980

9,345
60,647

37,805

6,117
61,563
30,851
172,315

16,338

RA

L

SOU

92,384

figures for grants are estimates given in

RC E

8,541
2,087
20,012

6,543
5,101
15,775
58,059

S

53,023
44,256
3,415
100,694

14,602
18,094
1,378
34,074

ADB

10,139
13,930
22,043
11,574
5,432
5,058
5,608

92

866
11,919
8,692
58,310

Grants

-

6,921

Norway
Denmark

Loans

Grants

- B I L ATE R A L

Japan

Nongovernment

1976-1980*

1970-1975

1963-1969

16,388

273,009

58,059

Sources:

w

~

(KG7, 1980)
(KG6, 1964-1980; KG7. 1964-1980)
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a seven years grace period, while those of its affiliates (IDA)
require 50 years repayment and 10 years grace.

Other donors vary

from 5 years to 50 years of repayment plus some grace period (PI 17).
The obvious implication of heavy borrowing is a proportionately
heavy debt burden.
Table XXXIV indicates that, as of June 1979, the main countries
to which Kenya owed a debt included West Germany, the USA, and Japan.
The United Kingdom had abolished debts owed by Kenya and now provides
aid on a grant basis only.

Among international organizations, the

largest debt was owed to the World Bank and its subsidiary, the
International Development Agency.
In general, debt servicing charges rise as the total debt rises.
External net servicing charges jumped to Kt 25.5 million in 1979
(from Kt 8.6 million in 1974).

There was a decline in the debt

service charges on external debts in 1979 because of the abolition by
the United Kingdom of outstanding Kenyan debts.

As a result, the debt

service ratio as a proportion of earnings from exports of goods and
services fell from a high of 5.5% in 1978 to 4.4% in 1979.

In real

monetary terms, interest payments siphoned off $18 of every $100
Kenya earned on exports (Wall Street Journal, April 11,1983: 18).
The summary of external debt charges related to exports is capsulized
in Table XXXV.
The influence of aid on national policymaking structures is
very strong and has been the subject of various studies (GR63; GR159).
Technical assistance personnel occupy crucial decisionmaking positions
in all Kenyan governmental ministries.

The expatriates are not only

TABLE XXXIV

SUMMARY OF KENYA'S OUTSTANDING DEBTS
1974-79 (MILLIONS OF KL)
1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

47.0
14.0
6.0
1.0
7.0
2.0
1.0
4.0

43.0
16.0
14.0
3.0
10.0
5.0
2.0
5.0

41.0
18.0
16.0
7.0
12.0
5.0
3.0
7.0

37.0
20.0
21.0
11.0
12.0
6.0
4.0
10.0

37.0
15.0
30.0
14.0

16.0
33.0
14.0

9.0
7.0
22.0

7.0
7.0
36.0

82.0

98.0

109.0

121.0

134.0

113.0

11.0
21.0
2.0

16.0
28.0
2.0
1.0

39.0
38.0
2.0
2.0

42.0
41.0
3.0
2.0

46.0
47.0
3.0
9.0

55.0
56.0
3.0
30.0

34.0

47.0

81.0

88.0

105.0

144.0

116.0

145.0

190.0

209.0

239.0

257.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

15.0

31.0

31.0

Bilateral Debts:
United Kingdom
United States
West Germany
Japan
Sweden
The Netherlands
Denmark
Other
Totals
Multilateral Debts:
IBRD
IDA
African Devt Bank
Other
Totals
Total External Debt
Annual External Debt Charge *

oj::>

* (KG6, 1980: 77)
Source:

(KG7, 1980, Table 228 (5))
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TABLE XXXV
SUMMARY OF EXTERNAL DEBT CHARGE RELATED TO EXPORT
1974-1979
1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

Debt Service Charge
on External Debt
(Ki million)

8.6

10.1

12.0

14.8

31.2

25.5

Exports of Goods &
Services

357.2

356.9

471.7

650.2

566.8

580.4

2.4

2.8

2.5

2.3

5.5

4.4

External Debt Service
Charge as % of Exports

Source:

(KG6, 1980, Table 6.12)

involved in devising poliCies and development plans, but also in
identifying potential sources of aid and negotiating with relevant
donors.

Once foreign aid is negotiated and agreed upon between donor

and Kenyan government representatives (often the technical assistance
personnel), its conditions, objectives, and implications are never
discussed by relevant political institutions such as the Parliament.
Because funds must be spent as quickly as possible before the expiration of the negotiated period, there is seldom time for discussions
and debates about the real aims and implications of aid for national
development.

Unspent aid funds are regarded as a reflection of inef-

ficiency or bad management on the part of the recipient country, so
virtually all aid is handled by technical assistance personnel whose
chief function is to ensure that all disbursed aid is spent.
Multilateral aid agencies such as the World Bank probably have
more influence on policy matters than bilateral donors inasmuch as
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they presently contribute the largest proportion of aid.

The World

Bank, for instance, claims that its aid and aid projects are based on
purely economic nonpolitical considerations and thus tries to keep
them out of political discussions in Kenya's Parliament.

Over the years,

the practice in Kenya has been to prevent political debate about development projects, particularly those benefitting from aid, under the pretext
of keeping politics out of development.

In the absence of such debate,

however, the development projects of post-independent Kenya have been
a continuation of colonial or foreign activities, with support from
foreign technical assistance surveyors, and in many cases, implemented
and evaluated by the same foreign personnel.

Under these circumstances,

Kenya has lost its freedom to determine the course of national development independently.
The implications of external dependence are thus clear.

To the

extent that a nation is dependent upon foreign aid, foreign investment,
and foreign trade for the creation of wealth and provision of goods
and services, demands and decisions adopted in the developed economies
become permanent inputs into the national policymaking process.

Under

such conditions, dependent nations such as Kenya have little prospect
for self-sustained economic growth and expanded employment opportunities.
The problems and demand of the national community must compete with and
may be secondary to the requirements of external decisionmakers, which
means that the Kenyan economy is becoming increasingly dependent on
external factors (price increases for its two major exports of coffee
and tea, and sources of international finance such as the IMF) to
determine its capacity to accumulate surplus in the face of foreign
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exchange pressures.
STATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP AS AN APPROACH TO
NATIONAL CONTROL OF THE ECONOMY
The government of Kenya has tried to expand its control of the
national economy by increasing the level of state ownership of the
means of production.

The evidence presented below, however, leads to

the conclusion that state participation in joint venture activities
with foreign capital is primarily geared toward bringing about a broader
base of local private control and ownership rather than toward public
control of the means of production.
At independence, Kenya inherited an economy that was dominated
in every respect by the expatriates and foreign concerns.

Major finan-

cial institutions such as commercial banks and insurance companies were
foreign owned and controlled.

Agriculture, the backbone of the national

economy, was also dominated by the settler farmers.

Industrial enter-

prises were also controlled by the multinationals and expatriate
concerns.

Import-export trade as well as retail and distributive

trade were also controlled in the same manner.

It was obvious that

something had to be done in the immediate post-independence period.
Africanization of the economy was the political answer to the problem.
The Africanization policy called upon the state to play an entrepreneurial role by taking equity participation with foreign capital
(KG1).

The principal agencies employed to promote industrial develop-

ment are:

the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC),

the Development Finance Company of Kenya (DFCK), and the Industrial
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Development Bank (lOB).
government

instru~ents

nationalization.

It is these three agencies that act as
for engaging in joint ventures or partial

There are now some 115 public enterprises of various

types in the country (GR95: 3) contributing more than 10% of the
Gross Domestic Product in 1976 and employing about the same number
of employees as the public sector (KG7, 1979).
At first these actions appeared to have been motivated by the
desire to introduce public investment into strategic industries as
a means of taking control of the economy.

In reality, however, the

state ownership (particularly the partnership solution) appears to
have been more politically than economically motivated for two specific
reasons.

First, public participation is seen as necessary to ensure

a rapid Africanization of equity ownership and managerial positions
in an essentially foreign-dominated economic sector.

In addition,

Africanization was necessary to ensure the political stability
necessary to attract more foreign investment and also to preserve the
impression of expanding opportunities for all Kenyans.

Viewed in this

way, the policy is not one of Africanization, but one of Kenyanization.
The means by which prominent Africans have access to multinationally-generated economic rewards cover a wide spectrum, from high salaries
to joint venture partnerhsip.

MNC executives believe Africanization

is at the heart of this process (GR99: 163).

Directorships are a

second means by which prominent Africans share MNC sector rewards.
In fact, most governmental ministers have ownership in MNC operations.
The ICDC, itself the largest governmental investor in the MNC sector,
is seen as the temporary custodian of its investment pending eventual
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transfer to direct or indirect African ownership.
Secondly, foreign equity participation in joint ventures is
considered critical, particularly if the foreign investor brings in
skills, know-how, patent rights, and other benefits required by Kenya.
This latter view is emphasized in the Third Development Plan:
The inflow of capital is not generally the most
important benefit to be achieved from such
ventures. More valuable are technology, skills
and techniques, which will enable Kenyans to
staff and manage complex production processes,
as well as experience and knowledge in the
design and marketing of exports.
(KG4: 284)
These two points are consistent with the government's developmental goal of maximizing economic growth and Africanizing the economy.
Nevertheless, the partnership solution seems to have reduced the
capacity of the government to fulfill these developmental objectives.
In practice, the policy seems to effer relatively little significant
constraint on the activities of foreign economic actors.

From the for-

eign investors' point of view, such participation institutionalizes
special access to the policymaking body of the government, subject
only to the increasingly important proviso that IIthese privileges be
shared with African 'insiders'" (GR99:162).

As a result, a signifi-

cant symbiotic relationship has developed in Kenya between foreign
capital and the state, focused around the structuring of II shared
privileges," to the mutual advantage of the MNC sector and of the
lIinsider African bourgeoisie which dominates the Kenyan state
ll

(GR99: 162).

In short, state entrepreneurship in Kenya has become an

important mechanism to reinforce the private enterprise system rather

147
than diminish its presence.

A close examination of the activities

of the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC)
will illustrate this pOint clearly.
THE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (ICDC)
AND THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT
The ICDC was established in 1954 under the name of Industrial
Development Corporation (IDC) to facilitate the industrial and economic
development of the colony by the initiation, assistance, or expansion of
industrial and commercial undertakings.

At its initiation, the IDC took

over the assets and liabilities of its predecessor, the East African
Industrial Management Board (EAIMB), which had been established in
1944 to supply certain essential products during the war period (GR74:

3).
In order to define more accurately the corporation's present purpose and functions, the name was changed by the Industrial Development
Amendment Act of 1967 to Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC).

Its purpose has been to promote and integrate Africans into

the industrial and commercial structure of the country's economy.

This

trend is in total conformity with the policies laid down by the Kenyan
government in Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 on African Socialism and
Its Application to Planning in Kenya.

The paper specified that the

"ICDC will help African traders and industrialists to expand their
operations in order to participate more fully in the development of
the country" (KG1: 41).

Clearly, the government intends to use ICDC

as the official channel of industrial and commercial development of
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Kenya.
ICDC has invested in a wide range of industrial and commercial
activities including the hotel, transport, assembly, bottling, catering, mining, processing, manufacturing, and engineering activities
and such service industries as insurance, clearing, and forwarding.
It is also an investor in other developmental finance institutions,
notably the Industrial Development Bank and the Development Finance
Company of Kenya (GR65).

ICDC Activities
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Structure of ICDC Organization.

Since the mid-1960's, the ICDC has been involved in new joint
ventures with foreign capital, taking shares in the equity with a view
to transferring the shares to Africans "whenever they have the necessary
capital to acquire them" (GR74: 4).

As of 1979, the ICDC has 12 sub-

sidiary companies and has minority ownership in 47 other companies, most
of them foreign multinationals (see Appendix B).

Through its subsidiary
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companies, such as the Development Finance Company of Kenya (DFCK)
and the Industrial Development Bank (IDB), the ICDC extends credit and
provides monopoly advantages of African traders.

In short, the ICDC,

using the support of the state, has become an instrument for accelerating African private accumulation.
The government of Kenya has reaffirmed its commitment to a mixed
economy in which private and public enterprises would exist side by
side (KG4).

This policy requires that public enterprises conform to

standard capitalist performance criteria.

Accordingly, the ICDC is

intended to function as a profitmaking organization.

Given the influence

of foreign capital in the Kenyan economy, the po1icymaking functions of
the ICDC are shared with many other interested parties, both governmental and nongovernmental.
A diagrammatic representation of the policy process is presented
in Figure 5.

The principal actors are the

r~inistry

of Commerce and

Industry (henceforth referred to as the Parent Ministry), the ICDC
Board, the Legislature, the Office of the President (Inspectorate of
Statutory Boards), and nongovernmental actors such as foreign banks,
donor agencies, and joint venture partners (or multinational corporations).
As a statutory body, the ICDC is responsible to the Minister
of Commerce and Industry, which is represented on the Board of the
ICDC through its Permanent Secretary (GR65).

In theory, the Industrial

Development Act of 1967 gives further powers and control over the
activities of the ICDC to the Parent Ministry.
relationship of the two is formalistic.

In reality, however, the

Although the Parent Ministry

is given broad powers over the activities of the ICDC., such monitoring
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Figure 5.
is never done.

ICDC and the Policy Environment.

According to Oyugi, lithe Parent Ministries tend to

leave these organizations pretty much on their own

ll

(GR124: 10).

First, government bureaucracies in Kenya (as is often the case in
other developing countries as well) are weak, inefficient, and lack
the expertise to implement and evaluate policies. Secondly, the
functions and responsibilities of the parent ministry and the Inspectorate of Statutory Boards are never clearly specified.

In the

absence of strong governmental institutions, public enterprises are

left to operate on their own.
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This situation leaves the policymaking

process open to external economic actors.
The separation of economic decisionmaking from the political
arena is one factor which allows external economic actors to dominate
economic policy.

The representative institutions, namely, the Parliament

and the Kenya Africa National Union Party (KANU), are not strong enough
to monitor the activities of public enterprises.

Insofar as a national

party system has existed in Kenyan politics, it is one of patron-client
ties built around individuals who cross into each other's district or
organizations.

As long as the privileges are shared, the question of

transformation is answered by never being fonnally posed.

It is reason-

able to conclude that some of the extra legal autonomy of Kenyan public
corporations results from the fragmented nature of the government.
A major characteristic of the ICDC is its heavy dependence on
foreign finances and management advice.

As shown in Table XXXVI,

the main source of finance for the ICDC was from the Kenyan government
(47%) in 1975 (GR65).

External finance, which included a consortium

of foreign commercial banks, accounted for 41% of the funds in 1975.
Loans from commerical banks and elsewhere have to be repaid later with
interest and thus contribute significantly to the balance-of-payments
difficulties.

According to the Review of Statutory Boards (KG17: 22),

public enterprises handle about half of the country's exports and
require large amounts of foreign exchange for the importation of equipment and machinery.
The ICDC is directed by a board of ten directors, each of whom is
appointed by the Parent Ministry.

In theory, the Board is responsible
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TABLE XXXVI
ICDC, SOURCES OF FINANCE
Donor (1963)
Kenyan Government
United States
Other Sources
Total

shs.

9,320,000
1,000,000
3,500,000

shs.

12,820,000

Donor (1974/75)
Kenyan Government
KFW West Germany
Eximbatak of USA
DEG of West Germany
SIDA of Sweden
Commerical Banks
Other Sources
Profit and Reserves

shs.

63,960,000
17,516,000
6,866,000
1,458,000
7,004,000
22,071,000
3,000,000
12,531,000

47%
13%
5%
1%
5%
16%
3%
10%

shs. 134,406,000

Total

Source:

(GR65)

for all policy decisions within the framework of overall governmental
policy and planning (GR65).

In reality, however, the Board cannot be

expected to playa leading role in policy matters, for several reasons.
Given Kenya's patron-client political structure, patronage is deeply
institutionalized in the recruitment system of public and private institutions (GR16).

Board members are appointed for political reasons rather

than for their professional and managerial qualifications.

The result

has been that board members serve at the pleasure of the Minister and,
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therefore, cannot take independent positions on policy matters.
In addition, there is a conflict of interest between public responsibilities and private profit.

There exists a widespread practice of

"straddling," whereby board members use their positions to secure
business with the corporation on behalf of their own companies
(GR32; GR41).

This practice seems to have official sanction judging

from a statement contained in the Ndegwa Commission Report which
offered
no objection to the ownership of property or involvement
in business by members of the public service to a point
where their wealth is augmented perhaps substantially
by such activities.
(KG14: 14)

There are also other nongovernmental entities that influence the
operations of public enterprises.

The Federation of Kenyan Employers,

which represents the bureaucracy of the large foreign companies; the
Association of Kenya Manufacturers, which acts as a pressure group on
behalf of manufacturing firms; and the Chamber of Commerce have easy
access to the government on behalf of the multinational sector (GR99:
139).* The result is that policies governing the operations of the
ICDC are usually compromises between the government and the private
interests.

What one often finds, therefore, is significant private

influence in the running of public enterprises in Kenya.

*

At least 72 of the 81 subsidiaries interviewed by Langdon were
members of the Kenya Association of Manufacturers, and at least
50 were members of the Kenya National Chamber of Commerce (GR99:
186) .
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In light of the foregoing analyses, what role has the ICDC played
in promoting national development? An answer to this question requires an evaluation of the ICDC's performance against its objective.
Its objective is the creation of an African entropreneurial class
allied to international capital.

The question, is, then one of

whether the ICDC is carrying out that calling to the fullest.

According

to Mwaniki, the "ICDC is more active as an agent of integrating state
capital with foreign capital than of accumulating capital on behalf
of nationals (GRl13: 35).

In two separate studies of the ICDC's

small industrial loan commitments, Mwaniki and Kaplinsky (GR79) concluded that the corporation's loan policy favors large industrialists,
mostly foreign businessmen.

The corporation frequently discontinues

credit to African entrepreneurs so as to direct funds to the joint
ventures with international big business.

Thus, local savings are

integrated with foreign capital, but as shown in the percentage of
share holdings (Appendix B), control remains in the hands of foreign
firms.
As the largest government investor in the manufacturing sector,
the ICDC serves as a mechanism through which MNC-generated privileges
are shared with affluent Africans.

Government participation in

economic activities through the ICDC is focused around the interests
of the political class in control of the state.

The issue of equitable

and broadly beneficial development 1s not given the attention it
deserves.

But from the foreign investor's point of view, such partici-

pation lessens the capital commitment the investor must make.

It

institutionalizes special access for an enterprise to ease problems
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such as obtaining work permits, exemption from local borrowing
restrictions, etc, because the government has a financial interest
in the success of the firm.
Many foreign firms insist that the government participate as
a regular business partner.

Because they rely on such symbiosis,

they generally have easy, informal access to decisionmaking.

Of the

81 subsidiaries interviewed by Langdon (GR99), 55 firms, or 68%,
reported that they had informal contacts they could use to approach
the government.

As such, the ICDC facilitates the interaction between

foreign capital and the Kenyan state.

The overall impact of the ICDC

in the Kenyan economy has, therefore, been to reinforce the growing
inequalities of income among different social groups.

From the per-

spective of national development, the state-centered, Western-oriented
structure of the Kenyan economy inhibits severely the full productive
use of much of the country's resources and thereby negates long-term,
broadly based growth possibilities in the economy.
The conclusion to be drawn is that external economic actors
playa crucial role in Kenya, act in a symbiotic relationship with
the dominant African class, and are relatively unchecked by governmental regulations.

Government investment through the ICDC does not

exercise national control; conversely, it gives foreign companies
greater access to economic privileges.
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SUMMARY

This chapter has tried to show that several domestic and external factors have inhibited the expansion of the Kenyan economy and
that they have persisted, sometimes with growing intensity, since
independence in 1963.

The removal of these constraints would require

not just marginal changes in policy and trade relations, but also
profound structural adjustments, both internally and externally.
First, Kenya's growth performance since 1974 has been vulnerable
to swings in its international terms of trade.

The escalation of

oil prices, the decline in the price of coffee and tea, and the
increase in import bills imposed a serious deficit on current accounts
and foreign exchange reserve.

The continued outflow of resources

deprives Kenya of the needed foreign exchange inflow required for
economic growth and expansion of productive employment to its population, particularly school leavers.
Secondly, public equity participation in different projects has
also not been utilized as an instrument for the development of the public sector.

Such participation is geared toward bringing about a

broader base of local private control and ownership rather than toward
public control of the means of production.

This particular policy

choice institutionalizes special access for an enterprise (foreign
or domestic) into the national policymaking process to ease problems such as obtaining special import licenses, exemption from local
borrowing restrictions, and the repatriation of profits.

The combined

effect of these economic problems is to reduce the ability of the
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Kenyan government to develop and implement policies directed toward
the problem of urban unemployment.

CHAPTER IV
GRADUATE UNEMPLOYMENT:

A KENYAN DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM

Kenya has been identified in recent analyses as an example of
a country with relatively successful economic growth and capital
accumulation based on the dominance of foreign and domestic private
capital (GR106; GR149).

The Kenyan economy has experienced a fairly

rapid rate of growth of real monetary GOP (well over 6% per annum
for 1964-70).

Growth in manufacturing and commercial agriculture

were more noticeable than growth in other sectors of the economy
(see Table XIV}. However, the detailed evidence of the national economic indicators from the 1970's reviewed in the previous chapter
questions the potential of the Kenyan economy to sustain capital
accumulation.

A built-in structural constraint appears to choke off

growth through the mechanism of large'foreign exchange outflows.
The rapid growth of industry in Kenya based on multinational
corporations has imposed many demands on the economy which it is
incapable of meeting.

An import-substitution policy has retarded

the rapid growth of employment because of the capital-intensiveness
of Kenyan industries.

Since 1974, there has been a distinct slowdown

in the growth of wage employment, particularly in the manufacturing
sector where expanding production has not been matched significantly
by expanding employment.

Furthermore, Kenya's continued reliance on

foreign technology and inputs has contributed to chronic trade and
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balance-of-payment deficits.

To make up for these deficits, the

government has borrowed large sums of money from the West.

Unfor-

tunately, debt servicing charges for these loans has added to the
foreign exchange problem.

In the present context, all these forces

have exerted an extremely powerful and complex influence and have
set limits on the ability of Kenya to formulate and implement policies directed toward the problem of urban unemployment.
THE SCHOOL LEAVER PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE
A major resultant problem facing Kenya is that for a great
majority of those who finish school, no further educational or employment opportunities exist.

In 1964, one year after Kenya attained

political independence, it was found that of 103,000 Kenya Primary
Education (KPE) examination candidates, approximately 67,000 (65%)
would not have access to secondary school or vocational training (GR8;
GR23).

The situation has worsened with each passing year.

In 1980,

about 350,000 pupils took the Certificates of Primary Education examinations (CPEls) throughout the country. Of these, 40.000 will fill Form I
vacancies in 2,000 government-maintained or aided schools.

Fewer than

100,000 will receive similar placement in Harambee and private schools,
leaving more than 200,000 pupils without any hope of further education
(Nation, Dec 29, 1981: 6). A more potentially damaging situation has
been the trend toward unemployment among academic and technical secondary school graduates (GR57; GR83).

At the postsecondary level, it has

also been observed that increasing numbers of university graduates in
arts, law, and some areas of commerce are experiencing difficulties
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in obtaininq

emplo~ent

(PI 5, 7, 10).

Unemployment among school leavers at various levels of the educational system stems not so much from inappropriate education, as
is often argued, as from the expansion of educational opportunities
which are not accompanied by a corresponding expansion in the number
of positions in employment (GR60, GR86).

The particular reasons why

school leavers are a problem, why they are frustrated, and why an
increasing proportion of them are seeking work, is not so much that
the opportunities do not exist, but that the opportunities open are
not attractive in relation to those obtained by persons with comparable qualifications only a few years ago.

In this sense, the school

leavers seeking work are evidence, not of a shortage of jobs, but of
a growing imbalance of opportunities in the modern sector (KG69: 67;
KG5: 2.71).
The increasing imbalance between job seekers on the one hand
and well paying jobs in the modern sector on the other has merely
intensified the demand for education.

This is understandable because

education was the primary qualification for access to wage-earning
jobs in the first few years after independence.

This led to a tremen-

dous quantitative expansion of enrollments in the face of an ultimate
scramble for attractive jobs.
It was indicated in Chapter II that a balanced approach to
secondary school expansion was subverted by the uncontrolled expansion
of Harambee schools built by communities throughout the country.
Inevitably, the richer communities were able to do more, and thus the
availability of secondary school education became even more unequal
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than before independence.

As a result, most of the pupils who attended

rural and Harambee schools found themselves unable to compete on
an equal basis with those pupils who attended government and urban
high-cost schools.

Since the type of jobs obtainable in the modern

sector is related not only to the standard completed at school, but
also how well the individual performed on examinations, we would
expect rural pupils and those in Harambee schools, with low quality
education, to be discriminated against the most.

Figure 6 shows the

relationship between the rate of expansion of positions in the public
sector and private sectors and the rate of growth of educational
enrollment for the period 1960-1979. An important point revealed in
the figure is that annual growth of employment in both the private
and public sectors was far lower than the annual growth rate of primary and secondary school enrollment.

Considering that it is the

students of these two levels of the educational system who have been
competing for the positions which are available in the modern sector,
then it is obvious that there will necessarily be a surplus of school
leavers in comparison with the number of available jobs.

Since the

long range trend has been one of modern sector jobs increasing at a
slower annual rate than the output of the educational system, then
educated unemployment becomes a serious potentially long term problem
in Kenya (PI 10,11,14).
The magnitude of the school leaver problem is better understood
after an examination of the number of job openings each year in the
modern sector.

It is estimated that Kenya's labor force as of 1980 is

slightly greater than 7 million, of which about 1.2 million are engaged
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Expansion of Employment and Enrollments.

in the MES or wage employment (KG6, 1980). And accordinq to the
fourth Development Plan (KG5: 481), it is expected that the population 0;
working age will increase over the plan period by 266,000 per annum.
Of this number, approximately 50,000 can expect to find work in the
recorded modern sector (KG5: 48).

Competing for those few jobs are

100,000+ primary school leavers, 50,000 junior secondary school leavers,
and at least 2,000 graduates from universities, poly technical schools
and institutes of technology (GR70: 9). Tables XXXVII and XXXVIII
should facilitate an understanding of the problem generated by illusionary aspirations of school leavers.
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TABLE XXXVII
ENROllMENT STATISTICS BY EDUCATIONAL
lEVEL AND YEAR
Year

Educational
level
Standard 7
Form I
Form IV
Form V
Form VI
Uni vers ity
undergraduate
intake icombined) ***

1976

1977

243,214
94,834
48,045
5,208
4,610
1,398

235,925
106,496
53,800
5,240
5,251
1,477

1980***

1979

1978

258,610 281,689
104,733 104,733
61,680
74,788
8,568
7,039
5,581
7,632
1,684** 2,311

351,860
112,185
87,513
10,317
9,316
2,411

* Indicated educational level is deemed to be terminal as characterized by a centralized selective examination at the end of the
year.
** Intake figure estimate
*** Provisional
**** Nairobi Univ and Kenyatta Univ College. Excludes foreign students.
Sources:

(KG6, 1981: 201; KG12 )

TABLE XXXVI II
SCHOOL lEAVER RESIDUALS BY EDUCATIONAL lEVEL, 1977-80

Educa tiona 1
Level
1977
Standard 7 136,718
Form IV
42,805
Form VI
3,133
Total

188,656

Average Annual Growth
Rate, 1977-80
1978

1979

1980

#

%

132,192 153,877
46,761
53,112
3,567
3,272

169,504
64,441
5,221

10,929
7,212
696

7.4
13.9
18.3

182,520 210,261

239,166

18,837

8.2

Source:

see table above
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Tables XXXVII and XXXVIII reveal that a larqe proportion of residuals
from one educational level to the next have to compete for wage
employment because the educational system cannot absorb them for further advancement.

Obviously, this is indicative of the intensification

of the paper qualification syndrome (PQS)

because of the widely held

belief that a high educational attainment automatically leads to high
wage employment in the modern sector (GR157).

In the 1960's, prac-

tically every student who received an ordinary level school certificate
was easily absorbed into the modern sector, notwithstanding examination
performance, because of the changing political and economic circumstances following independence.

Educational attainment was then

directly related to high economic returns from formal wage employment,
a factor that necessitated acceleration of the paper qualification
syndrome.

Continuation of this trend has increased school output,

causing the labor market to become glutted.
For Kenya, a relatively poor country, to spend 30% of its
national budget on education and then be faced with a high rate of
unemployment among the educated can be seen as a tremendous drain of
national resources.

This is a point of major concern among academic

and official circles and has been referred to time and again in
previous research and official reports (GR39; GR68: 171; GR70; G871;
GR 83; GR129).
In the context of national planning, three significant problems
emerge.

First, unemployment of school leavers is perpetuating the

shortages of skills in a wide range of occupations (see Table XXXIX).
This first problem might be called the manpower problem.
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TABLE XXXIX
PUBLIC SECTOR MANPOWER PROJECTIONS. 1979-83

Employment
Field

Currently
Employed
1978-79

Surplus (+)
Additional Additional
or
Supply
Requirements
Deficit (-)
1979-83
1979-83
1979-83

Medical doctors
Dentists
Pharmacists
Clinical Officers
Registered Nurses
Enroll ed Nurses
Public Health Offcrs

542
22
30
1,002
1,223
4,009
250

724
138
148
835
1,037
3,891
140

428
110
92
552
690
2,236
107

Public Health Techs
Pharmaceutical Techs
Lab Technologists
Lab Techs
Radiographers
Physiotherapists
Occupational Thrpsts

642
221
180
284
217
116
45

2,099
669
540
1,400
933
544
555

497
138
77
264
122
101
68

- 1,602

Dental Technologists
Orthopedic Technolgsts
Family Health Field Eds
Nutrition Field Wrkrs
Jurists
Engineers
Agronomists/Vets (grads)

15
12
430
210
217
421
841

115
138
930
280
527
999
1 ,478

13
35
1 ,012
248
250
325
900

102
103
82
32
277
674
578

107
2,864
1,399

297
3,829
1,684

300
3,700
1,500

+

4,399

8,404

2,250

- 6,154

1,760
183
429
523

3,365
325
677
1,225

3,600
200
540
900

+

Physical Scientists
Grad Level Teachers
Agronmsts/Vets (semiprof)
Other qualified A~ronomists/Vets
Engineering Techs
Printing Techs
Scientific Techs
Other techs/artisians

Source: (KG5)

-

296
28
56
283
347
1,655
33

531
463
- 1 ,136
811
443
487

+

3
129
184

235
125
137
325
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The structure of the educational system, with its colonial mold, is
considered the main source of the problem.

Secondly, when education

ceases completely after only seven years, what was painfully learned
will shortly be forgotten.

Furthermore, this short time in school

often raises false expectations of future employability.

Thirdly,

the educated unemployed represent an articulate and politically
conscious group (relative to the general population of the country),
with the ability to mobilize public opinion and governmental opposition.

Recent political events in Kenya tend to confirm this view.

Since the attempted coup of August 1, 1982 (which was largely supported
by students), the government of Kenya closed the University and other
colleges.

This and other studies (GR59) suggest that the prospects

of unemployment among the educated could become a major impetus for
student unrest.

Therefore, the deep rooted, socioeconomic causes of

these educational problems should be understood in their proper societal
context if realistic and viable solutions are to be suggested.
THE STRUCTURE OF KENYAN EDUCATION
At independence, Kenya inherited an educational system carefully
designed for the exclusive benefit of European settlers in the country.
The examination and selection process, the content of educational curricula, the structuring of educational administration and finance
still reflect the pattern of social relations which existed during the
colonial period.

Such continuity in educational policy contributes

immensely to the perpetuation of neocolonialism and tends to discriminate against the vast majority of Kenyans who, by virtue of their
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low social status, cannot afford to receive the type of quality
education required to gain access to modern sector employment.
The Republic of Kenya is divided into seven provinces plus the
Nairobi extraprovincia1 district.
into a total of 38 districts.
such.

The seven provinces are subdivided

There is no provincial government as

Rather, the provinces serve as administrative boundaries for

various central governmental activities (GR123).

For example, the

system of primary education is overseen by the seven Provincial Education Officers, who in turn de1gate responsibility to the District
Education Officers.

Superimposed upon the system of provinces and

districts is a network of local governmental bodies whose jurisdictions
often, but not always, coincide with district boundaries. The local
governmental bodies in several designated urban areas are called
municipal councils, and the rest of the country is subdivided into
county councils.
Primary Education
Soon after Kenya achieved independence in 1963, the administration and operation of primary schools became the responsibility of the
municipal and county councils.

The central government, through the

Ministry of Education, became responsible for curriculum, examinations,
and the setting of standards.

The eight year primary cycle established

by the Beecher Commission of 1949 was later shortened to seven years.
Secondary education extended for six years and was divided into a
lower course of four years duration (called Forms) and an upper course
of two years duration.

This structure is shown graphically in Figure 7.
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Structure of Education.
Source:

(GR62)

Prior to 1970, rural primary schools were funded partly by
school fees, partly by local government revenues, and partly by
central government revenues.
were grants from the

c~ntral

The most important sources of funds
government, which provided roughly 35%,

followed by graduated personal tax funds (23%), and school fees (24%)
in 1969 (GR48).

However, in 1971, because of the financial diffi-

cu1ties of the districts, the central government took over from the
councils the responsibility for financing education and other services.
The central government now collects school fees and graduated personal
taxes, and no longer extends grants to the councils.

This decision did

not, however, affect primary schools within the jurisdiction of the
municipal councils, of which there are seven in the country.
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Primary schools in the rural areas are run by District Education
Boards, which are composed of governmental officials, educators, and
private citizens.

The DEB's employ teachers directly through the

Teachers' Service Commission (an ad hoc subsidiary of the Ministry
of Education) and collect school fees in addition to performing their
administrative and curricular functions.

For budgetary purposes, the

Ministry of Education grants funds to the DEB's, which pay the salaries
of the teachers.
Secondary Education
The secondary schools are classified as either "aided" or "unaided."
The aided (or government maintained) schools are completely under the
supervision of the Ministry of Education, and all budgetary and educational responsibilities belong to the government.

There are also some

assisted schools within the aided school system, where the central government pays 80% of the salaries of both the teaching and nonteaching
staffs.
The unaided schools, on the other hand, operate outside the
established jurisdictions of the government.

The Ministry of Education

has little to do with the unaided school system other than to certify
its existence.

These schools include private schools which are owned

and operated by enterprising individuals and the Harambee or self-help
schools built with community contributions.

In 1969, the central

government initiated a small scale program to assist selected Harambee schools in securing teachers.

The government also takes over a

number of Harambee schools each year, thus relieving the local
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communities from financial responsibility.
Examination and Selection Process
Accompanying the ferocious competition for access to educational
opportunity in Kenya is an emphasis on academic criteria for advancement within the system.

There has been little attempt to break away

from the inherited colonial pattern of academic credentials.

In

fact, a tightening of these requirements has occurred as employment
opportunities have become scarce; the minimum educational requirements have been raised, and research and reform efforts have been
directed toward improving the efficiency of the examinations, thus
perpetuating the neocolonial situation (GR38; GR143).
At the end of the primary cycle, nearly all students sit for
the Certificate of Primary Education Examination (CPE). Those who
pass the examination go on to secondary schools.

Those who do poorly

frequently repeat Standard VII in order to improve their performance
the following year.

Passing the EACE qualifies students for

admission to senior secondary or technical schools.

Passing the EAACE

qualifies students for admission to the university.

The pyramidical

structure of the Kenyan educational system is perhaps best exemplified
by Figure 8 , which diagrams school enrollment for the period 19731974.
As Figure 8 shows, the critical problem in Kenyan education
is the scarcity of secondary schools.

Of the 227,000 students who sat

for the CPE examination in 1974, only 58,638 (25%) were admitted to
secondary schools.

Of these, 32,885 (56%) were admitted into the
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unaided secondary school system. The remaining 168,362 (75%) left
school without any prospect for further schooling or employment. On
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the basis of previous research by Fordham and Sheffield (GR51),
approximately 33% of the 1974 primary school leavers were expected to
find work in the formal or informal sectors of the economy.
et al (GR44) gave a much higher estimate of unemployment.

Dore
Of

the estimated 347,000 children entering the labor market in 1980,
57% had completed primary school and 21% had completed at least four
years of secondary school.

Making the very optimistic assumption

that there was a 5% growth in modern sector jobs and that 2% of the
existing modern sector job holders died or retired, the net increase
in modern sector jobs could be enough to accomodate only 13% of the
primary school age students and 6% of the secondary school age students.

Primary school leavers unable to find modern sector jobs

would comprise 44% of the total.

The corresponding figure for unem-

ployed secondary school leavers would be 15%. The unemployment
figure for females was much higher than for males at both the primary
and the secondary level.

Thus, a major bottleneck occurs every year

at both the primary and the secondary level, and this bottleneck has
intensified the competition for nonexistant jobs.
The Primary School Leavers.

Because of the relatively limited

number of places in secondary schools, the chief problem with Kenya's
educational system starts at the primary level.

As Table XXXX indi-

cates, on the average, about 30% of the primary school candidates pass
the Certificate of Primary Education (CPE) examination and continue
their education in government and private secondary schools.

The aver-

age opportunity index for admission to the government aided secondary
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TABLE XXXX
SUMMARY OF PRIMARY SCHOOL CANDIDATES AND RESIDUALS
1964-81

Year
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
Total

Form I O~~ortunities
KPE/CPE
Aided
Unaided
Total
Candidates Schools
Schools
Secondari:
103,400
148,900
146,900
149,700
159,700
159,900
166,900
176,100
187,600
200,300
216,200
226,700
243,214
236,925
258,610
281,689
351,860

36,400
24,100
32,200
36,200
40,800
42,000
47,400
54,300
59,500
64,700
73,700
70,000
106,496

Residuals

11 ,500
12,800
14,500
15,700
18,900
21,200
22,500
24,300
26,700
27,300
27,600
27,800
27,715
30,587
29,180
37,272
40,000

24,900
11 ,300
17,700
20,500
21,900
20,800
24,900
30,000
32,800
37,400
46,100
42,200
78,781
74,146
75,553
74,913
111,860

104,733
112,185
151 ,860

67,000
124,800
114,700
113,500
118,900
117,900
119,500
121,800
128,100
135,600
142,500
156,700
136,718
132,192
153,877
169,504
200,000

3,414,598 415,554

745,753

1,161,307

2,253,291

104,733

Opportunity Index for Form I Admission
12;~

22~;

34%
66~~

Residuals as % of Candidates
Sources:

( KG6, 1964-81 ; KG7, 1964-81;
KG8, 1964-78)
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school system was only 12%, while the overall opportunity index for
both government and Harambee schools was 34%.

On the whole, the aided

school system accounted for 39% of secondary school

candidates~

Harambee schools accounted for over 60% of all secondary

while the

enrnllment~.

it not been for the Harambee schools. the educational system of Kenya
would have collapsed.

The Harambee schools thus serve as cushions.

Despite the limited number of students who are admitted to
secondary schools every year, the available Form I places are not
evenly distributed, as demonstrated in Table XXXXI.

In the 1975 CPE,

TABLE XXXXI
OPPORTUNITIES FOR CPE CANDIDATES, 1975
BY TYPE OF SCHOOL AND PROVINCE
1975 Proportion Gaining Form 1 Places
Province

Candidates

Aided

Unaided

Central
Coast
Eastern
N Eastern
Nyanza
R Valley
VJestern
Nairobi
Kenya

50,361
12,479
42,059
547
43,412
31,782
30,422
8,488
219,550

6,550 (13%)
2,084 (16~n
4,379 (10%)
151 (28%)
4,109 ( 9%)
4,162 (13%)
3,835 (13%)
3,392 (40%)
28,663 (13%)
Source:

11 ,072
2,533
9,153

(22%)
(20%)
(22%)

6,660
5,623
7,274
2,722
45,037

(15~n

(18%)
(24%)
(32%)
(21%)

(KG8,1975)

of 220,000 candidates, about 28,663 (12%) were admitted into government-aided secondary schools, while another 45,000 (21%) were
admitted to Harambee secondary schools.

The corresponding figures for

Harl
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Nairobi show that 40% of the candidates were admitted to government
schools and another 35% to Harambee schools.

Thus, the probability

of gaining Form I places from a Nairobi primary school is significantly
greater than from a rural primary school.

In the case of Harambee

schools in Nairobi, access is determined almost entirely by the
student's ability to meet the fees which are charged.
The pyramidical structure of the Kenyan educational system may
be better understood from the following diagram which illustrates projected school enrollment for the period 1980-1993 (KG16, 1981).

1993

University

1992

Form VI

1990

215,000

Form VI

1987

220,000

Fonn I

1986

860,000

Standard 7

1980

900,000

Standard I

Fiqure 9.

Projected School Enrollment 1980-1993.

Data were taken from a recent government report on university education in Kenya (March, 1981).

The report stated that in 1980, some

900,000 children enrolled in Standard 1; about 860,000 of them will be
expected to sit for CPE in 1986.

If the present trend continues, about

220,000 of them will be able to proceed to Form I in 1987 (double the
present intake), with about 215,000 being allowed to sit for EACE in
1990. Thereafter, about 43,000 will likely aspire to proceed to senior
secondary (A level) and the university, although only about 17,000 of
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them are apt to meet the minimum entrance requirements for university
admission (KG16: 71).

Even if the government opens up a second uni-

versity (as projected), it is unlikely that the projected 17,000
candidates will be absorbed into the university system.
Given the statistical realities of secondary school opportunities, primary school for the majority of pupils is terminal formal
education.

Unfortunately, the primary school content and teaching

methods, dominated by the CPE examination--a computerized multiple
choice test made up of three papers (English, mathematics, and general
knowledge)--are almost inseparably tied to the task of preparation
for secondary education rather than a test of skill acquisition
(GR143).

Furthermore, the performance of repeaters and older

children is categorically better than that of first sitters and
younger students.

It has been convincingly argued that to a large

extent, the CPE tests the teachers rather than the pupils.

Because

of the orientation of the primary school curriculum towards the
CPE, other important

issue~

such as the quality of education, have

been neglected.
The validity of the CPE examination as an instrument for selecting children for secondary school must be viewed within the context
of the regional distribution of educational resources (i.e., the
number of qualified teachers, etc) and opportunities discussed in the
previous chapter.

Results of student performance in national examin-

ations tend to ignore historical and other economic and political
factors which influence the nature and structure of the school system (GR85; GR1l8; GR143).

Those students who come from the relatively
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rich areas, such as Central Province or the urban centers of Nairobi, perform better than those students from the relatively deprived
areas of the Northern, Eastern, or Coast Provinces.

The unequal dis-

tribution of qualified teachers and other school inputs tend to
intensify regional inequalities among the fortunate and the less
fortunate provinces.
A number of questions have been raised regarding the validity
of the CPE as an objective criteria for selection of secondary school
bound students.

The Report of the National Committee on Educational

Objectives (KG15: 131) highlights the major problems with the ePE:
• The examination has been dominated by items which test
abilities related only to the cognitive aspects of learning.

As

a result, it has encouraged memorization of facts rather than
acquisition of career oriented skills.
• The examination has not fulfilled the function of a
terminal examination for the majority of primary school 1eavers
who have no chance of going further with education.

In particular,

it has given only limited attention to agriculture and practical subjects and has therefore not prepared children for life in the rural
environment where the majority of them will live.
• The examination favors children from urban schools because
there settings provide an improved socio-economic background and
surroundings, more qualified teachers, and excellent school facilities.
The reasons for this situation are understandable.

Since inde-

pendence, competition for secondary school entry has steadily
intensified.

The simplest way of making the examination more difficult
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(thereby keeping the numbers of graduates low) is to increase the
proportion of items requiring specialized knowledge.

Moreover,

most of the people responsible for the certificate have been recruited
from secondary teaching and are naturally concerned about ensuring
a continued supply of high-caliber recruits to the secondary schools.
They have been supported by the manpower planners, who until quite
recently, were preoccupied with the need to provide for Kenya's highlevel manpower needs, particularly in the occupations still dominated
by expatriates (GR69: 236).

The result has been that the syllabus

of upper primary schools, and particularly the Certificate of Primary
Education (CPE), has become overloaded with topics that are the more
proper concern of the secondary schools.

The CPE does not make a

more accurate prediction of which pupils would make the best use of
secondary-level education.
Some attempts have been made to reform the primary school curriculum by adopting a freer approach to teaching in which children
are encouraged to be more spontaneous and to draw on their environment
and by adding a rural aspect to the science courses.

But these ef-

forts to change the curriculum are largely nullified by the examination
system.

The questions related to agriculture in the examination for

the CPE in 1971 accounted for 17 marks out of a possible 250 (50 for
mathematics, 100 for English, 100 for history, geography, science,
and nature study) (GR69: 237; GR70: 65).

Clearly, the \'/eight given

to a subject in the examination and the form the questions take define
the method and content of teaching.
effect" of the examination structure.

This;s known as the "backwash
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The Secondary School Leavers.

Although initial expansion of

the secondary school system was justified by the manpower needs of
the country, it was the problem of primary school leavers which later
became the driving force for such expansion.

International aid and

community self-help encouraged the expansion of secondary schools;
the Harambee schools now outnumber the government schools.

8y the

time these Harambee schools had been funded, built, and the first
batch of students graduated in 1968, the halcyon era of the secondary
school was over.

Only those with some sort of distinction in the

EACE examination could any longer secure the sort of jobs that had
spurred the vast building programs (GR83; GR88).
If school certificate results may be taken as a measure of the
quality of education in aided and unaided schools, then it may be
said that the quality of the unaided schools is extremely poor.
According to the examination results presented in Table XXXXII, on
the next oage, the Harambee schools are producing failures.

The

table shows that 48% of the pupils in government schools obtained
Division I-III certificates between 1972 and 1979. During the same
period, the proportion of Harambee school students who merited
Division I-III passes was only 16%.

The combined percentage of

those who received EACE certificates (Division IV) and those who failed
was 91% in the Harambee schools and 53% in government schools.

Fewer

than 6,000 students were admitted annually into senior secondary or A
level schools and the Mombasa and Kenya Polytechnics.

In 1979,

approximately 53,000 secondary school graduates were out looking for
work.

This figure is well in excess of the 50,000 jobs the economy

TABLE XXXXII
EACE EXAtUNATION, PERFORMANCE OF CANDIDATES
Average

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

Candidates

26,217

28,385

32,311

38,228

47,239

55,878

60,707

70,000

Div 1-3

12,494
(48%)

14,199
(50%)

15,847
(49%)

18,821
(49%)

22,410
(47%)

28,250
(51%)

29,889
(49%)

27,302
(39%)

48%

8,138
(31%)

8,598
(30%)

8,866
(27%)

10,532
(28%)

7,660
(16%)

15,410
(27%)

16,648
(27%)

23,712
(34%)

28%

5,585
(21%)

5,588
(20%)

7,598
(24%)

8,875
(23%)

17,169
(36%)

12,488
(22%)

14,170
(23%)

1~,9a6

5,109

6,044

5,773

9,698

5,004

5,330

4,214

4,158

1,235
(13%)

846
(17%)

(18~~ )

944

786
( 19%)

436
(11 %)

16%

1972-79

Aided Schools

%

Div 4
%

Fail
01

10

(27%)

25%

Unaided Schools
Candidates
Div 1-3
%

Div 4 (EACE)
%

Fail
%

3,832
(75%)

4,545
(75%)

3,522
(61%)

4,960
(51%)

1,553
(31 %)

2,492
(47%)

2,067
(49%)

1,988
(4856 )

55%

1,277
(25%)

1,499
(25%)

2,251
(39%)

3,503
(36%)

2,605
(52%)

1,894
(35%)

1,361
(32%)

1,734
(41%)

36%

Source:

.....

(KG7, 1980: 200)

co
0
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generates annually.
The next examination hurdle for those admitted to A level schools
(approximately 6,000) comes at the end of Form VI. The EAACE examination
is strictly used to select candidates to the university.

Even at this

level, the ability of the university to absorb qualified students is
limited, as shown in Table XXXXIII below.
TABLE XXXXI II
FORM VI LEAVERS AND CANDIDATES ADMITTED INTO THE
UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI AND KENYATTA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, 1970-1980
Year

Form VI
Leavers*

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

2,672
3,448
3,953
5,602
6,459
7,998
7,493
8,655
8,429
11 ,032
12,306

#

Adm to the U of Nairobi

#

& Ken~atta Univ College

Left Over

1,279
1,215
1,641
1,735
1,469
1,519
1,804
2,461
2,592
2,611
2,600**

1,393
2,233
2,312
3,867
4,990
6,479
5,689
6,194
5,837
8,421
11,706**

* Includes private candidates
** University admission for the 1981/82 academic year was given from
the Nation Newspaper, February 14, 1982, p 3.
Source:

(KG8)

For example, the total number of applications received for the 1981/82
academic year was 9,298.

Of these, a total of 4,500 met the minimum
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requirements to enter the University of Nairobi and Kenyatta University College.

The University, however, only admitted a total of 2,412

students (Daily Nation, Feb 14, 1982, P 3).
The importance of examination results in terms of opportunities
for further education, training, and employment has been well documented by Kinyanjui (GR88).

For example, in 1968, of a total sample

of 1,186 secondary school 1eavers, 394 (33%) were engaged in employment
and 531 (41%) were in school.

Of those who were employed, 24% were

from national schools, 38% from provincial schools, and 37% from Harambee schools.

The remaining leavers were distributed accordingly:

531

(45%) received further training, 175 (14%) were unemployed, and 86 (7%)
were untraced.

The overall unemployment rate for the group with

Division I to III certificates was 6.9%, but the unemployment rate among
1eavers from national schools with these certificates was 4.5%, 6.7%
for 1eavers from provincial schools, and 28.2% for 1eavers from Harambee schools (GR85: 37).

On the whole, the Harambee schools had the

highest numbers of leavers remaining unemployed:

37% in the sample were

unemployed in their first year after school, while smaller proportions
from national and provincial aided schools fell into this category. as
demonstrated in Table XXXXIV.
Unemployment in the second year after school was as follows:

86%

for Harambee school 1eavers, 59% for provincial school leavers, and 15%
for national school 1eavers.
EACE performance for the three types of schools was as follows:
the mean grade aggregate was 31.0 for national schools, 3S.7 for provincial schools, and 43.1 for Harambee schools (GR8S: 38).

On the basis
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of performance criteria, one might expect the distribution of opportunities for leavers from these three types of schools to be different,
but the Harambee leavers experienced discrimination beyond that indicated by their lower performance on EACE.

This discrimination also

affected leavers from the less well-established government aided
schools.

While more than 60% of the leavers from aided national schools

and about 42 % from provincial schools went on to higher education or
some form of formal training, only 18% of the leavers from Harambee
schools continued their education or training.

The implicatior. is

that more than 60% of Kenya's secondary school students are in the
Harambee schools and are receiving an inferior education.

Consequently,

they cannot compete on an equal basis with students who attend
government aided and urban high-cost schools.

In short, the different

school systems in Kenya have differential effects on social mobility.
TABLE XXXXIV
FIRST YEAR AFTER SCHOOL OPPORTUNITIES BY TYPE OF
SECONDARY SCHOOL ATTENDED, 1968 SCHOOL LEAVERS
Type of After
School
OQQortunit.l
Higher Ed
Training
Employment
Other Activities
Unemployment
Unknown
Totals

National
School
%

Provincial
School

37.8
21.3
24.1
1.1
9.2
6.4

17.4
24.2
37.8
0.8
14.5
5.3

99.9 (357)

0/
/0

100.0 (731)

Harambee
School
%

Total

4.1
14.2
32.7
6.1
36.7
8.2

266
265
394
16
175
70

100.0 (98)
Source:

(GR85)

1,186
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POPULATION GROWTH, EDUCATION, AND MIGRATION
Population in Kenya over the past decade has grown at one of
the highest rates in the world, 3.5% per annum.

In real terms, Kenya's

population grew from 11 million in 1969 to 16 million in 1979. At the
present rate, it is expected to swell to 28 million by the year 2000.
The projections shown below in Table XXXXV are based on a declining
birth rate.

Should this not occur, total population in the year 2000

is projected at 34 million (KG5: 63).
TABLE XXXXV
POPULATION IN KENYA (%)
Estima ted

Projected

1948

1962

1969

1978

1983

2000

20

17

19

19

18

14

School age
(5-14 )

26

29

29

29

30

27

Economically
Active
(15-59)

52

49

46

48

48

55

2

5

6

4

4

4

5,406

8,636

10,943

14,732

17,470

28,182

92

104

11 7

108

108

82

Age
Preschool
(0-4)

Persons 60+
Total PO)
(OOO's
Dependency
Ratio

Sources: (GR132: 208. Data for 1948, 1962, and 1969 are taken from
the Population Census for these years. The estimate for
1978 and projections for 1983 and 2000 were obtained from
KG5, Table 2.6, Declining Birth Rate Columns.
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The present population structure is indicated in Table XXXXV
above.

In 1978, 48% of the population was under the age of fifteen,

and only 3.7% was over the age of sixty.

Hence, the population of

productive age (15-59) was, in fact, smaller than the dependent population, comprising only 48% of the total.

As a result, the dependency

ratio (the number of people dependent on each one hundred persons of
working age) increased steadily from 92 in 1948 to 117 in 1969, and
then began to drop.
is 82.

The projected dependency ratio for the year 2000

The school age population was 29% in 1978, which, combined with

the other developments, suggests that there will be an increased demand
on the government to provide sufficient quality education and productive
employment.

The impact of this demand is expected to place tremendous

strain on both governmental and family budgets.
It is estimated that 90% of Kenya's 16 million people live in
rural areas and earn their 1ivelhood from peasant agriculture.

Because

of demographic and land tenure patterns, access to land has become
limited in recent years.

According to the latest Development Plan

(KG5), less than 17% of Kenya's land area is considered arable (i.e.,
high and medium potential land).

The average overall population density

was 26 per sq kilometer in 1978, while the density on arable land was
135 per sq km.

By the year 2000, these densities are anticipated to be

50 and 250 per sq km, respectively (KG5: 65).

Already, approximately

30% of Kenya's households do not have access to land.
trated in a very few hands.

Land is concen-

Njonjo (GRl17) reports in his 1974 survey

of 230 large farms occupying 222,000 acres, representing about 67% of
the total African-owned mixed farmland, that the smallest 91% of the
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farmers owned only 21% of the land and the largest 5% owned 69%.
Most of the landless in Kenya are too poor to be able to set up a
business.

Even those with access to some land have a hard time

generating subsistence-level income.
The increased drain on the land and the relatively low income
of rural peasants create a situation in which the vast majority of
rural peasants are forced to migrate to other, more prosperous rural
areas or urban centers.

The significance of such migration is

shown in Table XXXXVI, which indicates the proportion of casual labor
in the formal sector.

The table shows that 50% of the casual labor

is employed in agriculture and forestry; about 15% is employed in
manufacturing.

The high percentage of casual labor in the sugar and

coffee plantations reflects seasonal peaks as in coffee picking.

On

the whole, the data indicate that casual labor is a major source of
supplementing low incomes in rural Kenya.

Given the implied expansion

in the adult workforce and the comparatively small proportion of
medium and high potential land, this raises major questions of future
employment and labor migration.
Livingstone (GR107) has identified three kinds of population
movements in Kenya:

rural-urban migration; rural-rural migration; and

reverse urban-rural migration of returning migrants.

Rural-urban migra-

tion has been the main focus of attention because of its association
with the problem of urban unemployment (GR132; GR150).
In the 1960's and the early 1970's, rural-urban migration to
Nairobi was nearly 11% per annum.

The 1972 ILO Mission to Kenya was

particularly concerned with this problem because of its possible impact
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TABLE XXXXVI
PERCENT OF CASUAL LABOR IN THE FORMAL SECTOR, 1977
Casual Workers
in Industry
#

Agriculture &
Forestry

85,134

Manufacturing

46.7

0.9

24,625

20.9

14.8

32.5
36.3

35.1
3,511

Water works & supply
11 ,153

Other

40,629

Sources:

36.3

2.1

46.0

Construction

TOTAL
All industries

51.1

1,567

Food Products, mec
Soap, etc
Plastic Products
Electricity & Water

32.7

All Casual
Labor
%
--.-.:..:.--

54.8
46.0
44.0
15.0

Sugar Plantations
Mi xed Fa rmi ng
Coffee Plantations
Sisal Plantations
r·1ining & Quarrying

Casual Sector
Employment
%

166,619

23.1

6.7
24.4

18.5

100.0

(GR69: 5-16; GR107. Compiled from Central Bureau of Statistics,
Employment and Earnings, 1977, p 11).

on urban unemployment.

The Mission projected that a major urban avalanche

would take place in Kenya during the 1980's; however, the anticipated
explosion in the number of urban unemployed in Nairobi has not materialized.

One reason has been a considerable growth in large numbers of

other towns in Kenya which have absorbed the anticipated migration to
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Nairobi.

As indicated in Table XXXXVII, 12 towns grew faster than

Nairobi, and 14 grew faster than Mombasa.

Kakamega and Kisii grew

at nearly 18% per annum--phenomena1 growth rates.

Reflecting this

general dispersal of urban growth, the proportion of the population
in towns of 10,000 or more accounted for by Nairobi and Mombasa
appears to have fallen from 81.6% in 1969 to 60.7% in 1979, a dramatic change.

This change in urban population, however, has not

been accompanied by a corresponding increase in the distribution of
manufacturing establishments and wage employment. In 1978, Nairobi
and Mombasa together accounted for 73% of wage employment and 69%
of manufacturing employment in main towns (KG7, 1978).

Given the

historical concentration of manufacturing and commercial activity
in Nairobi and Mombasa, these two urban centers are expected to attract the majority of migrants, particularly those with several years
of formal education.

One feature of rural-urban migration is that it

tends to be selective, with a bias towards the younger age groups
and toward those who have had some education.

This may be due either

to raised expectations among the educated or to the greater probability
of securing a job in the case of migrants with some years of education.
A corollary of the latter is that as more of the populace acquire education, the degree of education required for a given probability of
employment will increase.

Thus, following the dramatic expansion of

education after independence and the gradual slowing down of the rate
of growth of industrial employment in the late 1960's and 1970's, unemployment among school graduates has reached epidemic proportions.
In an extensive study of labor migration by male students and
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TABLE XXXXVII
RATE OF GRo\ITIl OF

~la

1969

1979

Annual Rate
of Growth
1969-1979

6,244
6,083
32,431
10,004
10,144
18,196
11 ,573
18,387
10,757
47,151
5,343
11 ,624
509,286
6;920
7,602
247,073
8,201

32,000
31,000
150,000
36,000
30,000
50,000
28,000
41,000
23,000
93,000
10,000
19,000
828,000
11,000
11,000
342,000
11,000

17.8
17.7
16.6
13.7
11. 5
10.6
9.2
8.4
7.9
7.0
6.5
5.0
5.0
4.7
3.8
3.3
3.0

in Towns

Kakamega
Ki si i
Kisumu
Nyeri
Keri cho
Eldoret
Kitale
Thika
Malindi
Nakuru
Athi River
Nanyuki
Nai robi
Naivasha
Nyahururu
Mombasa
Isio10

~1AIN TOWNS (OVER 10,000)
1969-79

Sources: (KG7, 1969 and Central Bureau of Statistics Provisional
Estimate, 1979)
urban unemployment in Kenya, Rempel (GR132) found a relationship
between a migrant's education and his propensity to migrate to an
urban center. * The data presented in Table XXXXVIII, next page,
indicate that 25% of the migrants have some secondary education,
while an additional 47% have 5 to 8 years of formal schooling.
Of those with 5 to 8 years of education, 75% appear to have completed
primary education.

For

i~airobi,

34% of the migrants have some

* The sample excluded female students because of their low rate of
migration, resulting from a number of cultural sanctions which
act as prohibiters. The fear of being stigmatized as a "prostitute"
is one such example.
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secondary education, while an additional 42% have 5 to 8 years of
formal schooling.
TABL E XXXXV I II
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF LEVELS OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT
FOR r~EN WHO ~lIGRATED TO EACH OF THE EIGHT URBAi~ CENTERS
Education
Standards
Urban Centers
Nairobi
Mombasa
Kisumu
Nakuru
E1 doret
Thika
Nanyuki
Nyeri
Totals

Forms

No Formal
Education

1 - 4

5 - 8

1 - 6

10.8
15.8
11.6
17.5
30.8
5.0
10.0
7.6

13.5
18.4
21. 7
12.7
9.6
7.5
12.0
12.7

41.7
50.1
45.8
55.5
38.5
52.4
68.0
45.5

34.0
16.1
20.9
14.3
21.1
35.0
10.0
34.2

12'.7

14.8

47.1

25.4

Source:

(GR132: 31, Table 3.6)

The age characteristic of migrants is given by Whitelaw (GR167).
According to the data presented in Table XXXXIX, the typical
migrant tends to be very young, with several years of education.
Rempel also noted a significant variation in the distribution
of the levels of educational attainment among provinces of migrant
births.

For example, the Central and Nyanza Provinces contain a

proportionally higher population concentration in the secondary education group, while Coast and Eastern Provinces contain a low concentration.
On the other hand, Eastern and Rift Valley Provinces contain a
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proportionally greater population concentration with no formal
schooling, while Coast and Nyanza Provinces contain the proportionally
greater concentration of people with some primary education.

This

variation could be the result of differences among provinces in the
availability of employment opportunities in rural areas or in the
quality of primary education, which determines a student's ability to
compete for the limited number of secondary school seats available
in Kenya.
TABLE XXXXIX
PROPORTION OF AFRICANS SEEKING WORK IN NAIROBI,
BY AGE AND LEVEL OF EDUCATION
1970 (PERCENTAGES)
Length of Education (In Years)
Age

0

16-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35+
A11 ages

(43)*
(15 )
43
36
15
21

All

1 - 6

7- 8

9+

Lengths

(38)
52
28
14
12
19

(44)
33
10
7
6
17

(11 )
19
7
0
4
12

32
31
17
13
12
18

* Parenthesized figures indicate less than 25 observations
in cell. Persons not specifying age or education were
excluded.
Source:

(GR167)

The most important population activity in the quarter prior to
migration was determined to be the obtaining of an education (47.4%).
Only a small proportion of the population (16.6%) was engaged in
farming.

An additional 19.6% were employed for wages, which mayor
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may not have been on a farm.

This suggests that those with some years

of formal education may choose to take a risk and decide to migrate;
those with no formal education are much less likely to do so.

The

following, Table L, shows 'the percentage distribution of the
various employment categories prior to migration.
TMLE L
THE PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT
OF MEN PRIOR TO THEIR RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION
Nature of Employment
Province of
Birth

In
School

Empl for
Wages

SelfEmpl Farming

Empl

PIT

Unemel

Totals

Urban Center
Nyanza
Western
R Valley
Central
Eastern
Coast
Uganda and
Tanzania
Totals

41.4
48.9
41.8
53.8
54.4
39.9
50.0
21.9

20.7
15.1
18.6
15.4
14.5
14.6
14.5
31.2

3.5
4.8
2.3
7.7
3.5
4.4
3.9
12.5

13.8
16.5
20.9
2.6
9.6
27.8
22.4
18.8

10.3
3.5
2.8
5.1
3.2
4.4
2.6
3.1

10.3
11.2
13.6
15.4
14.8
8.9
6.6
12.5

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

47.4

16.0

4.2

16.6

3.6

12.2

100

Source:

(GR167: 36 )

On the basis of this study, a typical migrant is determined
to be relatively young, will likely have completed more formal education than the average Kenyan of the same age, and will have less
actual or potential claim to land ownership than the average Kenyan.
Conclusive evidence is presented to support the claim that the propensity to migrate increases with the level of educational attainment.
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Thus, Kenya1s continued efforts to expand educational opportunities
will likely increase the internal migration flows.
EDUCATIONAL STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING URBAN EMPLOYMENT:
THE KENYAN EXPERIENCE
That Kenya has achieved a high rate of expansion in primary
and secondary education has been well documented in Chapter II.

The

unprecedented growth in primary and secondary school enrollment
achieved so far has led to the emergence or accentuation of unemployment problems among school graduates.

Measures to deal with the

unemployment of school leavers have been taken at two levels:
within the formal educational system and from outside it.

from

Reforms

within the educational system have concentrated on curriculum changes
and the expansion of institutions to provide technical and agricultural
education (GR37; GR92; GR93).

Outside the formal educational system,

measures intended to alleviate the unemployment problem have ranged
from land settlement schemes to direct intervention in the labor
market through tripartite agreements, and more recently, from wage
guidelines set by the Industrial Court, and through the taking of jobs
held by nonresidents (GR14E).
The central component of the school leaver problem, as perceived by planners and politicians, is the so-called IIwhite-collar
mentalityll fostered by the educational establishment which makes
youngsters set their sights on the limited number of civil service
and management jobs available and causes them to reject agricultural
or manual work (PI3-5, 12, 15). This attitude is cited as a major cause of
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unemployment.

According to an editorial which appeared in the

Daily Nation:
The trouble with our educational system is that it just
isn't suited to our development programme. In its original form, the system was designed to produce a small
group of clerical Iyes men who would help perpetrate
colonialism in Kenya. And the disheartening thing is
that this sorry state of affairs has been allowed to continue up till now--18 years after Kenya became an
independent nation . . • . What this means is that the
educational system cannot play its role as the nerve
centre of our development process. It achieves a
spectatory role rooted in its colonial mess. It cannot
take an innovative role. . •. So, yearly we are producing school 1eavers whose most important qualification
is the ability to speak English with an anachronistic
Oxford accent. And the baffled kids, waiving certificates
that don't mean much, flock into urban areas where they
hope to get white-collar jobs and practice their Oxford
English. And so we end up with 'educated ' but unemployable kids who, because they have no skills, start loitering
in urban areas with imponderable consequences. The solution to this roblem lies in reformin the educational
system to give it a rura orlentation emphasis added
l

(January 19, 1982: 6)
The general theory behind this style of thinking is that unemployment in this case is due to an educational system which turns
out inappropriately trained labor, i.e., labor which is academically
geared.

The colonial legacy in the educational structure, which

ensures that an elite is groomed for administration is often blamed
for producing this situation.

The solution, therefore, appears to

lie in a reform of the educational system by promoting vocational and
practically-oriented training such as the Village Polytechnic Programme {PIl-15}. Instead of fostering aspirations for passing
examinations and gaining white-collar jobs, this program imparts the
skills necessary for gaining local craft employment.

In other words,
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the new orthodoxy advocated changes in the different components of
the school system particularly curriculum reform, thus maintaining
intact the main elements of the colonial educational and economic
structures.
A recurring theme all these reforms suggest is the view that
education and production ought to be closely linked.

The integration

of education and production is expected to discourage students from
seeking employment in the urban areas and lead them into rural areas
where employment is considered plentiful (GR3; GR37).

In Kenya, this

thinking was originally spawned by the National Christian Council of
Kenya (NCCK) in the mid-1960's.

One of its pioneering reports, en-

titled After School What? (GRllS) focused attention on the hundreds
of thousands of primary school leavers (67,000 in 1964) who had little
hope of finding higher wage employment or further education, yet who
were unprepared in terms of knowledge, skills, or expectations for
the rural environment into which they were left.

The report was sub-

sequently discussed at an international Conference on Education,
Employment and Rural Development, held in Kericho, Kenya, in March
1966 (GR14l).

One of the solutions proposed was the establishment

of Village Polytechnics to equip primary school leavers with simple,
practical skills such as masonry and carpentry, which could be utilized locally in a self-employed capacity.

The idea is that if

polytechnic graduates establish themselves in business locally,
possibly using skills which are new to the area, they will be creating
new jobs (hence bringing down the unemployment rate) and retaining
and bringing additional income into the community (hence developing
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the rural economy); the combined effect will, in turn, lower the
rate of rural-urban migration.
r1any of these reforms are to be welcomed on strictly educational
Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether they will succeed in

grounds.

having any major impact on the school leaver problem, and in particular whether they will succeed in halting the pressure for expanding
upper secondary and higher education, ignoring as they do the earnings
that regularly accrue to persons with advanced levels of schooling in
Africa (PI8; PIll).

The appeal of standard examinations stems not

merely from the wish of students to achieve entrance to higher education, but also from the very high earnings and status associated with
jobs to which higher levels of education give access.
In Kenya, for example, educationally qualified people with
relatively low skills can earn incomes that are large multiples of
minimum formal sector wages (GR68: 271).

According to a recent ILO

report (GR70: 11), a high school graduate (EACE certificate), for
instance, may take a two-year certificate or a three-year diploma in
an agricultural field.

At the end of the first training period

that graduate would earn Kt351/- in Job Group E, with a title of
Technical Assistant, Agriculture.
would earn

K~

sion Officer.

At the end of the second year, he

864/- in Job Group G, with a title of Agricultural ExtenAn extra year of learning simply awards him two promotions

within the same salary structure, amounting to about a 63% increase in
salary.

The difference for one year's earning, Kt 303/- (i.e., Kt 864/-

less Kt 531/-), is nearly equal to the total annual salary of a
Kenyan with seven years of primary education.

In a study of
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entrepreneurship and development, Marris and Somerset (GRllO)
concluded that Kenya is a society in which rewards for the educationally
qualified in employment far exceed the returns of all but the most
successful entrepreneurs.

The roots of the unemployment problem,

therefore, lie in the interaction of the conventional educational
system and the wage and salary structure through the allocation of
jobs and wages by reference primarily to educational qualifications
(GR69: 11).

This has led to a great desire for education at every

high level, such education being associated in the minds of the public
with income aspirations and expectations which the economy is becoming
increasingly unable to fulfill.
While changes in curriculum and in systems of selection may be
expected to bring educational benefits, it is unrealistic to suppose
that such changes will make people content to accept work at very low
incomes in rural areas if they believe themselves to be eligible for
highly-paid urban jobs.

As Colclough and Hallack succinctly put it:

Fundamental educational change may not be possible
in many societies without a significant change in
the existing structure of economic and social
relationships--and particularly in the incentives
structure that directly links the educational sector to the labour market.
(GR35: 20)
In short, as long as employers continue to use the level of
education attained as the main criterion for hiring recruits and
as long as the existing income differentials between the highest and
lowest paid jobs in the occupational hierarchy remain somewhat what
they are, the phenomenon of educated unemployment in Africa is unlikely
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to be more than marginally affected by even major changes in the
qualitative aspects of education.
THE SCOPE OF INDUSTRIAL TRAINING IN KENYA
Po1icymakers in Kenya have rationalized the unemployment situation among school 1eavers as that of graduates lacking marketable
skills to participate effectively in modern sector employment (PI3, 4, 12).
This has led to the establishment of various forms of industrial
training activities, combining both public and private initiatives.
The diversity of current involvement in policy for and provision of
training in Kenya is presented in Figure 10 (next page).

In general,

these activities can be classified into three component parts (GR92):
(a) Supplementary Programs are designed to supplement the formal
educational system.

Some are aimed at character building and the

formation of appropriate attitudes; others develop particular skills
that mayor may not be relevant to the needs of Kenyan youth.

Many

are local branches of international organizations and are aimed at
the school-going population.

The following are typical of this

category:
Young Farmers Clubs
4-H Clubs
n~CA

YWCA
Outward Bound Trust
World Assembly of Youth
(b)

BOY Scouts
Girl Guides
St John's Ambulance
Kenya Red Cross Society
Kenya Voluntary Development Association

Follow-up Programs attempt to provide primary school 1eavers

with some form of training and education that will equip them with
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skills for employment or self-employment, preferably in the rural
areas.

They include:
Village Polytechnics
Christian Industrial
Training
(c)

National Youth Service
Correspondence Courses

Alternatives to Formal Education are for the unschooled

who are not covered by other educational programs.

They basically

take the form of literacy classes and are run by various organizations such as:
Youth Clubs and Centers
Farmer and Rural Training Centers
Maendeleo - Progress for Women
In this section, the focus will be on the follow-up programs
which provide vocational training for primary and secondary school
leavers.

Specifically, the impact of the Village Polytechnics and

Secondary Technical Training programs are examined in detail.

The

careful examination of the village polytechnics and industrial training for secondary school leavers indicates that these programs are not
realizing their aims because of the restricted market for technical
and vocational skills in the country.
The Village Polytechnics
The village polytechnic movement has thus far been the most popular program for alleviating unemployment among primary school leavers,
attracting both state and international financial support (GR7; GR50;
GR93).

Following the Kericho conference, the NCCK set up four

village polytechnics--at Maseno in Western Province, at Mucii-wa-Urata
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in Central Province, Ndere in Nyanza Province, and Nambale in
Western Province (GR93: 190).

Since then, the number of projects

has increased to 300 including, in addition to the ones receiving
governmental funding, those projects financed entirely by the church,
by contributions from local authorities, by foreign aid donations, and
by Harambee collections.

The number receiving government funding is

currently 220, as shown below in Table LI, which gives some idea
of the growth rate of the program (30 projects being added each year).
Plans have been made to continue expansion at the same rate until
1985

(GR24) .
TABLE LI
EXPANSION OF POLYTECHNIC PROGRAM*
Year
1973/74
1975/76
1976/77
1977 /78
1978/79
1979/80
1984/85
(Projected)

# of
Projects

75**
130
160
190
220
250
400

# of
Trainees

# of
Instructors

4,000**
7,000
9,000
11 ,000
14,000
20,000
30,000

375**
650
800
950
1,100
1,250
2,000

* Table shows increases in Number of Trainees/Instructors/

Projects, 1973/80
** Commonwealth Youth Development Programme, March 1975, p 115.
Youth for Development: an African Perspective
Source:

(GR37:ll5)
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The above table indicates that during the period 1973-30,
the number of projects has almost quadrupled, whereas the number of
trainees has grown five fold.

It is questionable whether the number

of graduating artisians will all be absorbed into the labor market,
given the slow rate of economic growth in the country.

The situation

is made more acute by the existence of other institutions offering
similar training to the polytechnics, such as the National Youth
Service, Christian Industrial Training Centres, The Kenya Association
of Youth Centers, centers run by the YMCA and YWCA, Approved Schools
and Technical Secondary Schools, as well as various types of formal
and informal apprenticeship and on-the-job training programs.
The considerable expansion of the Village Polytechnic Program
that has occurred over the past decade has undoubtedly been promoted
by the adoption of a regional rural development strategy (KG3).

This

development plan referred to Village Polytechnics as part of a broad
policy of youth training and rural development.

The approach, as the

name suggests, focuses on rural development; in order to achieve this
development, increased output in the small holder farmer sector, the
wide scale adoption of appropriate technology (GR147), promotion of
informal sector activity (GR69), and decentralization of decisionmaking
are being advocated.

The emphasis on rural development is a reaction

against the industrialization policy of the 1960's which failed to
produce sustained economic growth and expanded employment opportunity.
This new approach, however, should not be seen as a substitute for an
industrialization policy; rather, it is complementary to an industrialization policy, and both are essential elements in a comprehensive
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development plan.
The most common courses offered by the polytechnics are
carpentry (21%) and Masonry (19%) for boys and tailoring/dressmaking
(19%) and home economics (16%) for girls (GR158: 25).
include:

Other courses

commerce (including bookkeeping, accounting, and typing),

leatherwork (including tanning and shoe making), metal work/tinsmithing, welding and fitting, motor mechanics, agriculture (including
animal husbandry, horticulture, and beekeeping), painting and technical drawing.

Courses are usually two years in length, and

governmental trade tests may be taken at the end.

Fees vary from Kshs.

50/- to Kshs. 800/- per year (GR24: 17).
The Village Polytechnic program got underway officially in
1971 with financial support for 40 VP's from NCCK and other voluntary
agencies (GR37: 115).

Then, in the early 1970's, the Kenyan govern-

ment became involved in the project in both a financial and an
administrative capacity.

In 1973-74, the government spent just over

-KL210,000 on the Youth Development Program, including Village Polytechnics and the lower level youth centers, and approximately KL
154,000 was provided from overseas (GR37: 117).
Today, the government is the major source of finance and pays
all staff salaries, though funds from other sources remain important
for buying materials and equipment and paying for new buildings.

It

remains the case that a new project must be funded from nongovernment
sources for a certain period as a test of local support and its viability; if it is successful, generally the government will eventually
adopt it.
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The ultimate test of the village polytechnics has been what
happens to the graduates after they complete their training.

The

results of previous research on the subject have been mixed.

Mackie

(GR109), for example, reported that of 24 1eavers from one pioneer
village polytechnic, only 3 had followed the anticipated route to
self-employment in the trade they learned, while 11 had returned to
formal education.

In a subsequent study, Anderson (GR1l) reported

that 30% of the polytechnic leavers he traced had migrated to urban
areas and almost 37% of those who were then employed had migrated.
These studies suggest that the village polytechnics had failed to
realize their aims.

On the other hand, other researchers have re-

ported that graduates of polytechnics were able to find employment
or start their own businesses.

The Norad Report (GR120) uses the

figures of 50-75%; and David Court (GR39) reported that at least
90% of the males trained in the village polytechnics in Western
Kenya found employment, but the percentage figures for females were
extremely low.

This raises the problem of defining realistic goals

for the training of females since their entrepreneurial opportunities are subject to stricter cultural sanctions in rural areas than
is the case for males.

The last two studies, in particular, should be

examined carefully since they exaggerate the percentages that were
self-employed.

The nature of rural life in Africa requires that every

member of the family participate in the production of goods and services,
and this pattern of lifestyle may have distorted the outcome of the
above quoted studies.
The most up-to-date study on the whereabouts of village polytechnic

205

graduates was conducted by Brian Cal pen and the Ministry of Labor
(GR24), based on information derived from two tracer studies carried
out in two communities of rural Kenya.

The aim of the study was to

test the hypothesis that a substantial number of polytechnic leavers
would be unable to take up the type of employment envisaged because
of the limited absorptive capacity of the informal sector in rural
areas.

It was felt that the demand for skilled artisans in rural

areas is limited by the level of development of the area concerned
(GR24: 1).

Furthermore, it was considered that even if there were

sufficient demand, the leavers might be unable to fully exploit their
potential because of the lack of raw materials, tools, and credit to
start their own businesses.

The question was then asked:

Is the

provision of training by itself sufficient to engender this type of
development, or are other kinds of assistance also necessary?
The hypothesis was then tested by carrying out surveys of the
polytechnic leavers in two communities. One survey was undertaken
in an economically vibrant area (Othaya in North Central Kenya), with
a good demand structure; the other was accomplished in Kenenya (in
Southwest Kenya), a less prosperous district with lower demand.

By

comparing the two sets of data, it was possible to assess the impact
of the demand level on the fortunes of the leavers.

Predictions were

that the program might be relatively successful in the high demand
area (i.e., Othaya), but less so in Kenenya.

The aggregate results of

the leavers' surveys for both polytechnics are presented in the table
that follows.
One striking feature of Table LII is the small percentage (9%)
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TABLE LII
SUMMARY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR VOCATIONAL SCHOOL GRADUATES
IN KENENYA AND OTHAYA*

Otha,la

Kenenta

%

#

%

#

Self-sufficient (80%+)
Borderline (50-80%)
Unclassifiable

22
21
11

10
9
5

16
12
13

8
6
7

Total Self-Employed

54

24

41

21

55
5
41
28

25
2
18
18
13

51
23
48
15
13

27
12
25
8
7

222

100

191

100

Cate90ries
Self-Employed:

Farming
Rural Wage Labor
Towns
Unknown
Other

39

Total
*

Two tracer studies carried out at Kenenya and Othaya Vi 11 age
polytechnics in August and September, 1980.
Source: (GR24)

of leavers from both polytechnics who belong in the self-employed,
self-sufficient subcategory.

This small pertentage represents the

real success stories among the leavers as defined by the program's
express goal of producing self-employed artisans.

The percentage

rises to 22.5% if leavers in the borderline subcategory (an average
of 7.5%) and those in the unclassifiable subcategory (an average of
6%) are considered.

However, it is doubtful whether more than 9%
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of these self-sufficient artisans would be able to survive solely
with income earned from their craft during a slump time.

The table

also shows that 26% of the leavers were found to be deriving the
majority of their income from farming, as they would have done had
the polytechnic not been there.

They may use their polytechnic

skills to improve their land or to earn some extra pocket money by
helping out with a local contract, but their chief occupation is
farming.

So what the polytechnics are doing in these cases are

graduating, not self-employed artisans, but better-grade peasant
farmers.

This and the prevalence of agriculture as a compulsory

subject in polytechnics is indicative of how the program is in some
ways a training for rural life rather than providing a breeding
ground for tomorrow's entrepreneurs.
The significant difference between the two sets of results
which can be noted at this stage is the much higher percentage of
Othaya's leavers who got local salaried jobs--12% compared with
Kenenya's 2%.

Considering the difference in employment opportunities

available in the two communities (Othaya being more heavily endowed
with wage labor posts), this is not surprising.
Complicating the problem still further is the lack of government financial assistance to the graduates.

The revolving loan fund

established by NCCK from which VP graduates could purchase tools and
equipment was too small to make a significant impact.

For example,

the maximum loan of Kshs. 2,000/- per graduate was too small to score
large contracts estimated to be around Kshs. 50,000/- (GR24: 63).

This

point illustrates the difficulty of getting started in self-employment
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regardless of one's technical skills.
The overall conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis
is that the Village Polytechnic program is not substantially realizing its aims.

These schools provide training opportunities for

less than 5% of the total number of school leavers not admitted into
secondary schools, and the chances of self-employment for those
trained in these institutions is determined by the social and economic
development taking place in each rural community.

As a result, these

schools are unlikely to provide a solution to the serious unemployment
problem facing the country.

As the data have indicated, only a small

proportion of leavers are becoming self-employed; and of those who do
become self-employed, the majority are unable to expand their businesses signficantly due to a lack of government support in the areas
of credit extension and protection from multinational competition.
Therefore, the rural economy is not being developed as planned.

This

failure is clearly due to economic factors, e.g., limited and nonexploitable demands which obviate an earlier key statement that
changes in the educational structure alone are insufficient to bring
about the program's aims.

The provision of training must be accom-

panied by other forms of assistance.

Rapid transformation of the rural

economy will be critical to the functioning of the village polytechnics,
even at the limited level at which they are now operating.
Technical Training for Secondary School Leavers
Secondary school is the only aspiration of many children, because
it is from secondary school that other viable openings in life (teacher
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training, employment in commerce, recruitment into the Armed Forces,
and so on) become real possibilities.

Since 1968, however, the problem

of the secondary school leaver has been acute, particularly in the case
of those from the Harambee secondary schools.

Despite this, a new

optimism emerged in the 1970's which argues that the only real security could be found in a technical qualification.

Once again,

international aid and self-help efforts were directed toward building
new vocational schools and technical colleges (GR57).
the same tale once again:

The result was

the first students emerged from the tech-

nical schools in 1970 and were absorbed into Nairobi's Industrial
Estate--the government's technical ministries.

Many of the next group

(from the class of 1971) were still walking the streets in early 1973
(GR84).

Thc situation has worsened since the mid-seventies.

At first, it was suggested that secondary technical school
graduates would have a better chance of obtaining employment than
students with academic secondary training.

Because of the country's

drive toward industrialization, it seemed certain that the expanding
manufacturing sector would absorb the graduates of technical schools.
But as these jobs in the MES became scarce, the government began to
emphasize the importance of technical training for self-employment.
A political rationale replaced the economic ones.

like their counter-

parts (the graduates of village polytechnics), the secondary technical
school graduates were asked to accept employment in rural areas.
In the absence of an up-to-date tracer study, it is difficult to
examine what happens to technical school leavers.

In 1975 and 1976,

the technical education section of the Ministry of Education attempted
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to follow up secondary technical school leavers from the previous year
to find out what had happened to them.* The surveys have certain
weaknesses (notably the low response rates--42% and 51% respectively-and the short time that had elapsed since the graduates had left school),
but they represent the most complete set of information available pertaining to outcomes.

The most useful table in each of the surveys

is that showing the status of secondary technical school leavers after
the Directorate of Industrial Training had completed its recruitment
of craft apprentices.

Table LIII combines that information for both

years.
The DIT apprenticeship program, to which the technical schools
are supposed to be geared, took only a small proportion of school
leavers in both years, leaving the majority to find their own ways in
the job market.

It would be wrong to conclude from Table LIII alone,

however, that a large proportion of the technical school graduates
are destined for chronic unemployment.
of recession for the Kenyan economy.
economy has rebounded since then.

Both 1974 and 1975 were years
This does not mean that the

Moreover, school leavers spend

several months waiting for their EACE results before deciding on
their best job market strategy.
A question that must be considered is what the optimal allocation of public resources among the various forms of education should be.
Which parts of the system should be marked out for emphasis in the

* Technical Education Section, 1974 Secondary Technical School

r

Graduate FOllow-u Study, Summary of Findings, August, 1975;
and 1975 Technica Secondary School Graduates Follow-up Study,
Summary of Findings, October, 1976.

TABLE LIII
SECONDARY TECHNICAL SCHOOL GRADUATES' STATUS AFTER DIT INTAKE, 1974 AND 1975

Student

Working &
and going
to school

~1i 1i tary

Employed
or
self-empl

Looking
for
work

Other

Total

1974 1975 1974 1975 1974 1975 1974 1975 1974 1975 1974 1975 1974 1975
Mechanical

8

10

39

38

Electrical

15

14

18

16

t1otor Vehi cl e/
Agr Mech

5

38

31

Building

4

22

43

8

28

33

Totals

4

2

4

2

10

19

39

28

2

5

100

100

2

8

63

57

2

4

100

100

9

8

48

51

2

5

100

100

2

8

74

41

2

2

100

100

6

11

58

43

2

4

100

100

Source:

(GR167)

N
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future:

primary? secondary? university? nonformal education?

That this is a question of great relevance to the efficient use of
resources and public funds is illustrated by the following contrasts
in recurrent costs per student, contained in Table LIV.
TABLE LIV
ESTH1ATES OF UNIT RECURRErn COSTS OF FORr1AL EDUCATION
1975-76 (Kt)
Educational Level
Prima ry (rural)
Secondary aided Form IV
Secondary tech Form IV
Secondary aided Form VI
University (undergrad)
NOTE:

Per Year

Per Graduate

16
80
150
120
1,500

130
450
750
700
5,500

These are costs to government, i.e., excluding
expenditures financed by fees and other parental
contributions.
Cost per graduate = total from time of entry into
primary school.
Secondary costs are an average for day and board
pupil s.
Source:

(KG: 15)

As can be seen, current cost per student in a technical
school is almost double that of the first four years of secondary
academic school; and any route to further training which involves
four years of technical rather than of academic secondary schooling
costs KL300 more per graduate.

The government's own estimate for

1978-79 confirms the NCEOP's previous estimation (as shown in Table
LIV , above).

Estimated recurrent cost per student in 1978-79
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ranged from
of Nairbbi.

K~18

in a primary school to Ktl,700 at the University

The cost to the government for one year of secondary

schooling in an aided institution amounts to nearly five times the
expense of educating a primary school pupil, while the average cost
per student at the University of Nairobi is nearly 100 times the
cost per student in a primary school.

The estimated recurrent cost

per student rose in all types of institutions between 1976-77 and
1978-79, with the University of Nairobi registering the smaller proportion increase per student, while Kenyatta University College
recorded the largest increase.

An examination of these figures under-

scores the problem confronting the government in financing continued
expansion of the educational system (see, for example, Table LV).
Even relatively modest rises in cost per student, such as the 12.5%
increase in per pupil expenditures in primary schools, when combined
with large-scale growth in enrollments, require considerable increases
in the educational budget.
TABLE LV
ESTIMATED RECURRENT COST PER STUDENT BY TYPE OF INSTITUTION,
1978-79 (K-i:)
Educational Level
Primary School
Secondary Aided School
Primary Teacher Training College
Harambee Institute of Technology
Kenya Science Teacher's College
Kenyatta University College
University of Nairobi

Per Year

Per Gradua te

18
85
270
150
902
1,730
1,780

145
425
810
900
2,700
6,920
7,120

Source: (KG6, 1979: 180)
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The village polytechnics and the technical and industrial
training schools are important initiatives, but as conceived at
present, they clearly reflect the unfortunate dichotomy which has
grown between formal and nonforma1 education.

As long as the formal

educational system operates as it does with its close ties to the
examination-selection system: attempts to gain popularity for a
separate, nonforma1 system of education without such ties will have
little impact.

As in the colonial period, Africans consider voca-

tional education as inferior education, and they regard all government
efforts to instill vocational education as attempts to suppress
particular ethnic groups, thus restricting their access to formal
employment opportunities in the modern sector.

The attempt to for-

malize and ritualize technical and vocational types of education and
training attests to the failure of the government to diversify into
other areas of the economy where most of the potential for employment
actually lies:

small scale farming and the social infrastructure at

the local level (GR69: 239; GR107).
While a reassessment of the value of formal education for an
essentially agrarian society is badly needed, advocates in favor of
nonforma1 education have missed the point (GR3; GR37).

Their argu-

ment provides policymakers with little in the way of realistic policy
options with respect to education for rural development.

The reasons

for this are as follows:
• The topic of "education for rural development" cannot be
addressed without linking the various alternatives for rural education
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to the larger issue of the kind of development which will be enhanced
by the choice of policy.

There are clear linkages between the chosen

educational strategy and its impact on the lives and options of the
school leavers and their communities.
• Advocating for an expansion of vocational and technical
education without addressing the existing disparities in educational

resources and opportunities (which created the problem in the first
place) seems hollow.

Any nonformal educational program which leads

to an essentially dual system will ultimately work to reinforce the
status quo and thus will neither provide mobility for the school
leavers nor promote their interests and the interests of the society
at iarge.

The lesson from this and other similar examples is clear:

any system which contains dual educational institutions will be seen
as prejudicial to the groups whose access is limited to the lower
status level.
GOVERN~·1mT

INTERVENTION IN THE LABOR f1ARKET

In addition to vocationalizing the school curriculum, the
government of Kenya has, from time to time, tried to alleviate the
unemployment problem by direct intervention in the labor market.

The

policies adopted include the establishment of wage guidelines, land
settlement projects, road building projects, and the Africanization of
jobs and commerce formerly held by expatriates.

Many of the measures

taken were of an emergency, short term nature, induced by the pressure
of events.

Among measures of a short term nature were the three

Tripartite Agreements (1964, 1970, and 1979) where the government and
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the employers undertook to increase their labor force by 15% and
10%, respectively.

A review of these agreements indicate that they

failed to achieve what they were designed to do.
Quantitatively, by far the greatest contribution to the relief
of unemployment was made by the settlements projects.

By the middle

of 1968, 45,000 families had been settled under various types of
the settlement program, which collectively provided gainful employment
to nearly 135,000 persons.

Several thousands more were employed

on individual and corporate farms seasonally as migrant workers
(GR69: 91).
r~easures

to step up the Africanization of commerce and industry

was justified in part on the grounds that it would provide jobs for
the local unemployed.

The Trading and Licensing Act of 19GJ (Regula-

tion 10(1) of Immigration Regulations of 1968) was one such measure
designed to restrict Asians from certain economic activities, thus
allowing Africans to participate in activities \'/:1icll \'/ere [)revious1y
off-limits to them (GR69: 93).

In a similar move, the government

ordered all companies in the country to provide full employment
returns (Daily Nation, January 17, 1982). According to the Principal
Immigration Officer, the purpose of requiring the returns was to
ensure that "noncitizens holding jobs which Kenyans were capable of
doing were rep1aced" (Daily Nation).
Most of the other measures taken to relieve unemployment have
been directed at the problem of school 1eavers.

They are largely

of an experimental nature and have been relatively insignificant
quantitatively.

A good example ;s the Village Polytechnic movement,
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which was fully discussed earlier in this chapter.

Its quantitative

importance to the solution of the unemployment problem has been
relatively insignificant.
The best known program directed at the problem of school 1eavers
is the National Youth Service, which was established in 1964 to provide training and employment through work on development projects.
Since its inception, a total of 20,000 young Kenyans (18,452 men
and 1,579 women) have undergone training under this plan.

Even so,

only one of every fifty applicants is admitted into the program.
Until 1972, the policies adopted to stimulate wage employment
in Kenya were of an ad hoc, short term nature, often induced by the
pressure of events.

Since the visit of the ILO Mission to Kenya in

1972 and subsequent publication of the Basic Needs Strategies in 1977,
a more coherent strategy for employment creation has been evolved
for the future.

The three main elements of this strategy, as indicated

in the latest development plan, are a significant acceleration in
the rate of growth output (almost a repeat of past policies), a comprehesive incomes policy, and an intensified program of integrated
rural development.

Nevertheless, past Kenyan experience with regard

to implementation suggests that what is preached is not necessarily
what is practiced.

It remains to be seen whether such strategies will

be implemented in the future.

The following, Table LVI, sUl,lTlarizes

the employment policies and the institutional framework undertaken to
stimulate wage employment in Kenya.

TABLE LVI
SUM~IARY

Empl Category

OF EMPLOYMENT POLICIES AND INSTRUMENTS

Objectives

Policy Instruments and Institutional Framework

Modern Sector

Alter relative cost of labor
Produce appropriate manpower in sufficient
numbers

I~ages Po 1icy
Trade Policy
Fiscal Policy
Education and Training Policies
Kenyanization Policies
Pricing Policy
Employment Services

Small Scale
Agri cu lture

Raise income levels
Increase labor productivity

Agricultural Intensification
Agricultural Extension Services & Training
Rural Development Policy
Land Policy
Pricing & Marketing Policies
Provision of basic needs

Pastoralists

Raise income levels
Increase livestock numbers & quality

Pricing and Marketing Policies
Development of arid & semi-arid areas
Provision of basic needs

Rura 1 Non-farm

Increase productivity
Increase labor absorption
Produce some of the privately
basic needs goods

Rural Development Policy
Appropriate training, e.g. the Village
Polytechnics
Review of the existing legislation on rural
non-farm activities and remove or an~nd those
sections that are unnecessarily inhibitive
Provide credit extension services &other support

Urban Informal
Sector

consun~d

Generate more employment
Produce goods and services for low
income groups
Increase productivity
Produce skilled workers

Remove restriction on informal sector activities
Provide basic infrastructure including the
necessary support services

N

0:

Source:

(KG5)
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EMPLOyr1ENT CREATION BY TRIPARTITE AGREH1ENT
In addition to efforts to create employment in Kenya through
expansion of the economy with the help of foreign capital, the
Kenyan government has attempted from time to time to produce employment artificially, but directly,through agreements with the Employers
Federation and the Trade Unions.

Since 1963, there have been three

such agreements, one in 1964, the second in 1970, and the third in
1978.

These were recognized to be short term measures to allow time

for long term measures to take effect.

These efforts are worthy of

specific mention, particularly the 1970 and 1979 agreements.
The 1964 Tripartite Agreement
The aim of the 1964 Agreement was
to alleviate the hardships being experienced by
the unemployed and to provide the new government
with a breathing space in which to get its plans
for economic development under way.
The government undertook to expand employment by 15%, and the employers· goal was 10%.

In a conciliatory move, the trade unions agreed

to a policy of wage standstills for one year.

Stewart (GR146) ex-

plains that the conjunction of events in which the 1964 Agreement
took place was significantly different from the 1970 and 1979 Agreements.

In the first place, the 1964 Agreement occurred at a time

when employment had been falling steadily and substantially:

by

83,000 or 13% between 1960 and 1963. Secondly, it occurred just a
year after independence when it was particularly important for the
government to reassure its own people and the capitalist world that
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it was in command of events.

Stewart explained the situation

this way:
One of the key elements behind the 1964 Agreement was
the determination to show people overseas, particularly foreign investors, the spirit of cooperation
that united employers, workers, and Government, and
that was symbolized in the Tripartite Agreement.
(GR146: 177)
Indeed, some of the loss in employment was due to a lack of confidence by the resident foreign community and foreign private capital
abroad, so that, insofar as the Agreement generated confidence, it
contributed both to its own and other more significant objectives.
The 1964 Agreement was greeted with enormous and immediate
response; within two weeks, 205,000 workers had registered, of whom
106,000 were classified as top priority (i.e., locally domiciled
unemployed--ex-wage earners and the landless).

Despite the claims

that over 38,000 extra workers were absorbed under the plan, total
employment increased by only about 18,000.

Some of the extra jobs

came from the transforming of casual into regular employment.

Among

men, the proportion of casual employment fell from 7.5% to 6%
between 1963 and 1964 (GR146: 178).

There was also a substitution

of adult for child labor, with an absolute drop in child labor of
3,000 for the same period.

It is, therefore, difficult to tell

whether the Agreement had any long-lasting effect on employment.
Employment in private industry and commerce was the same in 1965 and
1964.

Vacancies registered in 1965 were more than 20% lower than in

1963, while applications for employment were 12% higher and placements
about 10% lower.

These figures suggest that the Agreement had only a

221
temporary effect.

In addition, the Agreement did not bring the indus-

trial peace that was originally envisioned.

In 1964 and 1965, there

were a total of 494 strikes involving 172,757 employees (KG8).
The 1970 Tripartite Agreement
The aim of the 1970 Agreement was similar to that of the 1964
Agreement:

to alleviate unemployment.

The agreement contained three

main elements:
•

the government and employers agreed to expand their employment by 10% of their regular establishment;

• employees agreed to a twelve-month wage standstill;
•

there were to be no strikes or lockouts during the Agreement.

Interestingly, employers were given the option, in special cases, of
making a financial contribution to national projects instead of expanding employment.
Altogether, 290,111 people registered (46.4% of total modern
sector employment in 1969 (see Table LVII ), this figure cannot be
taken as a true measure of unemployment because people with jobs of
one kind or another also registered.

However, the massive response

does give a clear indication of the enormous potential demand for
modern sector employment.
Table LVIII shows the ratio of registrations to employment.
There were considerable variations.

Nairobi had the lowest ratio

where registrations formed slightly less than one third of existing
employment.

Registrations were greatest in relation to existing employ-

ment wherever employment formed a relatively small proportion of the
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TABLE LVII
REGISTRATION UNDER TRIPARTITE
(DECEMBER 1970)

AGREE~ENT

Pop of Working Age
(15-60)
1969 ***

Province

Registration *

Tota 1 Modern
Sector Empl
1969 **

Nairobi
Central
Nyanza
Hestern
Coast
R Valley
Eastern
N Eastern

52,000
40,442
39,516
26,775
40,504
59,641
27,914
4,119

163,615
93,800
45,722
18,761
84,526
178,949
39,219
2,622

299,674
702,198
962,480
561,647
508,131
1,048,941
855,198
123,498

290,911

627,214

5,061,767

Totals

* Ministry of Labor
** Annual Enumeration of Employees, 1968-70
*** Population Census, 1969
Source: (GR146: 157)
total population of working age.

In both the Western and North Eastern

Provinces, modern sector employment covers a very small proportion of
the population of working age (3.3% and 2.1%, respectively); and these
were the only provinces in which registrations exceeded the total
number employed.

Nyanza and Eastern Provinces, which have the next

smallest proportion of modern sector employment in relation to population, also showed substantially above-average ratios of registration.
The Nairobi figure indicates a positive correlation between registration in relation to working age population and the proportion of
the working age population employed in the modern sector.

It appears
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that the urban areas attracted a disproportionate share of registration, reflecting the belief that good jobs \'/ere more likely to be
found in the larger cities.
TABLE LVIII
REGISTRATIONS AS INDICATORS OF DEMAND FOR

EMPLOn~ENT

Province

Regis as % of
1969 Empl
(modern sector)*

Regis as %of
Working Age
POE **

Empl as % of
Working Age
Poe ***

Nai robi
Central
Nyanza
Western
Coast
R Valley
Eastern
N Eastern

31.8
43.1
86.4
142.7
47.9
33.3
71. 2
137. 1

17.4
5.8
4.1
4.8
8.0
4.9
3.8
3.3

54.6
13.4
4.8
3.3
16.6
17.1
4.6
2.1

Total s

46.4

5.8

12.4

*

r~inistry

of Labor

** Annual Enumeration of Employees, 1968-70
*** Population Census, 1969
Source:

(GR146: 159)

Altogether, 45,680 jobs were provided under the plan, 30,203
by the private sector and 15,477 by the public sector. The public
sector thus provided jobs for an additional 6.5% of its 1969 employees,
and the private sector provided jobs for 7.8%.

The percentage for

public and private combined was 7.3%, which falls short of the targeted 10%.

Overall, 16% (45,600) of those registered (290,911) got
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jobs.

This low ratio is significant from the point of view of

assessing the effect of the Agreement on aspirations:
raised more hopes than it satisfied.

clearly, it

As shown in Table LIX below,

placement was in general only a fraction of registration--less than a
fifth in all cases except Nairobi and Eastern Province.
TABLE LIX
PLACEMENT UNDER THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT
(DECEMBER 1970)

Province

Private
Sector

Na i robi
Central
Nyanza
Western
Coast
R Valley
Eastern
N Eastern

8,146
6,053
1,162
882
4,262
8,624
957
116

Totals

30,203

Government
555*
1,142
102
159
1,055

15,477

Government +
Private
Sector

Placement
as %
Registrations

8,146
6,608*
2,304
985
4,421
9,679
957
116

15.7
15.0
2.9
3.3
10.5
14.5
3.6
2.8

45,680

10.4

* Fiyures exclude government employment in Kiambu.
Source:

(Tables LVII and
LVIII)

The 1979 Tripartite Agreement
On December 12, 1978, the fifteenth anniversary of Independence,
the President announced that a third Tripartite Agreement had been
concluded whereby wage employment in both private and public sectors
should be increased by 10%, effective January 1,1979.

By June 30,

1979, a total of 260,089 people had registered as unemployed (64,000,

TABLE LX
REGISTERED JOB SEEKERS AGAINST DECLARED VACANCIES
(6/30/79)
# of
registered
job
Seekers

Private

3,572

1,072

749

438

14,264

2,301

3,170

462

Services

14,046

1,254

Skilled

17,981

Semi ski 11 ed
Genr1 Labor

Category
Technical
Managerial
Clerical
Sales

Declared Vacancies
Public
Central
Local
Gov1t
Gov1t

Total

Excess of
Seekers
Over
Vacancies

802

10,183

89

527

222

712

8,017

6,247

38

500

2,670

2,727

310

4,291

9,755

3,409

747

1,651

5,807

12,174

16,607

3,295

3,789

644

7,748

8,859

108,614

15,658

5,174

2,023

22,855

85,759

School Leaver

81,086

Totals

260,089

8,309

5,004

( 6,611)

81,086
27,889

27,750

6,289

59,928

200,161

Sources: (GR70: 9.2 (Table 9.1);
GR107)

N
N
01
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or 24.6% of whom were female) which is equivalent to 28.5% of
the formal sector of wage employment in 1978.

The number registering

was not far short of the 290,911 who responded to the 1970 exercise.
One interesting revelation is that the number of declared
vacancies in the professional and technical category is well in
excess of the numbers of registered job seekers (see Table LX).
In terms of numbers, unskilled general labor and agricultural workers
(42%) and school leavers (31%) dominate; together they accounted for
73% of job seekers in 1979.

Altogether, a total of 71,515 (27.5%)

of the registered seekser found jobs in the public sector, compared
with only 16% in 1970.

A total of 11,587 jobs were found in addi-

tion to the 59,928 declared vacancies at the time.

In comparison

with the 1970 Agreement, the 1979 Agreement demonstrated improved
performance of the public sector, which provided jobs for an additional 3.8% of its 1978 employees.

On the other hand, private sector

employment decreased from 7.8% in 1970 to 7.1% in 1979. The percentage for public and private combined was 7.9%, which was short
of the targeted 10% (see Table LXI).
There is reason to believe that the 7.9% increase might have
been exaggerated.

In the first place, average annual rate of growth

in the formal sector wage employment over the five year period 19731978 was 3.7%; this trend might have continued independent of the
Agreement.

Secondly, past trends in local government recruitment

suggest normal growth of 2%, leaving no more than 5% attributable
to the Agreement.

Given these circumstances, Livingstone (GR107)

concluded that an upper limit of 18,274 jobs might be attributable
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to obligations imposed under this agreement, which represents only
2% of the total modern sector employment in 1978 and oniy 25% of
th 72,000 jobs considered by ine r'linlstry of Labor to have been
created.

Therefore, the real effect of the agreement is distorted.
TABLE LXI
SUMMARY OF THE EMPLOYMENT TREND: THE 1970 AND
1979 TRIPARTITE AGREEMENTS
Increase % Increase
in Empl
in Empl
6/30/79
6/30/79

Sector

Placement
1970

% Increase
in Empl
1969

1978
Wage
EmEl

Public

15,477

6.5

390,000

34,226

8.8

Private

30,203

7.8

521 ,600

37,289

7.1

45,680

7.3

911,600

71 ,515

7.8

Totals

Source:

(GR107)

There are also other reasons which minimize the real employment
contribution of these Agreements.

First, a certain number of vacan-

cies occur naturally during the year through labor turnover.

Data

from a study of labor turnover showed a rate of turnover of 27%
for the economy as a whole (GR71).

The figures for agriculture

were over 60%, while mining and construction together accounted for
40%.

Outside these industries, the rate varied between 10 and 12%.

A rate of 10% means that 10% of the jobs in a typical firm become
vacant during each year without any expansion in the number of employees.

Thus, with such rates, the obligations under the Tripartite

Agreement could be met by filling the vacancies which occurred during
the year.

There are also allegations that employers normally fire
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newly hired workers after the agreement period is over.
From the perspective of alleviating poverty and generating
productive income-earning opportunties, the type of jobs created do
not constitute employment in the true sense of the word.

For example,

in the 1979 Agreement, 80% of private sector and 22% of public sector
jobs were general labor, and overall general labor was 55%.

If

general and semiskilled labor were taken together, these percentages
would be 87%, 22%, and 62%, respectively.

Only 8% of private sector

employment is clerical, compared with 50% for the public sector, and
25% overall.

On the basis of the data presented above, it is obvious

that the economic and employment effects of the Tripartite Agreements
were extremely limited.

The Agreements probably contributed more

to raising expectations than to realizing them, as shown by the massive
registrations.
It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that the problem of
educated unemployment does not lie so much in the numbers of school
graduates as it does in the whole philosophy of the educational
system which mentally prepares the pupils for nonexistent high paying
urban jobs in the context of a dependent economy.

In the forseeable

future, this will continue to be the case unless there are fundamental
changes both inside the school

syste~s

and outside them.

SU~1~1ARY

The school leaver problem in Kenya is more complex than is
often assumed.

It is an oversimplification to consider it essentially

as an excess of new school leavers over new job openings.

The root
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of the problem lies in the interaction of the conventional educational
system and the wage and salary structure through the allocation of
jobs and wages by reference primarily to educational qualifications.
This has led to a great desire for higher education and for migration
to major urban centers.
As shown previously, many of the efforts to solve the unemployment problem have taken place within the school system, with occasional
governmental intervention in the labor market, through tripartite
agreements and the setting of wage guidelines by the Industrial
Court.

The evidence presented in this study indicates that many of

these educational reforms solved an immediate political problem by
offering a new outlet for the economic aspirations in the society.
But their impact on employment creation has been limited by the
restricted market for technical and vocational skills.

The move to

employ more school leavers through tripartite agreements among the
government, employers union, and trade unions has also turned out
to be temporary and to provide only limited solutions.
What can be observed in Kenya (and in Africa in general) is that
the initial concern and emphasis on manpower development through the
expansion of the educational system was modified to deal with the unemployment of graduates which the modern sector could not cope with.
The aim of this policy was to inculcate values, attitudes, knowledge,
and skills which would lead school graduates to be committed to opportunities in the rural areas.

In fact, there are striking similarities

between this policy and the colonial policy which emphasized vocational
education for Africans.

In essence, the educational system in

2~O

postindependent Kenya has become the pillar of neocolonialism.
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CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this research project has been to examine the
consequences of Kenya's educational and economic growth policies on
the problem of urban unemployment.

Central to the urban unemploy-

ment problem has been the dichotomy arising out of a rapidly growing
number of school graduates on the one hand, and on the other, the
limited growth in employment opportunities for this segment of the
labor force.

Thus, an attempt to trace the causes of this particular

developmental dilemma must place the problem in the wider context of
the economic, political, and social predicament with which Kenya is
confronted.
The approach to this study has basically been in the political
economy tradition:

seeking to explain the interactions among social,

political, and economic organizations and processes.

A dependency

approach is used to analyze the structuring of the post-independence
Kenyan society, focusing first on the historical pattern of Kenyan
incorporation into the international economy, second on the shaping of
Kenyan social relations as the country's links with the international
economy changed in the context of decolonization, and third on the postindependence structure of the Kenyan economy as shaped by dependence
on external economies.

As shown in the previous chapters, these pro-

cesses of change led to some structural economic change and much
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institutional continuity in the post-independence period.

The central

focus of this study has been, therefore, to determine to what extent
dependency conditions the relationship between the educational system
and the economy and distorts manpower planning in Kenya.
THE COLONIAL LEGACY AND THE IDEOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT
To understand the causes of underdevelopment and growing unemployment in Kenya, a historical perspective must be examined, particularly
the periods of colonial and post-colonial development.
Until the mid-1950's, the structure of the Kenyan economy, educational system, and social interaction reflected the dominant interest
of the tiny European settler class which limited effectively the
political activity and social mobility of the Africans.

This European

dominance was maintained by restrictive legislation developed in the
periods between 1902 and 1952 and reflected the ideological climate of
colonial rule which justified the permanent relegation of Africans to
the status of laborers (GR22; GR105; GR168).
The measures introduced to forestall or permanently prevent
African participation in Kenya's political economy included:

(a) evic-

tion of Africans from the White Highland and relocation in the Reserves;
(b) the forcing of a large percentage of the African population to work
in European farms; (c) the barring of Africans from lndividual ownership of land; (d) the unequal distribution of tax burden; (e) the denial
of Africans' right to grow cash crops; and (f) severe credit restrictions.
By manipulating the legal frameworks of colonial rule, the European
settlers in Kenya constructed a system of Apartheid capitalism for their
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own exclusive benefit (GRl17).
On the eve of independence, the Kenyan economy was already
structured along lines which could effeciently sustain very different
levels and styles of living for a tiny minority of Europeans on the
top and the impoverished African population on the bottom.

Large sec-

tors of the civil service as well as the private sector, including
manufacturing and agriculture, were still controlled by expatriates.
Access to both education and income was heavily racially biased and
self-enforcing, as poor educational qualifications justified limited
African access to higher paid jobs and low incomes increased the
difficulties of acquiring an education.

Some of these imbalances

still persist and may even have been accentuated by the developmental
policies of the post-independent government.
IIREFORM" OR REVOLUTION?--THE INDEPENDENCE BARGAIN
The sharp inequalities among the three racial groups, in particular the limited amount of land available for Africans residing in the
Reserves and the large land holding of the Europeans, became a major
catalyst for the Mau Mau uprising in the early 1950 1 s.

The rise of

African nationalism in this period succeeded in creating a new political
context in which successive colonial Secretaries accepted the urgent
need for political and economic reforms in the African areas.
The most important reform was the 1954 Swynnerton Plan, which
introduced some changes into African agriculture.

The Plan included

the development of extension service in the African areas, permission
to grow cash crops, access to credit, and land consolidation and
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registration.

In other words, the racial division of labor which

was strongly emphasized in the early colonial period ceased to be important as the post-colonial economy took shape in the 1960's.

But the

declared aim of this process was to encourage the emergence of an African capitalist class with interest in land, commerce, and political
stability.

This class assured the smooth transition of Kenya from

colonialism to neocolonialism.

The important question of structural

transformation for the majority of Kenyans who had formed the most potent Mau Mau base was largely forgotten.
The 1950's and 1960's thus marked a period when the racial character of the society was dismantled, and the Africans increasingly
participated in the economic and political affairs of Kenya.

Impor-

tant though these changes were, the underlying philosophy concerning
economic development since independence has remained unchanged.

This

philosophy stresses that growth, whether for Europeans or for Africans,
can be sustained only by relying on skills, capital, and enterprises
imported from the developed countries of the West.

The new leadership,

under the chairmanship of Jomo Kenyatta, was, from the outset, fully
committed to the maintenance of the economic structure inherited from
the colonial period. thereby insuring the continuity of colonial
economic relations in Kenya.

This is clearly evident from the Presi-

dent's speech to Parliament:
government has continually affirmed its determination
to build a nation based on greater welfare for all its
citizens. We believe that rapid economic growth is essential to our goal . • • • Rapid growth requires the
cooperation of other countries. We need external assistance both to finance Government development projects and
to provide technical advice on managing development. While

My
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we appreciate the benefits of this dependence, we
propose to achieve greater control over our economic
destiny by reducing the influence of external factors.
(KG2: i)

The ideological and developmental philosophy which the new
leadership emulated called for the maintenance of colonial development
plar.ning and economic relationship.

The new leadership viewed such

institutional continuities with the West as necessary to its immediate
goal of rapid economic growth resulting from increased access to foreign
capital, skilled cadres, technology, and markets.

Structural trans-

formation of a Socialist type as in the neighboring Tanzania was ruled
out.

Instead, Africanization of commerce, industry, schools, agricul-

ture, and the civil service became the hallmark of the Kenyan government
developmental policy.
Africanization was directed toward establishing broader African
participation in the monetary sector.
the peasants.

Some land was distributed among

Part of the White Highland and other areas of the country

were converted into settlements where about three quarters of a million
families are now settled.

About 90% of the civil service was aiso

Africanized by 1967, benefitting mostly those with some education.
Through legislation and other administrative directives, non-Kenyans
were gradually replaced in the army, in education, and in business.
However, despite the increased access to opportunities, certain unanticipated problems emerged which have drastically influenced the nature of
politics as well as the pattern of development in the country.
The policy of Africanization was adopted at the time of independence in order that Africans might take over positions of power and
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privilege from the Europeans and the Asians. This new class of
Africans has used its position of power to accumulate personal wealth.
As a result, the pyramid of privileges which existed during the colonial
period has simply shifted from the Europeans to a small elite group of
Africans, and the inequalities may even have been accentuated.
DEPENDENCE, TRANSFORMATION, AND STAGNATION
At independence in 1963, Kenya inherited a disintegrated economic
system, already organized for effective maintenance of different social
strata.

The economy, the educational system, the public service system,

and agriculture were all organized around the interests of the Europeans.
This legacy of colonial rule left the new leadership with limited options to chart the course of national development independently.

To

resolve this unsettling situation, Kenya sought to maintain close ties
with the major Western industrial nations in order to build overseas
markets for its products, to expand tourism, and to maintain the flow
of private and public foreign investment into the country.

The Foreign

Investment Protection Act of 1964 (KG18) signifies the importance the
government attaches to external economic assistance in its development
drive.
The detailed evidence of national economic indicators examined
in this study, however, leads to the conclusion that Kenya's reliance
on external economic assistance has reduced its ability to determine the
course of national development independently.
is shown by the openness of the economy.
high percentage of gross domestic product.

Some of the dependency

Exports and imports form a
The major domestic exports
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of the country consist of plantation-grown crops such as coffee and
tea.

This is a major weakness from the point of view of achieving

economic independence.

Because of the dominant position of developed

economies in the world market, Kenya is not in a position to bargain
effectively for its products to attain comparative advantage.

The

events of 1975 and 1978, when coffee prices went down and the balanceof payments problem worsened, are good reminders of Kenya's vulnerability
in the world market.
The "incentives" guaranteed under the 1964 Foreign Investment
Protection Act enhance the process of decapita1ization in the form of
repatriated profits, interest payments on loans, and royalty fees.
This has drastically reduced the amount of resources available to Kenya
and has contributed instead to the growing balance-of-payment difficulties.
The policy of import-substitution has resulted in reduced employment
opportunities, high import dependence, high industrial profits, and
a high industrial wage for the labor elite, further aggravating the
inequalities in income among both regions and social groups.
Another measure of underdevelopment is the limited range of
policy options available to the regime.

Government participation in

joint venture activities with foreign capital seems to offer relatively
little significant constraint on foreign economic powers.

Rather, a

symbiotic relationship has developed between foreign capital and the
State, focused around the structuring of "shared privileges" to the
mutual advantage of the multinational sector and of the "insider"
African bourgeoisie which dominates the Kenyan State (GR99).

Such

participation is geared toward bringing about a broader base of local
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private control and ownership rather than toward public control of
the means of production.

The practice also institutionalizes special

access for foreign enterprises to obtain such privileges as work permits, exemption from local borrowing restrictions and import licenses,
etc.

The combined effect is to inhibit the full productive use of much

of the country's resources and thereby negate long-term, broadly
based growth in the economy.
Kenya's continued reliance on imported technology, spare parts
and other processed inputs, low world prices for coffee and tea, and
rapidly increasing prices for manufactured goods has contributed to
chronic trade and balance-of-payments deficits.

The 1977 windfall

coffee earnings helped matters for a short time, but the situation
again worsened.

Kenya's deficit for 1976-77 was just over Ki40 million

and improved to Kt34 million in 1977-78.

However, in 1978-79, the

situation worsened by three times, and the deficit reached almost KtlOO
million.

Provisional figures for 1979-80 show the deficit at Kt88 million

(The Standard. Oct 11, 1981: 5). The estimate for 1qRO-Rl is almost KL173.4
million (KG6. lqRl). This is a massive increase--almost 333% in 5 vrs.
offset these deficits, Kenya has continued to borrow large sums of
money from bilateral and multilateral agencies.

Unfortunately, debt

servicing charges for these loans has merely increased the deficits.
As a result, Kenya has mortgaged itself to the West, and its ability to
make truly independent decisions has been circumscribed.

The removal

of these constraints would require not just marginal changes in policy
and trade relations, but also profound structural adjustments, both
internally and externally.

To
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CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN EDUCATIONAL POLICY
In the field of education, two achievements are noticeable in
the post-independence period.

First, the racial character of the school

system which was strongly emphasized in the colonial period was abolished
after independence.

The integration of the different school systems,

however, was not followed by fundamental changes in the structure of
the educational system as a whole.

The policy of Africanization simply

transformed the racial structure of the colonial society into a classstructured, post-indepencence society.
The second significant development that took place was the rapid
quantitative expansion of enrollments at all levels of the educational
system. This uncontrolled expansion without any attempt to significantly
alter the colonially-molded school system contains a number of inherent
contradictions from the main thrust of development:

regional educational

disparities, rising costs, and educated unemployment.
The Problem of Eguity
The educational system in Kenya is characterized by an enromous
disparity between rural and urban educational systems and among highcost and low-cost schools in the urban areas.

The disparities documented

in this study had their roots in the colonial past.

Until independence,

the extent of educational opportunity for Africans correlated closely
with the intensity of mission activity.

Those tribal groups, such as

the Kikuyu and the Luo, whose geographical accessibility made them
the first target of mission education, received greater educational
inputs than those who were not.

Proximity to European areas, and above
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all, proximity to Nairobi yielded advantages for employment and for,
exposure to new patterns in economic relations.

After independence,

these two groups, particularly the Kikuyu, were able to move most
rapidly into open educational slots and into new economic opportunities
availed to Africans.

Unfortunately, this has not been the case for

those Kenyans who live in the most underdeveloped regions of the
North Eastern, Coast, and some parts of the Rift Valley Provinces.
The effort to achieve a wider distribution of educational opportunities by accelerating the rate of expansion in the post-independence
period has, in fact, accentuated the disparities inherited from the
colonial period.

The inequalities are further aggravated by differences

in the quality of teachers, educational facilities, and other inputs
among schools serving different geographical areas and income groups.
Those provinces and districts that were closely integrated into the
colonial economy had a head start in Western education; and because of
their political and economic influence, they have consolidated their
lead in the post-independence period.

One such region is Central Prov-

ince, home of the Kikuyus, who are now in control of the political and
economic apparatuses of the government.

What clearly emerges from this

study is that educational and other benefits in Kenya are being distributed in favor of the economically and politically advantaged districts
and provinces in the country.
The uneven development of educational opportunities among the
various ethnic groups in Kenya poses something of a dilemma in civil
service staffing:

should criteria be employed for the sake of national

harmony, or should universal achievement norms be adhered to for the

241
sake of professionalism and civil service efficiency? Because the
political culture and development have not wholly embraced a smoothly
managed merit and achievement system in the administrative process,
a certain amount of tempered patronage is present. As a result, ethnic
differences are well pronounced (GR122).

Allegations of Kikuyu pre-

dominance in the Kenyan political economy are widespread.
The constant expansion of formal education in Kenya is necessary
to preserve the impression of widening opportunity under the leadership
of Kenyatta and his Kikuyu-dominated cabinet.

But clearly, there is

a limit to the extent to which Kenya can absorb the cost of continuing
at the present rate of expansion.

The government spends approximately

32% of the total national budget on education, and dire predictions
have been made about other forms of productive investment likely to
be hampered by a continuation of the present rate of growth in educational
expenditure.

It is clear that there will be a slowing down in this

rate, but the danger is that such an action will make the government
appear to be blocking the aspirations of those Kenyans who had seen
education as their salvation.
Recruitment
Within the context of its strategy of development, Kenya's system of education has continued to offer opportunity for advancement
through a competitive examination system and to hold out to young
people the prospect of reward through merit and hard work (GR38; GR144).
Credential ism is well ingrained in the political culture, and the
governmental manpower policy seems to perpetuate it.

David Court
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challenges the basis of this policy and concludes:
The preoccupation with educational qualification as
the touchstone of educational merit may be attacked
on the educational grounds that examination results
are a relatively poor predictor of employment performance--but it has a strong socio-economic
rationale. In a pluralistic society characterized
by inequalities, it provides visible evidence
against the charge of official discrimination. Poor
people can accept ultimate inequalities of wealth if
they believe that they have a chance to enter the
school system, will be judged by objective criteria
within it, and will have an equal chance to enter
employment outside it.
(GR38:682)
As a result, the concept of equality of opportunity is invoked
as a means of achieving the political stability necessary to preserve
a selective school system geared to the high-level manpower requirements believed to be necessary for economic growth.

In this respect,

it is reasonable to conclude that the manpower requirements of particular industries have continued to dictate the content and structure of
the educational system in Kenya.

Given the likely continuation of

disparities of educational provision by region, the credibility of a
policy of equal opportunity depends upon the impartial use of examination criteria for allocating opportunities.
For many students, secondary school is the single target of their
aspirations.

In fact, many repeat once or twice in Standard 7 in order

to pass the entrance examination.

This is understandable in view of

the fact that it is from secondary school that other viable openings
in life (e.g., teacher training, employment in commerce, recruitment
to the Armed Forces, etc) become real possibilities.

However, because

of the limited capacity of the government to meet the growing demand
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for education, competition for secondary school entrance has been
intensified.

Since very few students can be admitted to this level,

the unrestrained expansion of Harambee secondary schools, which are
below recognized standards, has occurred; these schools provide education for 60% of the Kenyan secondary school students.

The implication

is that a high proportion of the nation's secondary school students
are being trained in low quality schools, and their ability to compete
in national examinations and employment is very limited.

A tracer

project by Kinyanjui (GR8B) found that 37% of Harambee secondary school
graduates are unemployed, compared with 9% of the graduates of government
secondary schools.

Kinyanjui also found that while 63% of the pupils

in government-aided schools obtained Division III certificates and above
in 1969 and 1970, over 70% of Harambee school 1eavers either failed
or obtained passes which merited only the East African Certificate of
Education during that same period.

This pattern has not changed since

1970 (see Table XXXXII, Chapter IV).
The expansion of the Harambee schools immediately after independence served certain social, economic, and political objectives in the
country.

For the government, the Harambee schools served as a safety

valve to accommodate the growing demand for education.
burden on the government was also removed.

The financial

For the majority of Ken-

yans whose aspirations were raised, the Harambee schools provided an
impression of expanded opportunities resulting from political independence.

But in actuality, Harambee school graduates have received very

little notice.

On the other hand, children from upper class backgrounds

who study in high-cost schools, perform very well in examinations and
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are allowed to occupy high power positions in the modern sector of
the economy.

In short, the different school systems in Kenya have

different resultant social impacts.
THE EDUCATION-EMPLOYMENT DILEMMA:

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The unemployment among school leavers in Kenya has been viewed
as entirely an educational problem, and all efforts to solve it have
been directed toward improving the different components of the school
system, such as examinations and curriculum.

There are two reasons

for the focusing of attention on the school system.

First, the govern-

ment rationalized the problem to be a matter of graduates lacking
marketable skills to enter the work force (PI3, 4, 5).

This led to a

concerted effort to establish village polytechnics and secondary
technical schools.

These educational reforms solved an immediate

political problem by offering a new outlet for the economic aspirations
in the society.

But their impact on the employment prospects is

severely limited by the restricted market for technical and vocational
skills in Kenya.
The second reason the government has continued to tinker with
the educational system stems from the fact that education is the only
area where the government has any direct control over policy matters.
The distribution of educational resources and opportunties, the content
of educational curricula and the examination, are determined by established national governmental agencies, with some private participation
(PI 4 ).

The economic sphere, on the other hand, is beyond the con-

trol of the Kenyan government.

The separation of economic decisionmaking
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from the political arena allows external economic actors to dominate
economic policy.

So long as the benefits generated by the multinational

sector are shared with a few elite Africans, national control of economic
decisions is not vigorously sought.

The result has been that the ef-

forts to reform the educational system in the absence of economic
reform simply did not lead to a resolution of the unemployment problem.
The move to employ more school leavers through tripartite agreements
between the government, employers, and trade unions also turned out to
be a temporary and limited solution.
The challenge of education for rural development cannot be solved
by good intentions.

While a reassessment of the value of formal educa-

tion for an essentially agrarian society such as Kenya is badly needed,
advocates in favor of vocational training have missed the point.
Hanson explains the shortcomings of current rural educational strategies:
No matter how imaginative a plan for rural education may
by, it cannot by itself achieve its goals if there is no
comprehensive strategy for rural development. Such a rural
development strategy must be accorded more than verbal
alleigance; it must be allocated the resources necessary to
carry it out, be dedicated to ensuring that rural incomes
approach those in urban areas, and be implemented not to
realize social class interests but rather to improve the
quality of life of the entire rural populace. Only such a
comprehensive strategy and the policies and programs
undertaken to implement it will provide the conditions under which young people will be able to visualize and then
achieve the good life on the land or in the village.
(GR60: 80)

The results of this study suggest that changes in the educational
structure alone are insufficient to bring about employment in the labor
market.

Although education does effect major changes in society in the

long run, schools are in the short run largely dependent variables of
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the society that surrounds them.

Any attempt to formalize and rit-

ualize vocational education without a significant change in the economic
structure of Kenya will have little impact on employment.

It would be

foolish to expect of schools that which they cannot alone provide.
Therefore, the unemployment problem is rooted in the structure of the
Kenyan society. and particularly in the failure of the Kenyan economy
to industrialize and modernize at a rate that absorbs the entire labor
force, including the school leavers.

The unemployment existing among

school leavers in Kenya is, then, a reflection of the contradictions
and limitations existing in the economic sector of the country.

If

this essentially economic problem is to be resolved, it appears that
the solution must come about through structural adjustments of the
entire political economy of Kenya, both internally and externally.
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APPENDIX A
ALLOCATION OF INFRASTRUCTURAL INVESTMENTS AMONG
MAJOR TOWNS (PERCENTAGES)

Towns;

Wage
Empl
1975

Average
Earnings
of Wage Emp
(1975) t

Number of
Industry
Plants
(1974 )

Planned distr
of public
investment
1974-78 plan

Nairobi

58.5

647/-

747

51 .15

Mombasa

19.0

504/-

191

31.27

Nakuru

3.6

503

43

4.52

Kisumu

3.8

381

52

6.35

Eldoret

2.1

379

23

1.55

Thika

2.9

332

17

1.35

Nyeri

1.4

382

8

1.09

Meru

0.9

388

7

0.52

Kita1e

1.1

344

14

0.94

Embu

0.5

406

5

0.67

Kakamega

0.6

377

3

0.59

Other Towns

5.6

Source:

(GR133) Compiled from Central Bureau
of Statistics

APPENDIX

B

ICDC SUBSIDIARIES AND ASSOCIATED COMPANIES
June 30, 1979
Wholly Owned
Subsidiaries

ICDC shareholding

Products/Activities

Kenya Nat'l Trading
Corp (KNTC)

100%

Kenyanization of Distribution of
Trade and Export House

Keyna Film Corp, Ltd

100%

Importation and distribution of
cinema filem, owns & runs cinema

Kenya Nat'l Properties

100%

Develop commercial properties

Africa Diatomite Ltd

100%

Production of calcined and uncalcined diatomite

Kenya Fishing Indus

100%

Inshore and deep sea fishing,
cold storage

Uchumi House

100%

Large grocery stores

Other Subsidiaries:
Kentaco Transport Co,
Ltd

97%

Long distance hauling and taxi svc

Kenya Wine Agencies,
Ltd

75%

Importation/distribution of wine

Ceramic Industries,
Ltd

51%

Production of crockery, chemical
resistant floor tiles

General Motors Kenya,
Ltd

51%

Assembly of medium size trucks

Minet-ICDC, Ltd

51%

Insurance broking

East Africa Fine
Spinners

71%

Manufacturing of sewing thread
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Associated Companies:
Kenya Cashewnuts, Ltd

33%

Cashewnuts processing

Associated Battery Manuf 20%

Automobile batteries

Africa Radio Manuf,
Ltd

34%

Assembly of radio, tv, tape recorders

Kenya Engineering
Industry

50%

Produce clocks, shovels, etc

ESA Book-shop, Ltd

49%

Distribution of books and lab
equipment

Kenya Fishnet, Ltd

43%

Manufacture of fishnets

Brollo Kenya, Ltd

40%

Steel sheet rolling and cutting;
fabrication of pipes, angles

NAS Airport Service,
Ltd

27%

Catering of airlines

East Africa Clothing
Factory

38%

Manufacture of industrial uniforms

Union Carbide, Ltd

35%

Manufacture of dry cell batteries

Rift Valley Textile,
Ltd

39~b

Manufacture of textiles and
fabrics

Kenya Industrial
Plastics

33%

Manufacture of melamine wares,
dinner sets, toilet seats

East African Industries, Ltd

34%

Produces soap, detergent, fats

Kulia
Ltd

I~vestment,

Pan Africa Paper Mills
ICDC Investment Co

Nakulines, Ltd

4%

Operates tourist hotels in Kenya
Seychelles

6%

Produces over 45,000 tons of pulp
and paper per year

19%

An investment company assisting
small investors to share directly
in the profits of well established
companies in Kenya

6%

Clearing and forwarding agent
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Raymond Woolen Mills,
Ltd

14%

Woolen/worsted yarns, suiting
fabrics

Metal Box (K), Ltd

17%

Printed metal containers, plastic pipes, domestic appliances

Firestone (EA), Ltd

20%

Produce tires and tubes

Nakuru Chrone Tanning, Ltd

20%

Tanning of goat skins

Sokoro Fiber Boards,
Ltd

26%

Produce and export soft boards
and wa 11 boa rds

Elson Plastics, Ltd

28%

Produce rigid PCV pipes, plastic bottles and containers

Mount Kenya Bottlers,
Ltd

42%

Bottle soft drinks

Rift Valley Bottlers,
Ltd

43%

Bottle soft drinks

Polysynthetics EA,
Ltd

30%

Produce synthetic resin for
paint, paper, and textile
industries

Seracoating, Ltd

40%

Adhesive and wide range PCV
coated fabrics and unsupported
films

Pan-African Vegetables, Ltd

39~~

Vegetable dehydration for export

Wananchi Sawmills,
Ltd

45%

Sawmilling and export timber

Infusions Kenya,
Ltd

22%

Medical infusions

Dawa Pharmaceutical,
Ltd

33%

Pharmaceuticals

Kenya Textile Mills,
Ltd

55%

Manufacture of textiles

Yuken Textiles, Ltd

33%

High quality shirts, children's
wear

African Synthetic
Fibers

49%

Polyester texturized filament
yarns
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Salt Manufacturers,
Ltd

25%

Produce common salt

Tiger Shoe Company,
Ltd

33%

Manufacture of footwear

CPC Industrial Prod

42%

Ma i ze mi 11 i ng and animal
feeds

Milling Corp (K),
Ltd

50%

Produce maize starch/glucose
syrup

Development Finance
Company

38%

Development financing (93
companies)

Industrial Development Bank

21%

Development financing

New Additions:
Kenya Peanuts Co,
Ltd

75%

Aero-chemical and
Food Company

28%

Chloride Exide (K),
Ltd

18%

Tanneries of Kenya,
Ltd

47%

Interfood Kenya, Ltd

20%

Fluorspar Co (K),
Ltd

53%

APPENDIX C
EDUCATIONAL AND ECONOMIC POLICY INTERVIEW
Date _________
Code Number

------

Name _________
Position- - - - - - SECTION I
1.

In what ways is education being put to use in Kenya?

In other

words, in what ways does education contribute to the development
of Kenya?
2.

How do you evaluate Kenya's primary and secondary educational
system?

If you believe some changes need to be made, what are

tho:,e changes?
3.

Unemployment in Kenya is a major concern of government policy.
Would you identify some of the underlying causes of urban
unemployment?

4.

The growing numbers of the unemployed are school leavers.

Would

you identify some of the underlying causes of unemployment among
the school leavers?
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5.

Are rising levels of educated unemployment a temporary or chronic
phenomenon? Would you consider that provision of technical education will increase employment opportunities for school leavers?

6.

What suggestions would you make for improving the links between
education and the labor market? Are there any questions I should
be asking you that are relevant to this issue?

SECTION II
7.

What has been the influence of external economic assistance to
Kenya's developmental efforts? Conversely, in what ways have
Kenya's policies influenced the inflow of aid and investment
into the country?

8.

What sort of working relations do you have with the government
of Kenya?

If there were a particular issue you wished to influ-

ence government policy on, what channels would you use to approach
them? Would you have any informal contacts in government that you
could use to make your influence felt?
9.

How much of the initial investment capital was raised by your firm
(or parent company) and how much was raised through loan or credit
from local Kenyan sources?

10.

What percentage of your machines and equipment is imported directly
and from which countries?

11.

What oroducer materials/items (raw materials) do yoU import and
which countries are the main suppliers?
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12.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of going into a joint
venture activity with the government of Kenya.

What assistance

do you receive from such government parastatals as the DFCK and
ICDC?
13.

If you have a parastatal partner, in what ways does the parastatal help your business operations in Kenya?

Be specific.

